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[NOTICE: The Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee will no longer be published as a separate JPRS-UKO report. Future selections will appear in the JPRS-UPA Soviet Political Affairs series.]

[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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KOMMUNIST

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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

28TH CPSU CONGRESS

Test by Freedom

915B0001A Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 12, Aug 90 (signed to press 1 Aug 90) pp 3-11

[Article by Igor Dedkov]

[Text] One would think that no one who lives on this Russian land remembers so much freedom here.

After the merciless lessons of "realized necessity," in the course of which the mass realization that new prohibitions and difficulties were bound to follow soon, we are being taught a lesson in marvelous freedom.

This also means a test by this freedom.

It is a test of our culture, civilization, spirit and human quality.

We were tested by wars, poverty, hunger, state violence, incalculable losses, ideological diktat and intolerance and the inflated grandeur of benevolent officials of the Stalinist school....

Now we are experiencing something which is incomparably easier but is fraught—given our placidity and scatterbrainedness—with anything one wishes.

It is true that freedom cannot clothe or feed one or add to the wages of a nurse or a teacher.

However, unlike all that which is of a material nature and of which, as in the past, there is little or simply nothing, there is freedom and the question was and is as follows: Do we wish to abandon it?

In winding up the discussions on the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 28th Party Congress, M.S. Gorbachev recalled that "the initial function" of a revolution "is always that of giving freedom to the people," and that perestroika has already implemented "this primary task." He also said at that time that "if there had been no freedom there would not have been this congress or the atmosphere in which it took place."

The atmosphere of the congress is remembered by whoever was interested in it. Today it is of interest to many others, both at home and throughout the world. Let us ask ourselves, what will be the case tomorrow? Several years hence? What words will be used at that time to recall this atmosphere which combined political science fiction (compared to the Stalin-Brezhnev "fora" of unity of thought and unity of feelings) with the most ordinary,

dampening and cowed reality and people who tried to make use of this fiction to ensure its complete and malicious destruction? Or else will those who are now shouting at meetings turn out to be right: this is the final congress and the party will vanish, will turn into a despised sect of extreme fanatics supporting a great utopian idea? Or else a dirty phalanx of experienced defenders of a vanishing absolute state power and, therefore, of the customary, reassuring and infinitely convenient (to them, the zealots!) "developed" socialist order?

Whether the congress wished it or not, with all those speeches, applause, din and noise in the hall, facial expressions on the television screen, i.e., in its entire human aspect, the congress answered these and similar questions. They existed as though on the surface of the agenda but also within it; they could be ignored but many people who, to this day, regardless of everything, are concerned with the fate of the party, it is precisely they who, above all, sought and found answers.

It was of interest to determine whether the congress and its intellectual and moral qualities were consistent with the current condition of the country in the party and the condition of the society which had obtained its freedom.

There was concern for the extent of the consistency between courage and the honesty of the party's report, including its historical self-accountability, as well as its ability to decisively realize its changed role in the life of the people and the state.

Worry was expressed about whether those meeting at the congress would feel that it was a question of the very existence and fate of a party to which more than 18 million people had linked their lives. Would they remember that a truly democratic party is based not on power, hierarchy or paramilitary discipline but on ideas, their rightness and their rallying power? Would they understand that the loss of spiritual and moral initiative is lethal to the party? Or that this initiative is the prime feature of its viability and its real involvement in historical action?

The congress ended and the answers were given. This time they were neither exhaustive nor unanimous. They were clear, however, in the main aspect: the resolutions passed at the congress confirm the party's loyalty to the political and economic course of perestroika and the need for the internal democratic renovation of the party itself.

This was one of the few congresses which did not pretend to substitute itself for the expression of the will of the people and their mind, honor and conscience. Having rejected, by majority vote, such claims which had become part of the flesh and blood of party committees on all levels, the congress preserved for the party an unquestionable historical opportunity: once again to become the moral authority and the living part of the people, aspiring to be with the people and never above

the people, acting as their guardian, and instructor, acting as their benefactor, enhancing its own status and getting carried away.

Precisely so: an opportunity to cleanse the entire organization with its sluggish structures, hierarchical grades, strict subordination, militiamen standing at doors, caste customs and rituals, the opportunity to make a revival, and to stop, finally, to cautiously select among all the cards of greasy decks the tried nomenclatural "revolutionaries" and, looking around it, see new faces of the new people—those who had been shunned aside, ignored and rejected. To recognize them before it is too late, before they have left, having lost their faith, disappointed forever, rallying under other flags or, in general, giving up politics.

So what, it is said in such cases, let them go, let everyone go, no one is irreplaceable, we are not sorry to see renegade opportunists go, we should have expelled them earlier, we should have watched over the purity of our ranks....

Yearning for the past purity and monolithic spirit, some speakers at the congress asked with particular zeal of the party leadership to account for the "breakdown" and "chaos" in ideology. Freedom allows them to ask and so, the brave, asked unceremoniously. It is as though those who asked and demanded an answer failed to realize that the very possibility of asking and demanding was the result of this "breakdown" they hated so much, i.e., this return to the basic standards of social life. Congress delegate writer D. Kugultinov dared to direct those forgetful accusers of perestroika to the time of, one would assume, impeccable ideological order, ideological harmony and blossoming. He said: "You and we were cowards. We sat down silently and then, at all party congresses, stood up and gave our rating as positive, and loudly applauded...."

They did not like to be reminded of this. This brought to mind images of which one should be ashamed. Where this occurred did not matter, whether in the Kremlin Palace or the assembly hall of a rural party raykom. There was identical servility, false words, and identical obedient respect for rank.... It was precisely this that was a breakdown, a breakdown of morality, honor and the idea of socialism. Kugultinov's speech turned the delegates back to the real reference points: to the biographies of people and the biography of the party. They were not allowed to forget to what and to whom obedience was paid for such a long time, the type of political theater in which the people performed and that which they left behind in 1985.... No more than five years have passed and the widespread forgetfulness all of a sudden became apparent, a kind of striking ethical lack of sensitivity!

It is true that freedom frees everyone, and that those who remained silent for a long time now speak, their voices choked with emotion. However, in the cruel administrator of other people's lives, the fanatic of a totalitarian state, freedom will not release any humanity; ignorance

will not release knowledge, and boorishness will not release nobility. This is because what is in the boor is boorishness, what is in the ignorant is ignorance and what is in the fanatic is frenzy....

Obviously, we must become accustomed to the fact that that which to some is a "breakdown" and the "destruction of foundations" is, to others, "spiritual revival" and the victory of reason. Revival is a responsible word but it nonetheless describes best not only this unusually head-long expansion and saturation of the spiritual range of life but also the appearing forces and possibilities. The universally mandatory conceptual food recommended by ideological dietitians has been absorbed once and for all. For the first time there is in front of everyone a totally unrestrained high spiritual horizon. Everything which has happened with the country, its entire great tragic experience and its social and moral results are being considered with previously unparalleled freedom. The liberation of the mental forces of the people and their spiritual energy has begun. This is the most important and most profound event which took place between the congresses, during the so-called "accountability period."

Naturally, if one strongly wishes it, this event may remain unnoticed. Some critics of the party, whether on the street or the high congresses, agree on this point.

Never mind. If they do not notice it, history will.

Never mind. Those who believe that they are lucky to be alive today will not forget and will recall everything a thousand times over.

Actually, in the light of the present economic difficulties a question which seems unanswerable may be asked: what good has come from your praised spiritual freedom, what did it change, how did it benefit you?

Actually, we live as poorly as we did in the past. Store shelves remain just as empty. The Russian countryside remains depopulated. Western store windows continue to lure and entice us. In the depths of the country the local princelings, who played a leading role, continue to rule today, playing the role of vanguard. Many are those who say that what was will be, laughing at self-taught democracy and clumsy freedom and all those revolutions of the mind, the economy and politics, occurring all together. Is this not the case?

Let it be so, but let us look more closely: no, this is not true, nothing is going on the way it did, as ordained and regulated to the point of automatic behavior, to the point of orders to be executed and subordination, and everything going from the top downward, demanding and goading.... No one already reaches his objective arrogantly, commanding, although, as before, he raises his voice, clenches his willful jaws and, as in the past, looks penetratingly, identifying the latest "troublemakers" and "renegades." No one, which is particularly important,

will any longer be led through agitation and propaganda, deafened or frightened by the sacred scholastic gibberish....

Naturally, words such as "nothing" and "no one" are stylistic exaggerations. We would like to think, however, that they accurately describe the trend of social and spiritual development and its firmness and persistence. Naturally, together with "inflexibility" we should put the word "irreversibility." Anyone who took his training in the 1960s, however, would be somewhat afraid to repeat it. The statements which were made at that time about "irreversibility" proved to be self-deluding or else a lulling lie. This too is difficult to forget.

These are different times now, precisely the type of those which should have followed the "thaw" and penetrated deeper within the permafrost but which did not.... Today it is not the gilding that is different. It is a different life: it is bristling, searching, mastering, acting. There is a difference between freedoms which have been bestowed (granted today withdrawn tomorrow) and freedoms which are sunk firmly in the foundations of the reconstructed state. There is a difference between the good will of the latest first party secretary and the stipulations of the law, which is neither good nor cruel but just and always functional, protecting society from the arbitrary behavior of individuals, organizations and parties, and from their good or bad mood, guaranteeing to the people their supreme and inalienable rights.

There is no point in proclaiming irreversibility. Anyone interested in it must work for it, there is no other way, and the end of this work will not be in sight in the foreseeable future. The 28th Party Congress did its share of this work by deflecting from itself suspicions of a tendency to seeking political revenge, galvanizing dead ideas and halting perestroika; it adopted new conditions for party activities, which make it equal in terms of rights to all other constitutionally accepted social forces and parties. The congress asserted that which may seem basic yet which constantly needs assertion: nation, justice, freedom, truth and right stand above party interests, ambitions, aspirations and theories. A vanguard role is possible only if the party truly emerges on the level of these superior values and engages in their most consistent, efficient and selfless defense.

Increasingly, today the party is being separated from such values. It is claimed that the party did not have and does not have any connection with them and that it symbolizes rather the opposite. Going a little bit further, it is being equated with the fierce supporters of Stalinism, the amateurs of issuing commands, those who like to put bridles and punish others, those who favor a party-governed state with its administrative-distribution skills of the Brezhnev type, those who invented perestroika and those who hurry it, those who struggle for democracy and those who hate democracy.... All of those, with no subtlety whatsoever, shout and keep shrieking: "Down!" However, we see all the indications that such newly-hatched harsh justice does not demand

full equality in responsibility. More than others, and before others, it accuses the initiators and makers of perestroika, not the party of the period of stagnation or the times of GULAG but the party of change which took the path of truth. One of the paradoxes of contemporary freedom is that at the point where the defender of the Stalinist empire ends his accusations, they are taken up by various insulted guardians of principles and dogmas, after which, one after the other, they call for overturning February, October, Lenin, Marx, Herten, Chernyshevskiy, the Decembrists and anyone else who dared contribute to the collapse of the best patriotic, autocratic Russian state, the best in the world.... The division may come later. What matters now is to win and pour more oil into the fire. The misfortunes and calamities of the people, quotations 50 or 150 years old, are all suitable; nor are the entire 73 years of the life of several generations to be regretted... as long as the fires keep burning.

In recent years charges that the people are "running wild" and becoming "corrupted" and of loss of "spirituality" have become quite popular. The so called "catastrophic awareness" has become a widespread means, zealously promoted within society. The purpose of such accusations is that these are precisely the results of perestroika. There is great willingness to demand accountability and draw up an indictment.

Alas, the historical field bears fruit according to its own laws and all that is growing in it was sowed not yesterday and not 5 years ago.

If anything grows on it with enviable constancy, it is the perennial many-faceted plant of freedom.

Let us be fair. Without perestroika the country would have continued to drown in the tall weeds, losing price-less time.

Why not remind us of what we left behind? What kind of ideological paradise and what spiritual well-being of the people were they?

Perestroika began at a time when any open dissidence in the country had been suppressed and kept on being suppressed; people who had dared to read and keep books which are now freely published were exiled or imprisoned; together with the party's ideological services, the censors vigilantly kept newspapers, journals, publishing houses, theaters, motion pictures and the graphic arts under observation; social thinking depended on those same ideological agencies and circumstantial concepts; the people's participation in elections was formal and there was no free manifestation of the will; there was no support for economic and political initiative among the people and the party; churches, believers and religious thinking were rightless and persecuted; the creative associations, with their "ranking" and vertical structures had become bureaucratic departments; artistic and conceptual searches in the arts were considered suspect; the infinite centralization of life led to suppressing any kind of local, ethnic and national cultural independence; the history of the country and the

party continued to be distorted or concealed; remembering the millions of Soviet people who had perished or suffered during the years of collectivization and repression was considered only half legal; hundreds of thousands or, perhaps, even millions of people remained slandered and unrehabilitated; Stalin and his accomplices had remained essentially under the protection of the party and the state, like some kind of valuable historical monuments; the truth about life—both present and past—made its way in the mass information media with difficulty; zinc-lined coffins continued to arrive from Afghanistan under a veil of secrecy....

The list of this sad and shameful chronicle could be extended. It could be extended by anyone who could refer to his own or familiar experience. Anyone, if he were honest, would have to acknowledge that this chronicle of daily lack of freedom and baseness was stopped and deleted. Thousands and thousands of people throughout the country could tell one another falteringly: "We survived." Nothing, no irritated-threatening verbal thunder can drown these quiet words today.

It was as though the country literally regained consciousness, realizing that socialism without freedom is worth nothing and that without freedom it simply does not exist, but with freedom, once again beginning with freedom, it is possible and, in any case, it makes sense to make what is perhaps a final effort.

When in one of the congress' speeches the suggestion was made to replace the words of the "Internationale," something remained unclear: strictly speaking, how had this old party anthem harmed the party members? Had they outgrown the lyrics or did the lyrics give them the wrong enthusiasm? We have not heard that the revolutionary "Marseillaise" had prevented the evolutionary development of the French Republic while another no less revolutionary song from Edith Piaf's repertory "Yes! So Will It Be!" ("Hang the Aristocrats!") had rallied the aggressors, we have always had, in our country, our own mores and customs. There have been ever new appeals to respect the past and defend the culture, peacefully coexisting with new and equally fierce cases of disrespect. Could we consider the old revolutionary songs, manifestoes, speeches, proclamations, Eugene Pottier or that same Marx and that same Lenin guilty of our misfortunes, stupidities and long years of patient obedience more than we could be blamed for them?

Perhaps a few words of the "Internationale" may indeed seem embarrassing to sing. Are they to be blamed for the fact that "a liberation with our own hands" we achieved only once—in that same 1917—while as far as the rest was concerned we in vain relied on God, the tsar and the individual hero? About this "entire world of violence" which we promised to destroy, we dutifully sang during Stalinist and post-Stalinist times as something distant and secondary which had no relation to us?

A spiritual rebirth inevitably begins with criticism. Contemporary society has become so successful in its criticism that we have produced more critics than anything else. In the past, criticism and disagreement were inherent in people who were independent and firm, who openly swam against the current. Today we have developed a particular variety of criticism, which requires neither knowledge nor profound convictions or personal courage. Frequently, in the very nature of the criticism and the selection of its targets, reasons and intonations we find something petty-malicious, petty-vengeful, the result of a long habit of leading an unprincipled-cynical life and overlooked moral atrophy. What obtains in some cases is what Herzen wrote in "*The Past and Thoughts*" about one of his characters: "From constant criticism of anything commonly acceptable... he lost all moral concepts and did not acquire even a thread of behavior."

At its last congress, for the first time the party felt what freedom of criticizing means, not somewhere at noisy meetings of people's deputies but in its own lofty circle and within the framework of a tested iron discipline and subordination. "The threads of behavior" were clear but we saw in their image something which made us bitterly recall the moral concept and spiritual fine points which do not depend on education but exclusively on natural tactfulness, upbringing and understanding the simple fact that in itself a social status does not grant anyone advantages or brings anyone closer to the truth....

Increasingly, contemporary man must be aware of criticism which can both excite and stupefy. With increasing persistency a variety of myths—social, historical, economic, etc.—are trying to push out any rational scientific knowledge in order to dominate the mass awareness and, in turn, to manipulate it.

In the final account, everyone selects his own spiritual bread. However, the extensive dissemination of various myths makes it necessary to think and be concerned not about someone's personal biases and tastes (free will) but about confusions and the evolution of the social awareness and social psychology, not to say mentality, and our common spiritual-moral prospects.

Many of us have realized from personal experience that the short or expanded, the published and republished course in political-historical mythology and, at the same time, the psychological training in the spirit of which generations were raised, brought incalculable harm, having replaced the real logic of life with a paranoid and dehumanized logic.

Let us ask ourselves, have some new myths which envelop trusting and trusted minds brought us closer to the eternal complexity and wisdom of life and to moral health and objectivity?

Thus, the myth of the happy and brilliant and impeccable decades of Soviet system and of its constant universal-historical victories was replaced by the myth of some kind of black failure, a gap, a tear which absorbed

without a meaning and without glory the destinies of millions of people and Russian history itself. The myth of the fabulous joint prospering of the Soviet socialist nations and of the first and eldest among them—the Russian nation—was replaced by the myth of the spiritual and all sorts of other degradations of the Russian people and the malicious destructive actions against the Russian people, initiated by adventurists-foreigners as early as 1917, if not earlier.... Instead of the deified Lenin, who was the most human of humans, we are now offered Lenin as the tyrant, the human monster responsible, furthermore, for everything which happened after him, and even for the false love of him by his fictitious "loyal pupil."

The law of political mythology is simple: the idealizing of individuals and events is replaced by their exposure, followed by a new idealizing with some amendments. However we may explain what is happening, the feeling is that the very fact that we live in the 1990s and are part of their history has not only freed us from the old dogmas and myths but also rewarded us with a great feeling of superiority and a substantial share of mental and moral looseness. It is not for nothing that the distant life of our predecessors is being increasingly assessed on the basis of some kind of new universally forgiving schematism and arbitrariness which could actually be applied to our contemporary reality as well.

The party, therefore, should be advised to forget and betray its entire past and all of its national and European spiritual sources in order to agree to add to or to correct its ideology with these new shameful myths.

The resolution "On CPSU Mass Information Media," which was passed at the congress, justifiably cautions against turning the party publications "into an instrument of forces which oppose the CPSU from the right and the left." Nonetheless, it stipulates that the party needs a press which can reflect "the different trends within the CPSU, including minority views."

All of this may seem clear and simple. Nonetheless, it is sometimes difficult to understand where a "trend" within the party ends and where a "trend" outside the party begins.

To many people within the party this has always been a problem and even a moral test. Was it not necessary to establish on the basis of daily life who one supports and why and to what extent? At that point, it turned out that what was most frequently demanded of a party member was great tolerance. One had to tolerate the fact that a good person would be torn apart in an important party publication, that the party leaders gave themselves constantly and shamelessly awards, that some ideological official would teach people how to live although he had been their student.... The more striking became the contrast between reality and the ideals in which the person continued to believe, the more hopeless this tolerance became. However, that is what happened and,

above all, that is what happened in the past. The intra-party or, more accurately, the nonparty "trend" which any honest person found difficult to accept has already lost its former sway. If today as well someone has to tolerate something, such as the propaganda of Stalinist socialism or an interpretation of the revolution as an anti-Russian-Kike-Masonic conspiracy, this may look like an excessive exploitation of the greatly tolerant party loyalty.

Could it be that in order to enter the party's premises it suffices to give the password "socialism," while as to what you mean by this or presume by this becomes your strictly personal matter? Is it socialism according to Stalin and Vyshinskiy, or socialism according to Brezhnev and Suslov? Is it socialism according to Purishkevich and Dubrovin?

Therefore, there are different "trends," and we must consider which of them, inside or outside, come closer to the fairway of perestroika and the "new thinking."

What does a trend mean? Amateurs and enthusiasts favoring all kinds of exposures—extreme, shrill, booming, encompassing the entire Soviet past and the entire perestroika present—rarely omit saying something about "spirituality." After the word "multidimensional" which, all of a sudden, has replaced the good old word "complex," "spirituality" perhaps is second in our militant vocabulary of today. However, the frequency of its use changes neither the world nor makes the word or its meaning any clearer. Usually, what is meant by it is a rather durable journalistic enumeration: love of monuments of ancient times, traditions and legends, or love of the temple of Christ the Savior, i.e., a kind of almost symbolic combination. It is as though nothing else is meant by this word which does not belong to any program. This applies even to its true and primarily nonreligious meaning. It is as though we need this word in the course of the struggle, opposition and contraposition instead of using it for its own sake, for the sake of its serious and quiet meaning.

In what struggle? Naturally, in the struggle against "lack of spirituality" which dooms all of us and which threatens the very existence of the nation.

Strange: the more daringly the country leaves behind any spiritual lack of freedom, "iron curtains" or the "Berlin wall," and the suppression of the church, the more people are being threatened with "lack of spirituality."

In order out of all freedoms to leave only one freedom, the freedom for oneself and, accordingly, to restore "order" in society and culture it is necessary to threaten the country, the people and the authorities with having too much freedom. One must horrify and shake up the imagination with the help of "lack of spirituality," "degradation," "breakdown," and "loss of patriotic aspirations," or anything else, as long as it can be stopped.

It cannot be.

"Free development" and "creative freedom" "on the basis of the entire wealth of global and domestic values," did the 28th Congress have to promise something more or assert it, in terms of literature, art and culture? Does this also need the human spirit? In general, is it worth speaking a great deal of what should be self-evident in a humane and democratic country? Something which is implied, such as breathing and freedom of motion?

Be that as it may, the memory of the past is too fresh and the perennial plant we mentioned is spreading well.

That is why words about freedom of development and creative freedom must be mandatorily given a broader meaning, including their historical and current subtext, interpreted as the rejection on the part of the party of claims to any whatsoever supervision of the artist, ideological supervision and censorship or imposing on the artist any whatsoever "rules" and "methods" of creativity. By this token the party realizes that with their incompetent and sometimes aggressive interference, its authorities and the state institutions it controlled caused irreparable harm to Soviet culture, science and art. The communists of today cannot be blamed for the deeds of Stalin, Zhdanov, their yes-men and their assistants, their pupils and their followers, both in the capital and the provinces. Why not refuse to acknowledge that part of the guilt and responsibility of those people has been passed on to us as well. Therefore, the true renovation of the party is possible only providing that there is a definitive break with the former primitive and cowardly policy in the field of culture and providing that a repetition of the past will not be allowed to occur.

This break took place and was ratified by the congress. Let us not delude ourselves, it was not easy and took a number of years, and even at the congress there were moments when all of a sudden nostalgia for the past firm management of all of God's world and all of God's creatures, now being lost, cut through.

There is nothing we can do: we have had to give back to God what is God's and creativity back to the creators.

The break occurred and, in particular, the process of this break was codified in the pages of our journal in articles on the vocation of socialist culture (1987), the more accurate understanding of the Leninist principle of party-mindedness in literature and the disavowing of a number of ideological resolutions of the party's Central Committee (1989).

These articles are part of publications in our press which, together, slowly and steadily worked for liberation.

Now the time may have come to liberate culture from its poverty. To liberate from poverty our schools and libraries, particularly the rural ones, and our museums, clubs and theaters.

We must also become free from the ubiquitous yet ineffective centralization of culture; once and for all we must begin to rely on the rich inner forces of the

provinces, on their concealed, underdeveloped or suppressed possibilities. The dissemination of culture and its comprehensive worthy development are the only way of surmounting the inequality of opportunities and of leaving behind and forgetting centralism which simultaneously gave to and took from provincial Russia.

It is perhaps one type of liberation that remains and will always remain impossible: liberating the artist from moral responsibility to society and to the supreme moral court, assuming that we nonetheless accept this court to be highest of all. The idea of the USSR Law "In Defense of Morality," which was voiced at the party congress, is directly related to the current test by freedom. It is related to the fact that not everyone supports it and the fact that increasingly total permissiveness is becoming increasingly free-and-easy while past shamelessness is increasingly presenting itself as creative daring. The defense of morality occurs above all when we protect the souls of children and adolescents. The party will be exonerated from defending a lack of freedom of anyone who has no conscience and responsibility.

What will not be forgiven to all of us, who live today, is fear of the road which lies open, a fear of what is truly nonspiritual.

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PERESTROYKA'S IDEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL

Ownership and Socialism

915B0001B Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 12, Aug 90 (signed to press 1 Aug 90) pp 12-18

[Article by Oleg Pchelintsev, department head, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics and Forecasting Scientific and Technical Progress]

[Text] How to pull the economy out of the crisis and ensure a stable growth of efficiency? "This requires private ownership," many economists and journalists claim. As to the question of how it can be achieved in a country in which all means of production are in the hands of the state, the simple answer they give is that everything should be either given away or sold. However, a variety of means can be used to give away and, whatever the means, there will be millions of discontented people. These millions of people, seeing how easily the offenders acquired their property, will try to do everything possible to secure their own interests. Would the result not be a permanent civil war?

Any other whatsoever significant distribution of state property would undermine the very foundations of ownership—its legal protection. Under such circumstances we cannot hope for any salvation from the present dependence. Furthermore, such a dependence will

become "enriched" with the addition of the impartial features of the coupon clipper.

How to ensure, perhaps through purely technical means, social justice with such a division of property? There are enterprises such as the Bratsk Hydroelectric Power Plant, where the capital-labor ratio per worker is in excess of 1 million rubles. Alongside such enterprises, there also are, let us say, state barber shops, the entire equipment of which consists of one pair of scissors. The same situation prevails with land plots, which may be substantially different from each other in terms of fertility and location.

As to property redemption, obviously, this is an idea affected by the euphoria triggered by the present inflation. In reality, naturally, there cannot even be a question of any mass redemption, at least in the immediate future. To begin with, under inflationary conditions, the capital assets themselves must be reassessed. In Poland, for example, recently their value was raised several hundred percent. Second, in a conversion to the market, funds will hardly suffice even for the most pressing needs of the overwhelming majority of the population and the enterprises. Third, even if such available funds appear, under the conditions of a competition they will have to be channeled into scientific and technical progress and not into buying out old assets.

Naturally, a variety of reciprocally complementing forms of ownership are necessary. Each one of them (state, cooperative and even private) will, in time, assume its own "ecological niche." However, the path to such a condition is by no means straight. At this point we cannot disregard the administrative stipulation of "increasing the share of private (cooperative, share holding, joint) ownership to 30 (40, 50?) percent!"

Nor should we rely on the automatic effect of the market. Under the conditions of an initial prevalence of property owned by the state and by giant enterprises, this would be a rather "bad," monopoly market. It is no accident that in Poland the "shock therapy" led to a worsening of the situation of, above all, private enterprises and, particularly, peasant farms.

Today a great deal is being said and written about stock companies. This form is, unquestionably, good as an instrument for the organization of the capital market. Its use will enable us, in particular, to avoid chaos in the process of dividing the present state ownership into Union, republic and communal. So far, unfortunately, expropriation trends predominate. For example, it is suggested that the entire property on the territory of a given republic be considered its own property, regardless of its origin and purpose. What is legal about that? We shall be unable to advance a single step toward a law-governed state if instead of strengthening ownership rights we destroy them.

Furthermore, if we use stock enterprises as a form of guaranteeing rights of ownership and as an antidote to the new expropriation trend we must take two essential

restrictions into consideration. First, the accelerated buying out of enterprises is unacceptable. Today, in a situation of financial crisis, shares of stock are considered essentially from the fiscal viewpoint as a means of freezing the population's money and removing it from the consumer market. This approach is little different from the notorious forced subscription to the Stalinist state loan bonds.

Second, we must not let the development of stock holding forms to threaten the rule of labor over capital.¹ It is considered that workers may participate in the management of stock enterprises through their own share of capital. They acquire this right not as working people but as "also-owners." In this case hired labor remains, as in the past, dominant, the more so since in practice matters will be reduced rather to issuing packets of shares to ministries, councils of ministers of republics and labor collectives. Such unearned securities, the expectations of the authors of the reform notwithstanding, will become an antistimulus for labor activity. They will breed in a number of people the mentality of coupon clippers and the dividends themselves will be provided most frequently through automatic price increases.

Union and autonomous republic ownership is frequently considered a counterbalance to ministerial diktat. This problem led to the sharpest debates in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Indeed, it is a question of balancing between the Scylla of the current "ministry ownership" and the Charybdis of the mechanical distribution of it among enterprises. Here as well a positive role could be played by republic ownership providing, naturally, that it does not degenerate into a means of expropriation of labor collectives, related to all-Union ownership.

We shall not forget that for the time being we have only one form of state ownership. The sooner we make developing the ownership of citizens and collectives the cornerstone, the sooner the question of republic ownership objectively will take second priority, for this is, essentially, a question of the internal organization of governmental ownership and of shifting it from one pocket to another.

The Law on Ownership in the USSR is considered a variety of and an equal form of ownership which substantially broadens the rights of the owner.

Naturally, variety is an excellent thing. In the next few years, however, the predominance of one form of ownership—state ownership—will be inevitable. What about us: Should we stand idly by waiting for the development of the other forms? Obviously, the main task remains of changing the nature of state ownership itself. We need a practical program for its democratization.

As to expanding the rights of the owner, this should be balanced with responsibility. Furthermore, we must know precisely the nature of the rights which this involves. Today suggestions are frequently made of granting the owner the right to manage the production

process and the distribution of the product; it is being stated that management will always be a function of ownership. This claim conflicts with the trend, which became apparent as early as the 19th century, of separating management from ownership. Essentially, management is part of the labor process, and the historical mission of socialism is the restoration of this tie. Naturally, this should not be done to the detriment of legitimate ownership rights.

The resolution of the ownership problem is related not to a single choice among its various forms or their arbitrary combination, but the development of an essentially different approach, based on the division of ownership rights. Its individual aspects—possession, handling and utilization (ignoring many other, which exist abroad)—could and should be under the control of the various subjects of economic activities.

It is precisely along this way that we find a solution of the problem of "destatification" of ownership under socialism. This applies to leasing. In this case ownership rights are clearly defined: the functions of handling and utilization are passed on to the labor collective. At the same time, the supreme ownership of the state over the land and capital is retained. It is also the state that receives the interest and dividends.

Another component of profit—entrepreneurial income—blends with the wages in the case of leasing. This is fair for, in the final account, enterprise and initiative are features of labor and not capital. In a democratically organized economy, they act as attributes of the entire labor collective. In this case the role of professional managers is not reduced at all and the expediency of differentiating among incomes, based on the real participation in management, is not denied.

Neglecting enterprise and initiative led to the widespread dissemination among all social strata of the ideology and mentality of hired labor. Yet the true objective of socialism is the exact opposite: combining the role of worker and owner and creating, if you wish, a society of general entrepreneurialship.

Some people in our country love to scoff at the familiar thesis that any cook should be able to run the country. However, they try to prove that there could be someone (employee, stockholder?) who could manage her kitchen better than the cook. This occupation is not harmless, for it is precisely the self-management of labor that contains our virtually sole opportunity, if we consider the extent to which, over a period of 70 years, the entrepreneurial function of capital has been destroyed.

Naturally, the full victory of self-management is a thing of the future. Today it is opposed by the entire system of power relations and the moral and intellectual lack of readiness of the workers themselves. However, it is precisely now that we must begin: it is only practical

experience in self-management that will lift these obstacles. To hope that the workers will change while remaining the "cogs" of the authoritarian system is, to say the least, naive.

Let us particularly note two economic advantages of leasing. First, the equal starting conditions, which cannot be achieved by simply distributing property among labor collectives. Second, the solution of the accumulations problem: interest helps to establish a fund of credit resources for economic growth and technical progress. This sharply limits the possibility of "eating up" profits through the senseless disbursement of money without backing, offered as bonuses. Let us note that it is precisely the practice of putting all profits into the hands of the labor collective that largely explains the failure of the self-management system in Yugoslavia. Essentially, the free granting of state capital led to a rationing of credit, opened the way to expensive projects and guaranteed the survival of inefficient enterprises.

Despite the widespread view, leasing enterprises are more profitable than those working with their own capital, for their profit should not drop below a level at which the lessee can fully meet both interest and principal and earn a socially acceptable profit for himself. The owner can survive for a while from income from his property, converting it into a component of his wage. Therefore, full ownership rights are by no means a guarantee of efficient management of an enterprise; conversely, under our circumstances, this is a direct road leading to complacency and continued stagnation.

The desire for full "uncurtailed" ownership is frequently explained by the fact that partial ownership could be taken away at any moment. However, historical experience fully proves that it is precisely unlimited ownership that triggers such a reaction.

A number of objections to leasing come from threatening the people with a leasing system in which the objectives and tasks are stipulated in the contract not by the lessee but the lessor. Leasing is related to the present faulty practice in agriculture in which, working under slavish conditions, individual families lease from kolkhozes and sovkhozes land without the necessary means of production. Finally, official reports as well classify as leasing anything they deem fit.

Naturally, objective features exist which distinguish true leasing from all of its surrogates. This includes, above all, the unconditional right to ownership by the lessee of the produced items and the specific formula according to which lease payments are a percentage of the capital and land rentals. A major lag has been allowed to occur in the development of such categories. In particular, to this day the question of rental based on location remains unresolved.

Furthermore, there is a great lack of clarity in the matter of lease payments. Thus, the "Foundations of Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics on Leasing," passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet, stipulate that lease

payments are based on amortization withholdings. This means that the leasing collective is deprived of the most important right of independently replacing and updating fixed capital and promoting technical progress. Leasing of capital becomes leasing of equipment. In our view, it would be expedient to deposit amortization withholdings into a special account handled by the leasing collective.

Today, in the course of the economic reform suggestions are being made to eliminate payment for assets and introduce a form of relations with the budget identical for all enterprises—a profit (income) tax. Given the absence of payments for resources, this could lead to unpredictable consequences. Enterprises which have obtained from the state extensive resources but which work poorly would find themselves relieved of financial obligations (they will show no profit and no funds with which to pay). Conversely, those which have taken nothing from the state, let us say the cooperatives, which use their own capital, would be taxed at a higher rate. Once again equalization will sneak in under the guise of perestroika of the economic system.

In this case references to Western experience are clearly unconvincing. In the West taxes “function” under the conditions of the full payment for resources and control economic relations between the state and, above all, the nongovernmental economic sector. In our country the main source of contributions to the budget should be income from state property—interest on capital and leasing payments.

Naturally, leasing is not problem-free. It will trigger sharp competition for the best means of production and land plots. It will bring to light the drastic inequality in access to public capital for the different social and territorial groups. Such problems can be resolved economically by regulating leasing payments.

Prices are another most important problem. Somehow it is believed in our country that any step toward cost accounting leads to price increases. On the surface, there would be no reason to expect anything else of leasing. The most important and perhaps the most progressive stipulation of the Law on Leasing is that the product of leased enterprises unconditionally belongs to the lessees. It seems self-evident that they should not sell at a loss. In reality, prices directly depend on the number of lessees. If, unlike the cooperatives today, they would account for most of the economy, the prices of their goods will no longer be governed by the rules of monopoly but by competition.

In leasing relations, the economic function of ownership is reduced to control over the reproduction of resources, maintaining the land (the environment) in a normal condition, and social capital. All other functions involved in practical economic management involve labor. This is consistent with the progressive line of abandoning the direct management of production enterprises by the state. Its task will be to provide general

economic conditions for economic activities: development of the infrastructure, a stable monetary circulation and suppression of monopoly status.

One of the most puzzling features of the current discussions is the effort to pit leasing against socialism and to find within it something capitalist. We can confidently say that if we would recall our history better and be better familiar with the theory of socialism no such feelings would have appeared. Socialism means, above all, the elimination of hired labor. This demand can be met only where it is not the owner of the means of production that hires a worker but, conversely, where the workers themselves—collectively or individually lease capital and land.

It is precisely from this viewpoint that the present state enterprises are not consistently socialist. Based on hired labor, they do not ensure the implementation of co-management functions by their personnel, turning them into passive performers. The income of such enterprises is reduced to wages and does not include any entrepreneurial approach. The latter, under the conditions of the administrative system, is converted into wages paid to hired employees and privileges to the bureaucratic strata.

How to convert from a command economy to economic democracy is a key problem of perestroika. It seems to us that to this effect a significant share of state ownership should be leased to labor collectives on the basis of uniform interest rates, determined by the market for capitals. Privatizing such property is unnecessary and, furthermore, impossible. It must remain national property.

The result of such changes would be an original economy, so far without analogues in the West or the East: a national leasing system. Functioning as part of a mixed economic system, it could eliminate the contradiction between state ownership and free entrepreneurial activities. It would be based on independent self-governing leased enterprises and a bank superstructure which, as the representative of the state, would be responsible for safeguarding and increasing the leased social capital. The most important aspect of their ties would be subordinating the Central Bank directly to the country's parliament, which would ensure that the government will not interfere in enterprise affairs.

The organization of such an economic system would mean, according to Marx, a revival of individual ownership based on the common ownership of the land and of means of production. Because of the seeming lack of clarity of this concept, for how can there be such a thing (individual and public, all of it mixed), our domestic political economy has ignored this exceptionally important idea. Yet it is a question of a truly brilliant prediction: socialism cannot be based on pitting social against private ownership; it must be based precisely on the separation of ownership rights, which ensure the real domination of labor over capital. Nationalization which,

so far, was considered the main feature of socialism, operates only as one of its premises. It indeed destroys the monopoly of private ownership of means of production and, by depriving capital of its former potential for power, opens the possibility of developing the entrepreneurial function of labor. The stratum-class restrictions to access to objects of ownership are eliminated and economic openness in relations between an individual or a group (a labor collective) and the state is ensured.

From the economic-theoretical viewpoint, socialism means a conversion from the monopoly of private ownership to a free market (equal access granted to all citizens and groups) of capital and technology. It is only on this basis that the national economic optimum can be achieved and conditions created for progress, faster than under capitalism.

Naturally, against the background of the present problems, such a claim would appear, to say the least, speculative. Nonetheless, let us not forget perhaps the fact that high labor activeness under capitalism is the result essentially not at all of ownership and income derived from ownership but, conversely, the lack of same, proletarianization. The bulk of those who work (excluding small businesses) are by no means owners, and labor itself, in the majority of cases, is hired. The participation of the workers in profits, although highly effective, as a whole is nonetheless in the nature of an experiment. This means that more efficient forms of labor organization are not excluded even from the economic viewpoint, not to mention that of social criteria.

This question becomes particularly important under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution. The point is that motivation for mental labor is quite different from physical labor incentives. Whereas the latter are essentially material, mental labor is largely self-seeking. In other words, its most important incentives are professional satisfaction (self-attainment through labor), independence and responsibility. They can be ensured only by combining the mind with the will and by combining the processing of information with decision making or, in short, by participating in management. If we consider that the distribution of entrepreneurial capabilities in society does not coincide in the least with the distribution of capital, it becomes understandable that the elimination of all barriers on the way to their application and the equal accessibility to capital and technology for all will indeed be beneficial and could become one of the major advantages of the self-governing system. This makes understandable the sharpness of the contemporary debates on socialism which, in a broad historical context, acts as a system for shifting management from ownership to labor and dissemination of democracy from the realm of politics to that of economics, opening all the gates of enterprises so far closed to it. At the same time, such debates have nothing in common with the pitting, traditional of our publication, of the various forms of ownership—private and

public—against each other. Such a “frontal confrontation” conflicts with the contemporary level of economic knowledge and the practices of the most developed countries.

Characteristics of such practices is the interaction, the cooperation among different forms of ownership. Naturally, this requires a higher standard of culture and changes in traditional values. For example, the notorious privatizing of the infrastructure, about which such a great deal is being written in the West, turns out, when analyzed, similar to share participation which is familiar to all of us. However, it also presumes certain shifts in work management and style (“debureaucratization”) of state enterprises.

Let us emphasize in this connection the essential political value of leasing. The point is that in the course of the reform we have come very close to the stage at which the task arises of making profound socioeconomic changes in the state sector. Unquestionably, cooperatives are useful but they employ no more than an insignificant minority of people and their share in the social capital is minute. We must not keep away from economic perestroika the overwhelming majority of the people who work in the state sector, for any serious policy in a democratic society is oriented, above all, toward the majority and only then variants may be developed and corrections made for the sake of various minorities.

For the time being, the development of leasing is being slow, for the Law on Leasing is not functioning. Nor are all the newly passed progressive laws, perhaps because they too must officially be shifted from the level of the Union to that of the republics. Opposition to leasing is mounted from the right and the left. From the right, because it truly makes meaningless the existence of many of the present management structures. From the left, because it does not ensure a “single indivisible ownership.” We are not saying that leasing is the easiest option. Its application will require a great deal of political will and standards.

The present situation is not fatal and does not exclude but, rather, conversely demands the accelerated democratization of the economy. However, to this effect the purpose of the reform should be not the pluralism of forms of ownership as such but the shaping of a national leasing system. This is dictated by the very scale of our state sector and the practical impossibility of developing entrepreneurial activities in the production area on the basis exclusively of capital but without the extensive participation of labor collectives.

Footnote

1. In our view, we must distinguish between the general historical foundation of this category and the specific and largely destructive form of its manifestation under conditions in which capital achieves domination and becomes the pivot of the economic system. Under socialism capital does not disappear but simply loses its dominant position and becomes “subordinated” to labor

while preserving its specific form of manifestation—the interest which, in this case, becomes a measure of the efficiency with which the capital resources of society have been used.

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'Sketches From CPSU History:' Concept, Approaches, Outlines

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[Text] Vitaliy Startsev, doctor of historical sciences: The Bolshevik Party on the Eve of October

In the first days of the February Revolution, some 24,000 people announced their affiliation with the Bolshevik Party. By the end of April, the party had already as many as 80,000; by the middle of July, 240,000; at the start of October 1917, it had 400,000 members.

Lenin and the few thousand guardians of party tradition who, together with Lenin, had undertaken its recreation, tried to accustom these hundreds of thousands of new members to the ideology and organizational principles of bolshevism. However, they also felt a powerful opposition movement: the 400,000 new party members brought with them the democratic and freedom-loving spirit of the February Revolution.

This was a time of real political pluralism and a multi-party system, and of open and unrestrained political struggle and a factually established bourgeois democracy. In the summer and autumn of 1917, the Bolshevik Party itself was not a closed "order of knights" but a truly democratic party, a true alliance among like-minded people to whom personal greed and career considerations were alien. In 1917 this was a party of young people, with their entire radicalism of views and tendency to adopt "simple" solutions, something which is inherent in young people and in youth as a whole. It was the party of workers operating machine tools and not based "on social origin." The military as well played a major role in it, the former peasants and now soldiers and noncommissioned officers. There were very few intellectuals and employees. Above all they were found among the older party members, who had survived the preceding periods or else had returned to the party ranks after an absence of many years. The combination of knowledge and experience of this extremely thin layer of professional revolutionaries, of the party intellectuals, with the energy and democratic experience of the

broadest possible new party masses, gave us the party which gained the support of the people and came to power in October 1917.

Even in the most remote guberniya a minimum of two or even more party conferences were held in the first eight months of 1917, with elections of party committees. Each guberniya organization went through several electoral campaigns for the zemstvos and city dumas and for the Constituent Assembly. At each plant and each reserve regiment elections for committees were based on the struggle among party slates and with a most fierce and open electoral struggle. The opponents of the bolsheviks were, above all, parallel socialist parties—the million-strong party of the S.R., which rallied in its ranks all strata of the toiling people of the Russia of that time: peasants, soldiers, and members of the labor intelligentsia; and the mass Menshevik Party, which included some skilled workers, intellectuals and members of national minorities.

The shaping of the leading nucleus of the Bolshevik Party in 1917, which we justifiably know as "Leninist," and which remained in power in the party and the state for 8 to 10 years after the October Revolution, deserves a reinterpretation. This process took place entirely democratically. At the April Conference and the Sixth RSDWP(b) Congress, former exiles and clandestine workers who had returned to the country and local workers who had distinguished themselves in the course of the revolution were elected to the Central Committee. The "oldest" among the 31 Central Committee members and candidate members elected at the Sixth Congress was the 47-year old Lenin; however, it also included very young people under 30.

The most impatient, radical and revolutionary representatives of the Russian social democratic movement, some of whom had previously belonged to other factions and had even fought against the Leninists, joined the bolsheviks after they had sharply separated themselves from the revolutionary-democratic camp (after their break with the mensheviks and the S.R. in the soviets, under the influence of the Leninist platform). They included Trotskiy, Lunacharskiy, Pokrovskiy, Uritskiy, Volodarskiy, Antonov-Ovseyenko, Ioffe, Larin, Steklov and dozens of others. All of them found their place in the party's leadership, formulating the most radical and maximalist slogans for resolving the confused problems facing revolutionary Russia. It was only a small handful of slow and cautious "centrists" who left the Bolshevik Party in April and joined the "governmentally thinking" mensheviks.

The most important problem was the theory developed by Lenin of the socialist revolution in 1917 and its acceptance by the Bolshevik Party. The old systems of 1905, aimed at a lengthy period of struggle for the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and its subsequent growth into a socialist revolution, proved obsolete in the face of the headlong development of events of the February Revolution. In April they were

supported by the "old bolsheviks," who wished for the party to remain within the united revolutionary-democratic front under the slogan of "completing" the democratic stage of the revolution. Lenin firmly opposed this. On three occasions, between April and October, he involved the party's leadership in the sharpest possible debate, the purpose of which was to convince the bolsheviks of the need to struggle for power for themselves, for the sake of a socialist coup d'etat, the purpose of which was to mark the beginning of a global revolution. Lenin recreated the theory of the socialist revolution. The discussion which was of the most essential practical value was the one initiated with Lenin's letters concerning the uprising, dated 12-14 September 1917. The supporters of the party's participation in the united socialist revolutionary-democratic front turned out to be in the majority in the RSDWP(b) Central Committee. They rejected the proposal of practical preparations for an armed uprising, seeking a compromise with the menshevik and S.R. parties and intending peacefully to wait for the Constituent Assembly, the opening of which was scheduled for 28 November 1917. Had this majority, led by Kamenev and Zinovyev remained in October, no uprising would have taken place. With a display of incredible energy, willpower and persistence, however, Lenin was able to prove to the majority of RSDWP(b) Central Committee members the accuracy of his line of mounting an immediate uprising and seizing the power. The supporters of the reformist and democratic way in the Bolshevik Party were defeated. On this basis, a socialist revolution became, at that time, not only possible but also inevitable.

There was also the question of the support of the bolsheviks by the majority of the people. In the same way that in 1917 the party could not make anyone think of it as being an instrument for the seizure of power, obedient to the will of Lenin alone, but of having arrived to this idea through a democratic internal struggle, in that same way the armed uprising was in no way a military conspiracy behind the back of the people. It is no secret that the majority of the people—which was a petit bourgeois mass in a classical petit bourgeois country—was not with the bolsheviks, whether in April-May or June-August 1917. It also opposed the imperialist policy of the big Russian bourgeoisie. The majority of the people supported the bloc of menshevik and S.R. parties and the alliance between this bloc with part of the Russian bourgeoisie was "centrist" and stood for a coalition of all live forces in the country, excluding the extreme right and extreme left (at that time it was precisely the bolsheviks who belonged to the latter). Centristism is an expression of the age-old experience of the majority of the people in all societies and all countries. At crucial moments, however, when the hesitations within the masses intensify and when feelings of despair and disappointment become endemic, it becomes capable of a fast shift in sympathy, particularly if the ruling party or parties, which previously expressed the view of the majority, begin criminally to postpone the implementation of reforms and delay the resolution of problems

which affect the profound interests and destinies of many tens of millions of people.

It was precisely such a drastic fluctuation of sympathies on the part of the overwhelming mass of the people in the autumn of 1917 that secured the bolsheviks' success and made possible the bolshevik assumption of power in Russia. Having defeated, with the help of the people, the Kornilov conspiracy, Kerenskiy's provisional government then refused immediately to meet the demands of the nation. It did not totally expel the bourgeois Cadet Party from the government; it did not give the land to the peasants and did not start peace talks. It was only such a policy that could have made the majority support the governmental bloc. Against the background of Kerenskiy's stubborn refusal to do what the people expected, bolshevik propaganda, previously mistrusted by the majority of the people, began to assume a new meaning. Trust us, the bolsheviks said, and tomorrow we shall give you peace, bread and land! At tens of thousands of meetings, from Minsk to Vladivostok and from Murmansk to Kushki, the majority of workers, and approximately one-half of soldiers and a substantial share of peasants, voted for resolutions which approved the bolshevik program of immediately giving the power to the soviets. This was a true popular referendum. All of this made the socialist alternative, formulated by Lenin in Russia in April 1917 and at that time scoffed at by the majority parties, possible and desirable to the people.

It was thus that the realities of the socioeconomic and political life in Russia in the autumn of 1917 singled out and strengthened one among all the possible choices of social development: the assumption of power by the bolsheviks. It was this that predetermined the subsequent development of events.

Yuriy Polyakov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member: On the Possibility of a 'Third Way'

The split within the Russian socialist movement, which became aggravated in the eight months from February to October, reached its peak as a result of the victory of the October Revolution. Different views on the ways to socialism and on socialism itself developed into open confrontation. Unity among socialist forces in the revolution did not develop. Conversely, history turned trends and factions within the socialist movement into irreconcilable enemies.

The S.R.-menshevik leaders stated that they opposed both an open counterrevolution and bolshevik dictatorship but favored a third way. The idea of a "third force" or "third way" was quite tempting. However, it was not a question of the attractiveness of a given choice but of its realism.

Under the conditions of unparalleled class fierceness and extreme polarization of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces, the possibility of maneuvering between them proved minute. Once the barricades of class battles had divided the country, it was no longer possible to find a middle way between barricades. No third way was

obtained. The efforts to implement it, both in 1917 and subsequently, inevitably ended in failure.

The feeling of arising tragedy, related to the confrontation among the various factions within the socialist movement, was felt by many members of the revolutionary social democratic movement. The question of establishing a coalition Soviet government kept being raised throughout the Second Congress of Soviets. At the very beginning of the congress, Martov, warning of the danger of civil war, spoke out in favor of "creating a unified democratic system." His suggestion was adopted but not followed up.

The right-wing mensheviks and right-wing S.R. as well called at the beginning of the congress for initiating talks with the provisional government on forming a cabinet which would be based on all social strata. Since the provisional government was collapsing, this was received by the congress with indignation and the S.R. and the mensheviks left the hall. The appeals to the congress to create a coalition government continued. At the second session, the social democrats-internationalists, the left-wing S.R. and the mensheviks who had not left the congress once again called for a socialist coalition, claiming that the bolsheviks were isolated.

Trotsky sarcastically answered: "Could we have organized an uprising had Dan and Avksentyev remained in our ranks?" He emphasized that a coalition would provide neither bread nor peace. The only coalition possible was one with the workers, soldiers and the poorest peasantry. The other democratic parties had switched to the enemy camp; it was not we but they who had proclaimed a merciless war. These essentially accurate words of the representatives of the bolsheviks have a categorical sound to them and one can clearly see them as the arrogant maximalism of the winner.

At the Second Congress of Soviets the question of coalition was heatedly debated among the bolsheviks themselves. According to John Reed, "Lenin and Trotsky spent the second day of the congress in fighting the supporters of a compromise." A considerable number of bolsheviks were in favor of setting up an all-socialist government.

However, supported by Trotsky, Lenin was firm: "Let the conciliationists adopt our program and join the government! We shall not retreat an inch." (Reed was referring to the 26 October Central Committee session. No minutes of this session have been preserved but it is known that it discussed the question of the structure of the Soviet government and that the leaders of the left-wing S.R. were invited to attend it.)

Immediately after the first Soviet government was formed, the question of a coalition arose with renewed strength. It triggered a crisis situation in the bolshevik

leadership. Noted bolsheviks (Kamenev, Rykov, Milyutin, Nogin) did not share the views of the majority within the RSDWP(b) Central Committee also on the matter of the Constituent Assembly.

The evaluation of these complex problems, which were previously presented by Soviet historiography one-sidedly, leads to the following conclusions.

The bolsheviks, as became apparent essentially at the November talks with the All-Russia Executive Committee of the Railroad Workers Trade Union, were extremely unwilling to form a coalition. It is true that some bolsheviks agreed to a coalition "at any cost." The majority of the Central Committee, however, demanded that the "control packet" be kept within the government by the bolsheviks. This view had an objective foundation: a coalition in which the governmental majority would consist of mensheviks and S.R. would change the nature of the revolution, turning it into a social democratic one, with a conversion to a parliamentary system. This would have been the "third way." Such a revolution, however, had not justified itself in the pre-October months. It had been unable to satisfy the popular masses, triggered their extreme radicalization and created the real threat of a military dictatorship.

Granting the supreme power to the Constituent Assembly, i.e., the adoption of the "third way," would have meant the liquidation of the soviets, which was against the interests and the feelings of the toiling masses which clearly preferred them. The Constituent Assembly could provide democracy (which had already been gained by the people) but was unable to provide peace and land. Inevitably this would have led to a new revolutionary explosion, on the one hand, and a powerful counterrevolutionary pressure, on the other.

The experience of the few previous months had indicated that wherever they found themselves in power (Siberia, the Urals), the S.R. and the mensheviks had been unable to support the socialist choice and easily surrendered to the open counterrevolution. However, practical experience also proved that the confrontation between the bolsheviks and the other socialist forces made the Civil War longer and fiercer. Obviously, the possibility still existed for joint actions launched by all truly revolutionary factions. The brief bloc with the left-wing S.R. had also indicated the realistic nature of a compromise, its difficulties and the opportunities lost by both sides.

Many other reasons which made a broad coalition of socialist forces by the end of 1917 and beginning of 1918 impossible could be listed. They included the exceptionally acute class awareness, the growing radicalization of the masses, which rejected the right-wing leaders, and the complexity, confusion and contradictoriness of internal and external circumstances which gave their own special coloring to political decisions. The old

differences, the severity of the new accretions, the animosity of the S.R. and the mensheviks and the maximalism of the bolsheviks had their effect. The priority given to the principle of "he who is not with us is against us" was intensified on both sides. The hatred which the conciliationists felt for the bolsheviks intensified the firmness and decisiveness with which the latter exercised the dictatorship. The irreconcilability of the bolsheviks toward the "Vikzhel Wishes", as the opportunistic leaders expressed themselves at that time, and the drastic nature of their accusations they had raised, in turn made them reject the idea of a unification of revolutionary forces. The mensheviks and S.R. wanted to become the "third force." The bolsheviks wanted to remain the only force, having routed the bourgeois-landowners' counter-revolution without the help of the S.R. and the mensheviks and, whenever necessary, even against them. The socialists-S.R. and the mensheviks were in the counter-revolutionary camp! This was the tragedy of the socialist movement. The bolsheviks rejected their conciliationism while they, in turn, rejected bolshevik irreconcilability. This was the tragic logic of the political struggle which had developed into a civil war!

It was not pitting the bulwark of the revolution—the bolsheviks—against the "third way" but unity among socialist parties and groups based on a truly revolutionary platform, through compromise and reciprocal concessions and the broadening of democracy that was the task which remained unfulfilled.

Valeriy Zhuravlev, doctor of historical sciences: The First Steps of the Ruling Party

The period between 25 October 1917 and the summer of 1918 remains perhaps the most dynamic and complex in party history. This was a time when the bolsheviks, in the vortex of the October tempest and the post-October thrust of the tense struggle against the open enemies of the revolution and a dramatically developing dialogue with political opponents belonging to the petit bourgeois camp, learned to act as a ruling party in the first state of workers and peasants in world history. It was in the interwoven heroics and the daily events of the first months of its existence that the inspiring innovativeness of those who were "storming the sky" and much of that which, for objective or subjective reasons "brought down to earth" the socialist ideal under the heavy burden of the sharp conflict of reality and occasionally bitter necessity were manifested. It was necessary to act within the framework of a society stricken by most serious social ills, under the conditions of a "medium-weak" country in terms of its development, dislocated by the war, the inept policy of tsarism and the impasse created by the inability of the Provisional Government to act.

The conversion of the party to a qualitatively new condition took place in a complex and contradictory fashion. Its ties with the masses deepened and strengthened, although this process was not an exclusively upward one, but one complicated by turns and retreats. Nonetheless, the bolsheviks became the acknowledged

political vanguard of forces which aspired toward the development of revolutionary changes and the embodiment of the ideals of socialism. The party increased numerically as well: by March 1918 it had approximately 400,000 members. Its social composition was a clear manifestation of the class nature of the proletarian organization which expressed the interests of the broad toiling masses. Gradually, the structure of party authorities and nuclei was taking shape in accordance with the new situation, and its ways and means of work were improving. During the first stage the party concentrated all of its efforts on strengthening the Soviet system and its authorities both centrally and locally.

Nonetheless, by the turn of 1918 the RSDWP(b)-RKP(b) found itself in a state of severe crisis. This was expressed, above all, in the aggravation of contradictions and difficulties of functional, organizational and cadre perestroika and the development of a new style and political methods of leadership, the price paid for the sharp increase in membership and the existence of profound differences both within the leadership and the party masses on problems of principle (above all the Brest Peace). The dynamic development of the revolutionary process in the country and the consistent formulation of ever new tasks by the party raised particularly urgently the problem of a regrouping of party cadres and their renovation, replacing those who were unable to abandon the old work methods among the masses, and getting cured of the illness which Lenin described the "slavish repetition of yesterday's slogans" (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 160).

Under the developing circumstances, a search for the basic link which could pull the party out of its situation of crisis, assumed a decisive significance. Such a link was improvements in internal party democracy from top to bottom and developing autonomy and initiative in party work in the local areas. The sharpest possible struggle on the question of the Brest Peace, which was waged within the RSDWP(b)-RKP(b), indicated that however complex a situation may be it cannot be used as grounds for any whatsoever restriction, not to mention rejection of a democratic procedure for the discussion, adoption and implementation of political resolutions. Need we point out how much the party would have benefited in its subsequent development had it always, and without stipulations, mastered this most important lesson in surmounting the first crisis within its ranks after the October Revolution?

The study of such crises, despite their uniqueness during different historical stages, brings to light the dialectics of the processes of a crucial nature in the life of society as a whole and its reflection on the political party itself. Acknowledging the objective basis for the crises within the ruling party, caused by the actual situation of a sharp historical change, makes mastering the experience of surmounting each one of them a major component not only in the knowledge of the past but also in engaging in political action under contemporary conditions.

The headlong development and intensification of the revolution during the first post-October months became a test of the strength and maturity of all political parties and social movements. Neither the bourgeoisie nor the petit bourgeois parties were able to pass it. The wave of urgent popular demands and social needs crossed the barriers of their political guidelines and possibilities and defined the objective historical unattainability, under those circumstances, of the idea of a "unified socialist government" on the basis of the weak foundations of the Constituent Assembly, in which mensheviks and right-wing S.R. wished to see above all a counterbalance to the Soviet system which was becoming victorious throughout the country. The post-October political realities organically led to prerequisites for the development of a single party political system representing this power.

The concept of the establishment of a one-party system strictly as a result of the arbitrary actions of the bolsheviks, aimed at monopolizing the power, collapses in the face of historical facts. Nor does the history of the political (and, subsequently, governmental) bloc of bolsheviks and left-wing S.R. fit within the framework of such a system and history, although, with all of its overall controversial nature, it played a positive role in the destinies of the socialist revolution. At the same time, it would be naive to explain the stress of relations between bolsheviks and left-wing S.R. and the absence of reciprocal tolerance between them, exclusively in terms of the incompatibility of the two types of revolutionism. Here the stumbling block was the exceptionally complex economic situation in the country and, in particular, the hunger for food and commodities. It was precisely in these areas that at that time the sharpest objective contradictions between the working class and the broad strata of the toiling peasantry concentrated.

The steps taken to supply the cities with bread, which led to the development of a system of food dictatorship, were aimed, above all, at preventing kulak sabotage. However, they could not fail to alarm the middle peasantry: the bolsheviks demand grain but are unable to offer goods in exchange. Furthermore, in the circumstances of arising hunger in the cities, the discontent of the working class increased which, among its least conscientious strata, assumed an anti-peasant trend. All of these features had a direct impact on the political behavior of both bolsheviks and left-wing S.R. Forgetting that in the first post-October months the toiling peasantry as a whole extensively supported the steps taken by the Soviet system, some bolsheviks began to consider the left-wing S.R. as an almost unnecessary link, a hindrance in the exercise of the policy of the new system toward the peasantry. This could not fail to worsen the situation which was already worsening as a result of the disagreement shown by the left-wing S.R. concerning the conclusion of a peace with Germany, their political instability in many critical situations and their extreme discontent with the accelerated socialist revolution in the countryside and the introduction of committees of the poor in the spring of 1918.

It was thus that surreptitiously a conflict was ripening, which eventually broke out as a left-wing S.R. mutiny on 6 July 1918. Having deliberately broken their political alliance with the bolsheviks, in addition to everything else the left-wing S.R. obstructed the implementation of the "peasant way" to socialism, outlined in Lenin's Decree on Land, and the left-wing S.R. law on the socialization of the land, which called for gradual and organic (i.e., controlled by the peasants themselves) changes in the agrarian system on an alternate basis, while preserving for the foreseeable future the private peasant farms.

The extensive search for ways, means and methods of renovating the economic structures was characteristic of the sum total of steps taken by the party and the Soviet system in the national economic area in the first months of proletarian dictatorship. Sensitively reacting to the constantly changing conditions in the development of the revolutionary process, throughout the summer of 1918 the bolsheviks consciously retained the possibility of giving priority, depending on the circumstances, to either of two trends in the economic area: on the one hand, the gradual and "smooth" development of socialist changes, with the utilization within the foreseeable future of the elements of private initiative; on the other, the accelerated creation and strengthening of the state economic sector and implanting socialism "from above." This enabled the new system, whenever necessary, to amend the pace of progress toward socialism and to increase the variety of forms of relations between the new and the old such as, for instance, between the proletarian state and private capital. In this respect, the 18 April 1918 Sovnarkom Decree, drafted with Lenin's personal involvement, on the registration of stocks, bonds and interest yielding securities, assumed an essential significance. In resolving the problem of retaining the structure of ownership of securities, which had developed in October 1917, this act also confirmed the intention of the Soviet system to allow, under favorable circumstances, the free circulation of stock in capitalist enterprises, to restore the payment of dividends on such stock and also to compensate the former owners of factories and plants which were either being nationalized or had been appropriated by the republic.

However, the further aggravation of the situation in the country and the entire course of events which was "sliding" toward civil war predetermined the victory of the second trend. In an atmosphere not deprived of pluralism, in the search of new forms of economic management, the clear outlines of the future policy of "war communism" became increasingly clear.

Gennadiy Bordyugov, candidate of historical sciences, and **Vladimir Kozlov**, candidate of historical sciences: The 'War Communism' Phenomenon

How to qualify the bolshevik policy of 1918-1920? What was this: a "frontal attack," an error or a trial balloon? The "black and white" way of thinking, which was characteristic of our social awareness until recently,

proved essentially incapable of understanding such questions. That is why the debates have been so far developing essentially on one level: Was the policy of "war communism" a doctrinal task or did it develop as a pragmatic reaction to the Civil War?

If we take into consideration the conditions and trends of this debate, sooner or later we see the balance of arguments favoring either viewpoint. It becomes clear that we could structure an entirely convincing version which would prove to one and all that the bolsheviks had been planning for a "war communism" as early as the pre-October times. However, we can prove with equal justification the opposite: that the revolution and Civil War demanded of the ruling party the only possible measures and actions which, it is true, it implemented with a mass of tactical errors. We believe that the debate on this level has all the chances of becoming eternal, leading researchers into the impasse of politically one-sided answers.

It is our view that it would be much more instructive to mention the actual laws which governed the policy of "war communism." What were they?

At the very start of 1918, A. Bogdanov, Lenin's permanent opponent, admitted himself that he had already "diagnosed war communism," based on the study of the processes which were developing within the warring sides in the World War. These processes had led to the fact that a significant portion of the population, drafted in the armed forces, was being supported by the state, being no longer a participant in the production process. The influence of the armed forces on the society increased strongly, determined by two distinguishing features of the military machinery: the authoritarian structure and a characteristic "consumer communism." The features of the latter spread from the army to the rest of society. The destructive course of the war led to the rationing of consumption and controls of prices and of all marketing and, subsequently, of the production process itself. The abnormality of this situation was that the transformation of the forms of social life was dictated not by the production process or an increase in production forces but, conversely, originated from the consumption area.

It may have seemed that, with the end of the war, the system of state capitalism of a military model would disappear by itself. However, this did not occur immediately in any of the belligerent countries. Any government, which is the main feature in Bogdanov's prognosis, is forced, in the process of converting from war to peace, to follow for a while the path of a consumer "war communism." At a certain stage its regressive and historically transient forms (limited consumption, monopolization of products by the state, state-bureaucratic control of marketing and production, etc.) begin to be gradually curtailed. However, such progressive forms as trusts and trade unions remain, for they are consistent with the overall line of development of capitalism.

Bogdanov believed that, to an equal extent, authoritarian trends would be active only in the period of transition from war to peace, after which the democratic system, actually eliminated or restricted by the growth of authoritarianism, would be restored.

It is conceivable that the sharpest and most observant minds of that time predicted precisely the type of development of events which actually took place. Given this view on the situation, it is no longer possible to accuse the bolsheviks of imposing upon real life a kind of doctrinal system which, at all cost, through a purposeful political will, would be applied with the help of governmental forces. Conversely, with such an approach to the situation, we must inevitably acknowledge that the bolshevik policy reflected the objective trends of social development. The bolsheviks were not guilty in the least of preserving the "war-communist" trends within society. It is not they who were to be blamed for the fact that the seeds of "military-communist" trends turned out "durable," and possessing a high degree of resistance. The very situation of emerging out of the fiercest possible crisis triggered by the World War, followed by a new outbreak of war—this time civil—created a nutritive environment for the growth of such seeds.

The fact that legitimate processes occasionally assumed a fictitious ideological cover is a different matter. Many of the steps and methods of economic management, forced by the war, were considered by the bolsheviks and, partially, by Lenin, as material preparations for socialism, regardless of the actual level of development of production forces, semidestroyed by the war, on the basis of which such measures and methods grew. They were quite frequently depicted in socialist terms and their implementation was somewhat being sanctified by the socialist ideal. Hence the obvious confusion in determining what was socialism, and the efforts to proclaim as basic less the level of development of production forces than control over the measure of labor and consumption. No longer the progressive elements alone but the reactionary elements as well within the military-economic system, subject to absolute elimination, were considered attributes of socialism. Some of them (product bartering, total unification of the population within consumer communes, rationed consumption, labor service, etc.) were essentially converted into programmatic requirements and into a long-term policy of the Bolshevik Party, which contributed to their preservation and reproduction.

In order to free the study of the problem of "war communism" from the pressure of the political circumstances and ideological biases and stereotypes, methodological approaches are needed, approaches which were not used usually by historiographers in their depiction of this period. We include among them the phenomenon of "critical points" of the historical process between 1918 and 1921, i.e., the type of aspects which aggravate and concentrate contradictions of previous development and are linked to the contradictions of the future as a result of

both the spontaneous development of events as well as the conscious efforts of the bolsheviks to direct them into a specific direction.

The most important "critical point" of the first postrevolutionary years was the spring of 1918. The bolsheviks themselves provide direct testimony to the fact that at that time they were more on the eve of the NEP and not of "war communism." Naturally, the side toward which the political balance leaned, on the one side of which was an orientation toward the "storming," the direct conversion to the new system and, on the other, reliance on intermediary ways and "transitional bridges" to socialism in a backward small-peasant country, depended not on the doctrinal aspirations of the bolsheviks but on circumstances independent of their will, on the one hand, and the extent to which specific decisions would be effective, on the other.

The bolsheviks tended to consider the introduction of a food dictatorship in May 1918 a "purely communist" task. However, if we look at the discussions among representatives of different parties, initially under the Provisional Government and, subsequently, in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, we would see that all of them acknowledged the need for grain monopoly. The food dictatorship was one of its possible forms. The fact that this dictatorship, introduced after the hopes that grain would come from the Ukraine were entirely lost and the possibility of bringing grain from the Northern Caucasus doubtful, was being implemented extremely clumsily, is a different matter. The practice of exceptional measures and actions during the period of committees of the poor already created a type of food policy in which the economic autonomy of the peasant farms had been destroyed, which triggered the drastic discontent of the peasantry. The subsequent turn of the countryside toward the bolsheviks was determined above all by the fact that out of two evils (a return of the landowners or "bolshevik" food requisitioning) the peasants chose the lesser. Incidentally, food requisitioning, which was introduced at the start of 1919, and which is so heavily criticized today, was a step toward an orderly food policy, compared to the methods of violent expropriation of the grain from the barns by the committees of the poor, a form of compromise which, in the final account, was adopted by both bolsheviks and peasants.

A major "critical point" of the first postrevolutionary years was the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919. It was precisely then that prerequisites appeared for eliminating the most hateful aspects of the emergency system and, in particular, those of its elements which even many bolsheviks tended to consider as a substitution of the "All Power to the Soviets!" slogan with the slogan "All Power to the Extraordinary Commissions!" A series of steps were taken to institute revolutionary legality and to limit the arbitrariness of the local executive authorities. Once again some of the ideas of the spring of 1918, which were part of the anticrisis economic program, were heard. The bolsheviks even tried to resolve the food problem on the basis of the principles of a tax-in-kind.

Nonetheless, this situation, which contained within itself the possibility of a political turn was, furthermore, as subsequently acknowledged by the mensheviks, a possibility of "laying the beginning of a rapprochement between the units of revolutionary democracy, divided by the terror and the Civil War," eventually resolved by the first effort in Soviet history of "revolution from above." It is a question of an effort of accelerated statification of agriculture in the form of sovkhozes, organizing communes and resolving grain procurement difficulties by creating "socialist bases," as they were then known in the countryside. To a certain extent, this "revolution from above" developed in accordance with the shortened scenario which, 10 years later, Stalin was to repeat in its expanded version. What was indicative, however, was that, under Lenin's leadership, the bolsheviks had no doctrine which prevented them from abandoning this sterile policy and asserting a course toward the long-term preservation of individual peasant farms.

Another "critical point" was the one between the end of 1919 and beginning of 1920, when possibilities already began to appear for radical changes in food procurement policy and abandoning the principle of tax-in-kind. Finally, yet another "critical point," also distinguished by the extreme concentration of contradictions, occurred by the turn of 1921. At that time, in their enthusiasm for the pressure and reliance on the war enthusiasm of the masses, the bolsheviks exceeded the admissible limit, going beyond the framework not only of basic expediency but of Marxist doctrine itself. Having told the private farmer that his work is a "state duty," that he must sow according to a "state plan" (it was precisely such resolutions that were passed at the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1920) and, furthermore, having established on this basis the possibility of a postwar revival of the economy, were factors much closer to the "Asiatic" means of production than socialism. Subsequently, the bolsheviks themselves were to assess the decision of the "great state obligation of the peasant population" as one of the ideological utopias of the period of "war communism."

In order to explain the phenomenon of "war communism," in addition to addressing themselves to the study of the "critical points," the authors had to make a special study of the mechanism itself for political decision-making. How did this mechanism work? How did it take shape? In broader terms, what was the nature of the power under the conditions of a developing one-party system?

To us this problem is of an essential nature. In order to assess the correlation between the doctrine guiding the ruling party and the expediency which led this party to make one specific decision or another, it is important to understand the extent to which the policy of the ruling party remains open to perceiving the real needs of life. In this connection, we deem it important to consider also the unique subject of the decision-making system, i.e., Lenin. The question of his role is one of the key questions in the study of the policy of "war communism." It

can be said that by reason of his special personal qualities Lenin was able to compensate for many weaknesses of the emergency-type system, although he, too, frequently failed promptly to react to changes in the situation. As a unique "political instrument," Lenin was actually irreplaceable. Probably he personally realized this in the last years of his life, fearing that as he lost the power of his authority, the latter could become an authority of force. However (unlike economics) the program for profound political reforms remained undeveloped. Lenin was able to earmark merely some and perhaps even not the most efficient of its steps.

We agree with historians and political journalists who, on the basis of the study of factual data, or else guided by political intuition, felt that the answer to many key problems of our entire history may be found, in a concentrated way, in the period of "war communism." However, it is precisely for this reason that we deliberately avoid to provide simple answers, preferring to depict the fine fabric of the historical process in the course of which a great deal depends on random events and in which doctrine can play the role of a mobilizing or guiding factor but is never in a condition to define real policy entirely and fully. (To be continued.)

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ECONOMIC POLICY

'Open Door Economy in Words and in Action'

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[Article by Viktor Spandaryan, advisor to the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences USA and Canada Institute, and Nikolay Shmelev, department head, USSR Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canada Institute, USSR People's Deputy]

[Text] Something strange is taking place today in our foreign trade and other areas of cooperation with foreign countries. On the one hand, it is as though we have proclaimed throughout the world a course of creating an "open economy," and active inclusion of the Soviet Union in international economic life. Greatly promising resolutions and decrees were adopted on the freedom of foreign economic activities by producers, encouraging the setting up of cooperatives and joint enterprises and creating in the near future free economic zones in different parts of the country. The government continues to speak of its intention gradually to make the ruble convertible, i.e., to remove not only administrative but also economic barriers which protect our domestic market from the external impetus of economic and scientific and technical progress, without which no efficient development of the national economy is possible.

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that in real life everything occurs according to the principle of "one

step forward, two steps back." The freedom given to enterprises to export on the foreign market proved to be paralyzed by the recently appeared (although essentially medieval) system of almost total licensing of exports. Bureaucratic prohibitions boosted even further the insane campaign of whipping up public anger against exporters, which broke out as a result of the rather muddled and equivocal story involving the ANT concern.

But this is not all. Judging by the intentions of our foreign economic authorities, a real threat exists not of increasing the foreign exchange income of exporting enterprises (which is demanded by everyone, from miners and oil workers to the most enterprising members of cooperatives) but rather their total deprivation of all foreign exchange withholdings. Adding to this the obstacles put on the way of the recently opened few joint enterprises, which are not only not being reduced but are, conversely, worsening, the empty blabbering and bureaucratic games on the topic of free economic zones, and the unabated demagoguery displayed by many mass information media about an allegedly threatening "sell-out of Russia" and the xenophobic moods they promote concerning any form of partnership with foreigners, and many, many other actions, the resulting picture becomes stupefying.

Therefore, what do we actually want? Do we want to leave our economic isolation behind or once again protect ourselves with high fences from the rest of the world? Do we want access to the advantages and benefits of international economic trade or, once again, lock ourselves within our borders, rejecting material sufficiency for ourselves and all achievements of foreign scientific and technical thinking?

Words are one thing and practical actions, something else. For the time being, they indicate that the proclaimed course of developing an "open economy" could full well turn out to be merely a short event in the history of our self-destructive society and self-destructive economy.

Now, when the economic reform has reached its decisive and critical stage—a conversion to a market economic management mechanism—actively involving in this process a powerful factor such as foreign economic relations is not only possible but also extremely necessary, for we shall never create a first-rate active market in our country unless we integrate it with the global economy.

International experience confirms that no country, even one with rich natural resources, a developed economy and science, and skilled labor reserves, as well as a big domestic market, can efficiently develop while remaining on the margin of powerful integration processes which operate in the global economy, and deprive itself of the advantages of the international division of labor.

One would think that this obvious truth is beginning to be understood in our country as well. However, in order

to convert from understanding to action, we must above all decisively review the purpose of the role and place of foreign economic relations in the overall context of the radical perestroika processes taking place in the country.

We must firmly pull our "foreign trade cart" out of the old ruts which are taking us farther and farther away from the high road of international economic cooperation. Despite declarative statements and documents, as in the past foreign economic practices are oriented not at upgrading the efficiency of the national economic complex or assisting in the implementation of most important socioeconomic tasks of perestroika but, as during the time of stagnation, obediently serve "his majesty the Deficit." The role of foreign relations is reduced essentially to darning the caftan of our unraveled economy. For decades we have tried to compensate for our negligence, waste, errors in planning and breakdowns in procurement with forced and inefficient imports which even corrupt the national economy.

The command-bureaucratic system quickly mastered the use of a "modus vivendi," which it found convenient for itself. It turns out that one could more or less "meet" many of the vital needs of the country without any particular difficulties and quite profitably for oneself, by inflating the purchase of "scarce goods" on the foreign market, squandering irreplaceable natural resources and concealing through imports our economic lack of initiative and incompetence.

Why, for instance, should "the agroindustrialists" burden themselves with concerns about seeking efficient forms of agricultural management and serving the working people in the countryside and enhancing the countryside, building storage bins, roads and processing facilities and creating reliable and inexpensive agricultural equipment, and so on, when it is much simpler to purchase grain, meat, butter, sugar, vegetables and fruits abroad? What is most amazing is that imports of food are essentially used to replace our own losses of farm produce. According to the USSR State Committee for Statistics, every year we lose 29 million tons of already harvested grain and nearly 1 million tons of meat. Correspondingly, we import from abroad, on an annual average, about 30-35 million tons of grain and about 1 million tons of meat and meat products. In the 1970s and 1980s we thus consumed, in the literal meaning of the word, some \$300 billion! Yet only a fraction of this astronomical amount would have sufficed to create miracles in agriculture!

Meanwhile (and not least thanks to our large and long-term import purchases), world prices of basic staples are sliding upward. Thus, compared with 1985, the 1989 grain prices were higher by 44 percent; sugar, more than double; meat by 40 percent; cooking oil by 17 percent, etc. Meanwhile, petroleum prices had dropped by 40 percent, which led to a drop in the prices of natural gas and other energy carriers and, as a result, to a drastic lowering of our foreign exchange earnings.

Inefficient imports lead to inefficient and economically unprofitable exports, of energy raw materials above all. It is much simpler to pump petroleum and gas than to sell industrial commodities. To sell such commodities one must work hard at home and on the international market, to be able to withstand fierce competition. This is difficult and bothersome as well as unusual, facts which were rapidly mastered by our command-bureaucratic system.

The discussion of problems of foreign economic activities in the USSR Supreme Soviet and at the 28th CPSU Congress revealed the need to accelerate the formulation of a contemporary concept for foreign economic relations. Such relations must become a powerful catalyst for the increased efficiency of the entire national economy and a means of resolving acute socioeconomic problems as well as a channel for introducing global achievements of scientific and technical progress, a major and constant source for the attraction of foreign capital, technology and managerial experience and, finally, a powerful competition factor which would undermine the diktat of domestic monopolists on the Soviet market for commodities and services. The old concept of foreign economic relations simply does not fit a market-oriented economy. The new concept must be based on a materially and economically backed **program for the development of the country's export base and comprehensive incentives to domestic exporters**—enterprises and organizations which independently export on foreign markets.

Finally, we must realize that the foundation for efficient foreign economic activities and a true guarantee for the country's economic safety under the conditions of its involvement with the international division of labor and global economic integration processes is not imports for the sake of mending patches but comprehensive encouragement of the development of its export potential.

Initially, based on domestic and international realities, the efforts must be clearly concentrated along the following main directions:

Intensified processing of energy raw material resources, which would enable us, with the same volume of their export (or even by reducing it) significantly to increase foreign currency earnings. Thus, for example, by extensively processing timber alone, without increasing timber exports, we could earn additionally foreign exchange totaling 2-2.5 billion rubles annually. Exporting petroleum products instead of crude oil, not to mention petrochemicals, would enable us to triple our foreign exchange earnings without increasing the amount of exported energy carriers. This applies to all types of raw materials, for even their primary processing increases their value.

Specialization is another key to assuming a firm position in foreign markets. Not even the most economically developed country scatters its efforts in exporting finished products but seeks and cultivates its own export specialization. Japan, the successes of which we tirelessly

admire (without, however, drawing the necessary conclusions for ourselves) is skillfully concentrating its efforts on areas of export which it considers decisive, such as ship building, chemical and metallurgical output, such as automobiles yesterday and household electric appliances today, and electronics and other high technology items, tomorrow. The new industrial countries are developing their export expansion on the low and middle technological levels and in the area of consumer goods in mass demand, combining the efficient use of foreign capital and technology with relatively inexpensive labor.

One could endlessly try to convince oneself and everyone else of the advantages of exporting machine-technical goods and finished products. However, it is precisely in the area of such commodities that the strongest competition exists on the global market and it is precisely such goods that require the highest possible production, trade and service standards. Common sense indicates that we must find our own area for export specialization, making efficient use of natural resources, large-scale industrial output, high level of scientific and technical potential and a relatively inexpensive and sufficiently skilled labor, whether in the aerospace industry and heavy and electrical engineering machine building or else involving the converted defense industry for export and restoring the export potential of agriculture.

Those who believe that the global market is closed to new arrivals are wrong. The market has always had, has and will have "niches" which, given proper flexibility and a high level of competitiveness can be filled by other exporters. Our significant scientific and technical developments in defense and civilian sectors enable us, in principle, to rely on such possibilities. On the regional scale, for example, in the interest of the entire national economy, we could turn the Far East into a kind of "foreign exchange shop" for the country, using its rich natural resources and exceptionally advantageous geographic location in the dynamically developing Asian-Pacific area.

Success in foreign economic activities greatly depends also on providing **comprehensive support to exporters**. Unlike the overwhelming majority of countries throughout the world (including the United States, the EEC, Japan and the new industrial countries) we are not only failing to provide for our exporters universally accepted facilities but rather the opposite. The extensive emergence of Soviet economic enterprises and organizations on foreign markets was proclaimed. To this day, however, the basic conditions stimulating their foreign economic activities have not been provided: neither a rate of exchange of the ruble into convertible currencies, which would facilitate exports (not to mention the convertibility of the ruble itself, which has been postponed indefinitely), nor tax benefits, credit-financial support or normal banking services, risk insurance related to foreign economic operations, an adequate infrastructural and information support or an efficient system for the training of cadres of foreign trade specialists consistent with contemporary standards.

Conversely, instead of setting a realistic exchange rate for the ruble, which would stimulate exports rather than imports, a cumbersome antediluvian system of "differentiated currency coefficients" was applied, which created an economically unsubstantiated, complex and rigid system of multiple exchange rates. The USSR is probably one of the few countries which mainly licenses (i.e., restricts) exports rather than imports. The key right to issue licenses has been granted to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and to more than 50 other departments, which are zealously protecting "their own" foreign trade associations and are mercilessly squeezing "outsiders" out. This has created the worst possible monopoly on foreign trade, based on departmental interests and arbitrariness, for a license can always be denied, justifying it with the scarcity of one commodity or another (and what today in our country is not in scarce supply?). Is it amazing that enterprises and organizations which are trying independently to export on foreign markets are groaning under such "supervision," while their successful departmental competitors are skillfully "cutting off their oxygen supply."

Adding to this the rigid foreign exchange monopoly held by the USSR Foreign Economic Bank, which pushes away bothersome "petty" customers, one can imagine the sometimes impossible circumstances under which domestic exporters have to work, those who have dared independently to export on foreign markets.

It is high time to put everything in its proper place if we indeed wish seriously and efficiently to engage in foreign economic activities under the conditions of a market-oriented economy. The government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Foreign Economic Commission the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Finance, the Foreign Economic Bank and other respective institutions in the country should provide the most favorable conditions for the independent trading by domestic exporters on foreign markets and comprehensively encourage them through a system of economic facilities and privileges. It is necessary to develop a contemporary system for crediting and ensuring foreign economic operations. With rare exceptions, the licensing of exports must become general and not concentrated on specific items, and should be aimed above all at restricting economically unjustified imports. In turn, the Ministry of Finance should offer real tax benefits to exporters.

In the interest of this project, we should as soon as possible and no later than in 1991, introduce a realistic rate of exchange of the ruble for foreign economic operations and start preparations for making a gradual transition to a convertible Soviet currency. We must go back to the idea of a parallel (convertible) currency. Supported by our exports, gold reserves and direct imports of foreign private capital and international loans, such a currency could revive our entire foreign economic sector and, in the course of time, could even eliminate the present "bad" ruble. In China the "wooden

yuan" and the "gold yuan" coexist and function quite successfully! Our own experience of the 1920s proves the same.

Finally, it is time to realize that a complex and difficult subject, such as foreign economic activities, should be the work of professionals who have mastered the harsh laws and demands of the international market with its fierce competitiveness and complex interwoven tremendous numbers of factors which influence the situation. A wise English saying appropriately stipulates that "any idiot can sell at a loss."

With the right freely to export on the foreign markets, enterprises and organizations, particularly small and medium-sized, should have the possibility of using the skilled services of independent (i.e., nondepartmental) general trade brokers operating on a total cost accounting basis or, to use international terminology, "trade houses." This would enable us to reduce costs, eliminate unnecessary duplication, prevent foreign currency losses and, as a result, obtain the highest possible returns on foreign economic activities.

The new concept of foreign economic relations, which is based on exports, requires radical changes in our approach to imports. For obvious reasons it is impossible immediately to abandon forced imports needed to cover shortages. However, we must aspire to achieve this by systematically and firmly replacing the structure of imports and eliminating with their help not the consequences but the reasons for the outbreak of shortages.

Today the main articles of our imports, in addition to food, are medium complex equipment, machines and industrial materials (metals, chemicals, etc.), i.e., essentially that which we could produce ourselves in adequate amounts and satisfy our own needs providing that the economy is efficiently managed. Understandably, a radical economic reform and a conversion to a market-oriented mechanism for economic management will put everything in its proper place, in the final account, including imports. However, this does not mean in the least that import policy should passively wait for changes for the better in the national economy instead of actively contributing to a change which became pressing a long time ago. Of course not! Imports must be firmly serve perestroika.

In the short term, the main task of import purchases should be, as we said, help in meeting consumer demand and eliminating the budget deficit. This requires major and systematic purchases of consumer goods in greater demand for the next two to three years. The question which immediately arises is where to find the necessary funds?

Several possibilities exist. First, extraordinary efforts must be made to sell abroad anything we can from the huge material and technical stocks (particularly above-normal unnecessary installations, secondary raw materials, scrap metal and a great many other items which are now lying idle). Such exports alone would allow us,

within a couple of years, to "purchase out" the 150-200 billion rubles of "hot money" from the population, which has messed up our internal consumer market.

Second, we must reduce imports of equipment for group "A" sectors (which account for more than one-third of the cost of our entire imports during the perestroika period). Under the conditions of reduced investments in new industrial construction in such sectors and considering the huge volumes of unfinished construction, and the growing stockpiles of uninstalled imported equipment at many enterprises, more than one-third of the foreign exchange income and the lion's share of loans (essentially for the purchase of equipment) continue to be spent for such purposes, which makes simply foolish such waste, particularly given the present situation on the consumer market.

Third, we must decisively take the path of reducing imports of agricultural commodities, for the production of which domestically all the necessary conditions exist. We can simply not allow ourselves such imports on the previous scale. The country is bankrupt. Rubles and foreign exchange must be invested above all in our own agriculture, in the processing sectors and the infrastructure, as is being practiced by virtually all countries in the world. Changes in forms of economic management and ownership in such sectors offer a certain hope that henceforth invested funds will go to the true owners (and not the "curators") and yield real economic results. The currency which would be saved from stopping grain imports should be channeled into specific projects in the building of storage facilities, roads, processing capacities, and so on, which would sharply reduce losses in agricultural commodities. In turn, this would make it possible to further reduce food imports.

Fourth, energetic steps must be taken to mobilize all foreign exchange possibilities of the country. For example, no particular efforts are required to draw and use the foreign exchange owned by the population. The action involving the "Berezka" (closing down stores which traded with checks or certificates) was an unforgivable error and should be corrected as soon as possible. The Foreign Economic Bank should lift all restrictions concerning private deposits in foreign currency and the spending of the latter, and pay depositors standard worldwide-accepted interest. This, however, may turn out to be insufficient. Finally, we must provide reliable legal guarantees against confiscations or any other possible attempts on the part of the state concerning such accounts. It is time to stop fearing the long-term leasing to foreigners of anything in demand on their part, such as land, buildings, installations, housing, etc.

Other major sources for increasing foreign currency resources exist as well. The most obvious among them is revising the policy of aid to other countries. Currently such aid amounts to a minimum of \$15 billion annually. Considering the present economic crisis, this is an unbearable burden. If the full cost of rebuilding the domestic consumer market and "buying out" the hot

money and the financial health of the country would total (based on world prices) \$15-20 billion, do we have the moral right as regards our own people to waste such funds in other parts of the world where even our political interests are, to say the least, questionable?

Fifth, we should calmly consider the possibility of involving foreign loans without displaying unnecessary emotions on this matter. Above all, we must objectively assess the situation concerning our foreign debts and separate the short-term operative debts which must be strictly controlled by the Foreign Economic Bank, from medium-term and long-term credits which were obtained either directly by the government or were guaranteed by it. This would enable us precisely to determine the necessary funds for "servicing the debt" (interest and repayment of principal), taking a new important factor into consideration. The point is, starting with 1991, in connection with changes in our accounts with Eastern European countries, our exports will essentially be based on freely convertible currency. This means that subsequent repayment of debts will pertain not to the old and relatively small exports against convertible currency to the nonsocialist countries (about 16 billion rubles), but the virtually entire amount of exports (about 60 billion rubles). According to the estimates of the information service of the Bank of America, the correlation between the annual repayment of debts and the volume of exports would be for the USSR, for 1991, 15.5 percent (the normal ratio is 20-25 percent).

In any case, the question of additional loans should not be neglected, although the increased delays of Soviet organizations in paying their foreign customers are worsening (temporarily, we hope) the situation. Actually, it would be useful to make a thorough study of the reasons for such hitches: could they be related to the aspiration to strengthen the monopoly of departments on foreign economic activities or to breakdowns in the bureaucratic machinery of the exclusive foreign exchange monopolist, who is short both of personnel, premises and contemporary equipment to service a sharply increased number of clients?

Naturally, it is also very important for loans to be used efficiently. It is no secret that major loans recently obtained from Western Europe for the development of the light and food industries are being used with great difficulty and returns on such loans are clearly dragging.

Sixth, a review of economic relations with Eastern European countries (in connection with the radical changes taking place in those countries) opens new opportunities for a more efficient development of Soviet foreign trade. The conversion, starting with 1991, to the settling of accounts with such countries on the basis of world prices and in convertible currency will contribute to the consolidation of economic relations between them on a firm, natural and truly mutually profitable basis, not burdened by ideological dogmas and an artificially inflated trade of goods which are noncompetitive on the global market. From the economic viewpoint, orienting 60 percent of

the domestic foreign economic trade toward such countries is clearly unjustified, taking into consideration their share of world production and international trade. We should not fear any likely drop in trade with Eastern European countries. Healthy and economically substantiated relations will remain and strengthen. Furthermore, converting to a new base of accounts based on world prices with such countries would, according to available estimates, yield the country annually an additional roughly \$16 billion.

There is another important circumstance which will have a substantial influence on foreign economic relations. The point is that our trade with a united Germany will probably total about \$30-33 billion annually (on the level of the trade between the FRG and the United States). This means that the GDR plus the FRG will become our biggest trade partner, which provides new opportunities for broadening economic cooperation with a united Germany on a large-scale and long-term basis.

It is thus that by accelerating exports, economizing on the purchases of equipment and grain and mobilizing domestic foreign currency reserves, reviewing our aid policy, involving foreign loans and changing the nature of relations with Eastern European countries and with a united Germany we could, within the immediate future, find additional resources which will give our imports a more efficient social trend of development, redirecting it toward the solution of the most pressing problem, which is balancing the market with the budget.

This, however, is for the immediate future. In the more distant future the role of imports must intensify as a source of attraction of foreign capital, technology and managerial experience and as a powerful competition-promoting factor affecting the country's domestic market. For decades we underestimated a most important function of foreign economic relations such as a comparison between domestic and global levels of production, national and global costs and the scientific and technical novelty of output. Meanwhile, the experience of the leading industrial countries proves that such a comparison, based on international competition, is a mandatory prerequisite for a dynamic economic growth and scientific and technical progress. Importing goods and the extensive attracting of foreign investments in the country, as well as exporting specific goods on the world markets are the real ways for comparing and correlating domestic with global levels of output, technology, labor productivity and production quality. Meanwhile, this will be the catalyst which will truly encourage our producers and merchants (domestically and on the world market) and force them, in Lenin's words, to learn to manage and learn to trade.

With efficient and economically substantiated imports of what would be either unprofitable or impossible to produce domestically, we could channel the thus released material, labor and financial resources into

economic sectors which, for a variety of reasons, we could develop more efficiently both for our own sake and for the world market.

However, in order to benefit from the international division of labor, in its entire variety and not merely through simple exchange of goods, we must attack the "sacred cow" of ideological dogmatism, i.e., create the type of normal conditions universally acceptable for foreign capital investments and enterprise in the country and, once and for all, abandon the concept of "besieged fortress."

The first step in that direction was allowing the creation of joint enterprises in the USSR with the participation of foreign partners. However, this was a rather timid step and, despite a number of additional resolutions, for the time being joint enterprises have not yielded proper results in the sense of extensively attracting foreign capital and technology, particularly in the production area. No more than 10 percent of some 2,000 joint enterprises registered so far are operating successfully. Why is this?

The main reason is that foreign partners could show profit from activities in our country almost exclusively by exporting goods or services. If we wish to ensure the serious participation of foreign partners in joint enterprises, we should make possible earnings in convertible currency. Simple calculations prove that it would be profitable for us to convert profits from goods produced on Soviet territory into import-replacing goods rather than simply paying their full price as we import them.

We must also give the joint enterprises the legal aspects of stock companies, as is universally accepted, the more so since within the country we are moving in that direction.

In order to involve foreign capital on a truly extensive basis it would serve us to go back (taking the current situation in the country and the world into consideration) to the Leninist idea of concessions. If Lenin did not fear involving foreign capital in the young and still weak Soviet republic, persistently explaining that this would not bring about either any "bargain sale of Russia" or the restoration of capitalism, why should we not, as a great power, apply this on an extensive scale, naturally with proper legal and economic guarantees.

Concessions (direct and mixed) could be granted, above all, in the area of the production of consumer goods, in new technologies, and in the development of complex exportable energy raw material resources (such as the extraction of minerals from the continental shelf). In any case, goods produced by concessionary enterprises would be less expensive than imported goods, for we would begin to earn income from leasing the land, equipment, communal services, local materials and manpower, not to mention taxes. The goods produced by concessionary enterprises would also provide a powerful competitive factor on the domestic market, which is very

important in the light of the development of antimonopoly measures in our country.

We need not fear that the Soviet economy will become "enslaved" to foreign capital. In 1989, for example, foreign investments in the United States, of all kinds, totaled about \$2 trillion, of which direct capital investments (i.e., in enterprises, real estate, etc.) exceeded \$200 billion. Such investments particularly increased in the 1980s. Would any sensibly thinking person seriously speak of the "colonizing of the United States" by foreign capital?

Today the free flow of capital is one of the main prerequisites for the dynamic growth and prosperity of many countries which have become involved in the global integration process, for foreign investments, direct capital investments in particular, mean not simply a flow of funds but also new technology, contemporary equipment, progressive managerial experience, new jobs, etc.

In order to become part of the international division of labor and global economic integration processes, we must create within the country the necessary prerequisites to this effect, from comparability of statistics and customs tariffs, standards and taxation system to guarantees to foreign investors and entrepreneurs. We must accelerate the process of joining the most important international economic agreements and organizations. All of these important problems, related to involving the USSR in international economic cooperation, should not be left to departments which, as experience has indicated, find it difficult to rise to the level of understanding national interests. We simply need to have an economic diplomacy. This complex national matter should be headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as is the custom in most countries in the world, the more so since economic diplomacy is a powerful support in pursuing a foreign economic course of action.

Of late our country has found itself at the crossroads. Its integrity, its place in the world and its political and geopolitical future directly depend on the success or, conversely, the failure of the economic reform. We doubt if there have ever been at any other time possibilities of restoring the health of the economy and turning it to the market without the use of the foreign economic factor and outside help. We profoundly believe that if we rely today exclusively on our forces we would be unable to resolve this problem. The more energetically we use the possibility of international economic cooperation the faster and the more confidently we shall be able not only to surmount the present crisis but also to go forward.

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Golden Grain. Food Import Problems

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[Text] Today problems of foreign trade—how and what for are we spending our scarce foreign currency—are triggering tempestuous arguments. These problems are discussed by committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, among scientists and in the press. Occasionally, they seem to inevitably lead to exaggerations and reciprocal charges. The opposing sides try less to substantiate their arguments than to discredit the arguments of their enemies.

Why enemies? Apparently, the "image of the enemy" can now be applied in discussing problems of economic policy. This is a matter of common interest to practical workers, scientists and journalists, who must meet around the same table, speak and listen and reach agreements. Emotional indicting debates have exhausted their usefulness and the time has come for constructive joint encounters. It is an experience of this kind that we are offering to the readers. It involves the participation of Oleg Klimov, chairman of the Eksporthleb All-Union Foreign Economic Association, and Andrey Sizov, leading scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations. The talk was moderated by Aleksey Ulyukayev, editor in charge of the department of political economy and economic policy.

Ulyukayev: In recent years, whatever kind of harvest we have, we regularly lose \$5-6 billion annually to purchase that which, based on our natural-weather conditions, we should be able to produce at home. Let us begin with a discussion of the mechanism of the cause and effect of grain imports.

Klimov: Records on grain imports have been kept since 1963, when the first major purchases were made. At that time, however, they were still not regular. There also were exports. Some years we even were net exporters. In particular, the country exported excellent quality high-protein wheat from the Northern Caucasus and Kazakhstan. Since 1972, however, annual mass grain purchases began and we became a net importer. It is true that, statistically, to this day we do export certain amounts but they amount to some 20,000-30,000 tons or, in short, a drop in the bucket. The volumes of purchases are huge: in 1989 alone they amounted to 38 million tons of grain, worth 3.2 billion foreign currency rubles or approximately \$5 billion. Furthermore, we also purchased more than 4 million tons of soybeans and soybean cake totaling roughly \$1 billion. Therefore, the country spent \$6 billion.

Now as to the structure. Until recently we purchased food and livestock grain in approximately equal amounts. Last year, wheat for human consumption accounted for no more than 31 percent in volume and 33 percent in the cost of our purchases. The rest went into animal feed.

I consider as the main reason for the growth of imports the inadmissibly low standards of our agricultural production and the tremendous amount of losses in the fields, in transportation, in the elevators and in the commercial network. Occasionally, as a result of the extremely poor handling of the domestic grain its use has been impossible for food and even animal husbandry purposes, although officially it was listed as such. The growing grain scarcity had to be covered above all with overseas purchases.

Ulyukayev: These reasons are understandable. However, losses and shortcomings in transportation, storage, and so on, have always existed in our country. Why did we start firmly to import precisely then, at the turn of the 1970s?

Sizov: I believe that this was related to the changes which occurred on the world markets, above all on the market of energy carriers. The increased prices of petroleum and, therefore, increased export earnings, enabled us freely to import large quantities of grain. V. Matskevich, the former minister of agriculture, recently published an article which mentions, in particular, the way we became involved in this import circle. The view of the leadership was expressed in the words of the then Gosplan chairman, L. Baybakov: "Tell me how much grain you need and I will buy you 10, or 100 shiploads of grain." This approach seems, on the surface, quite simple. However, it is the most dangerous and was used for a number of years, resulting in the fact that we became quite heavily dependent on foreign procurements.

Klimov: Let me clarify something. The possibility of easily resorting to imports, naturally, exerted pressure on the position of the government and the planning departments. However, it could not influence the direct production process. What had a kolkhoz chairman to do with this? He did not even know how much we purchased abroad. The figures became known only in the past couple of years, thanks to the press.

Sizov: However, the kolkhoz chairman feels the changes which occur in economic conditions. The economic conditions for farming are created by departments. Unquestionably, the prime reasons for our imports are irresponsibility and the critical situation in the agro-industrial complexes. However, we should not deny the corrupting influence of imports, strictly speaking, on the state of affairs in the country's grain production. For many long years the production not of high quality but of any kind of grain was encouraged; gross output indicators were in order. Looking at statistical figures, we see that while domestic wheat production increased, purchases of bread-quality grain declined. This was largely thanks to the fact that we kept receiving steady supplies of high-quality grain from abroad. The orientation toward such purposes corroded our entire grain production system.

Klimov: Still, I disagree that foreign trade adversely affects agricultural production. Had we had a normal

agrarian policy, not only imports but even discussions related to them would be unnecessary. Unquestionably, imports became easily acceptable because of the availability of petrodollars. This enabled the government to ignore problems which were facing our agriculture. Now, in my view, everything is clear: if you want to reduce imports, you must increase output. However, as in the past, this process is marking time.

Ulyukayev: Let us be specific: What comes first and what comes second? Should we gradually improve our production, at which point we could abandon imports or, perhaps, should we immediately stop imports, which will provide an incentive. Do what you want, you will no longer receive a single ton of grain from overseas. We should apply, as is now fashionable to say, "shock therapy."

Klimov: This too is possible but at that point we shall have to tighten up our belts and drastically reduce meat production and supplies to the population of grain products. Today no one is speaking of totally ending imports. According to the Reuter News Agency, even Comrade Veprev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Agrarian Problems and Food Supplies, has said that we could hope to reduce imports not before 3 to 5 years. Naturally, the structure of imports must be improved as of now. We must improve the planning of purchases.

Ulyukayev: You say that we cannot do without importing grain, for we must increase meat production. However, it is much more economically profitable to purchase directly meat and dairy products than to purchase grain and feed with it our not all that purebred cattle, under not very good conditions and with poor labor incentives to livestock breeders.

Klimov: This too is not entirely right, for today it is virtually impossible to buy inexpensive meat on the world market, while grain prices have dropped. Therefore, that which applied yesterday could not be extended to apply to the future. In principle, we must pursue a flexible policy. When meat prices are low, naturally, it is more advantageous to purchase meat. However, we must not forget our limited transportation facilities, for in order to procure meat we need specialized vehicles which come expensive. The main guideline should be economic advantage. We should purchase abroad that which indeed we are unable to produce domestically at any given time, as well as that which is more advantageous. Therefore, we should support the idea of changing the structure of imports. We must lower the share of food grain. Our domestic production of such grain is 90 million tons. This is a great amount. We could even export a little, but at this point a large number of problems arise. For example, we wanted to sell 1 million tons of rye abroad. However, the quality of the rye in our country is such that we were unable to sell it profitably. Wheat is also essentially of low quality. The emphasis on volume led to the fact that the production and procurement of high quality grain in the country declined.

Ulyukayev: We frequently describe such grain as grain fit for food consumption by inertia. In terms of its baking qualities, it is much worse than it was 20 years ago.

Klimov: This is confirmed by the fact alone that our purchasers (the Ministry of Grain Products in the past and the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Procurements today) regularly requests the purchasing of several million tons of high grade wheat. We purchase such grain from Canada and the United States, at a high price, to improve the quality of the bread. However, in this area we have some difficulties, for foreign granaries are not infinite. Last year, for example, we were on the brink of a food crisis. In 1988 there was a drought in the United States. The situation on the world food markets worsened. Roughly speaking, the Soviet Union ate up all world stocks of inexpensive meat and grain. Had the drought been repeated in the United States in 1989, we might have been unable to buy anything at all and find ourselves on the brink of hunger.

Sizov: You said that in 1989 we might have gone hungry. In other words, like it or not, we are dependent on the U.S. harvest. This is a terrifying situation for a country with a tremendous arable area, producing more than 200 million tons of grain.

Ulyukayev: Let us consider the mechanism of purchases. Who places the orders? Who pays for them? Where does the money come from? How are the figures of 40 or 50 million tons which we must purchase appear?

Klimov: The rough plans for imports are formulated by the USSR Gosplan. As a rule, however, it issues a lower figure for purchases. At the stage at which the prospects for grain production become clear (sometime in August), the State Commission raises the question of grain purchases. At this point the amount becomes higher. Let us note that the handling capacity of the ports is primarily based on an approximation of the quantity planned by the Gosplan, i.e., some 20 million tons per year. If we know that, in fact, we shall have to purchase more, such estimates should be computed not after the crop has been harvested but earlier, in order to ensure more or less even deliveries.

Proposals on increasing grain purchases are considered by the Gosplan, with the participation of the State Commission and other departments, such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Maritime Fleet, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Foreign Economic Bank. Occasionally, consultations are held but sometimes we are not listened to. For example, aware of the handling capacities of ports, we, together with the Ministry of Maritime Fleet, frequently say that the set deadlines for shipments are too short and that it is impossible to procure the necessary volume of grain within that time. However, our arguments are ignored. The government passes a resolution and we must implement it. We are asked how much this will cost. We answer that "according to the market, it will be so much." We are told: "This is too much, and here is what

you get." We are then given foreign currency which turns out to be substantially less than what we requested. That is how problems arise.

For example, last and this year the situation was very tight, when it became necessary to buy huge amounts, within a very short time at that. The decision to do so was delayed and was passed only by the end of September. The shipping our purchases had to be completed before January. Yet no less than 2 months are needed, under normal circumstances, to purchase the commodity, to handle the freight in the foreign port and for the turnover of the ships. The schedule was quite tight, for which reason in January more than 2 million tons of grain were waiting to be unloaded in our ports. And this despite the fact that we were unable to implement precisely the instructions of the Council of Ministers. We were slightly behind. Otherwise, 4 million tons would have piled up at the ports, which means penalties for ship idling, loss of freight, etc.

Subsequently, another resolution was passed and, once again, together with the Ministry of Maritime Fleet, we proved to the State Commission that it was impossible to handle such volumes within the required time. Our ports were short of capacities and the number of freight cars was inadequate. That is precisely what happened. Add to this the problem of payments.... Whereas in the past, the moment the instructions of the Council of Ministers would be issued, we knew that payments had been secured, whereas this year the situation was extremely difficult. As a result, the work rhythm was irregular. If one is planning in advance purchases on the market, one could make use of fluctuations in the situation and stock exchange operations, i.e., one could buy much more advantageously.

All such spontaneous decisions adversely affect our business. Naturally, we try to take the situation into consideration and in the majority of cases we buy below world quoted prices. However, had decisions on payments been issued at a normal rate, our work would have been more successful.

Ulyukayev: Do I understand you correctly that you are unable to pursue systematically a trade policy, i.e., that you cannot look much farther than two or three months?

Klimov: Yes. A sensible commercial policy can be sensibly built only when purchase decisions are made at the most twice annually. There must be a realistic projection of what we shall be needing for the next year and how much we should buy.

Incidentally, the Americans have already projected our crop for this year and assessed that we shall need to import 36 million tons. The fact that they may be wrong is not excluded. Therefore, we must have our own accurate projection. As early as August we must make a well considered decision in order efficiently to use the ports and to use, for haulage, primarily Soviet ships; the

volumes must be precisely computed by October-November. We are spending too much on chartering foreign vessels. Regularity of procurements is what we need.

Sizov: I am afraid that even excellent projections and timely resolutions would be unable to change the situation. Why? Because all of our actions are based on the faulty apportionment principle of shaping the Union-wide grain stock. It is believed now that it should total 85 million tons, to meet the needs for food and for animal feed within the framework of the interrepublic balance. The result is that, actually, as in the past, the government assumes the obligation to feed not only the people but also the cattle. These are vestiges of the old approaches which reproduce the command-apportionment mechanism of managing the agrarian sector. In this case, Eksportkhran finds itself at the tail-end of the administrative chain. It has the burden of urgently plugging the holes which will constantly appear, for the desired amount of purchases is never reached. For example, the latest increase of grain purchase prices by 50 percent is an anti-incentive for increasing the volume of sales. Furthermore, this may even result in reducing sales. Why? Because by selling less the producer would earn the same amount of money as in the past, and he does not need any more, for there is nothing that he could buy with it. Such additional 9 billion rubles per year, wasted because of increased purchase prices, will only worsen inflation in the country.

In my view, the state should assume the obligation to procure only the food stock. As to fodder, at this point the producers themselves can resolve such problems more successfully. In other words, we must expand the range of free market relations.

Ulyukayev: I would like to clear yet another question. What, nonetheless, is the restricting factor: money or tons, cost or volume, when we make decisions on grain imports?

Klimov: To the best of my understanding, all of this is based on the balance of procurements. The difference between what was purchased within the country and that which, in the view of the Gosplan and the State Commission, is needed to supply animal husbandry and the population, is what determines the volume of purchases abroad. In the past we proceeded precisely on the basis of this figure, for until 1989 we had no problem with foreign currency. The situation has now changed. The question has appeared: How to purchase if there is no foreign currency? The possibility of borrowing abroad has been reduced. Whereas in the past we could obtain loans for grain purchases from the Foreign Economic Bank, today we have been switched to a system of commercial credit. We are therefore forced to turn to foreign companies which tell us that their lending capacity is not unlimited. The companies with which we deal do not, as a rule, have substantial funds. Therefore, in order to extend credit to us, the company itself must turn to the bank for money. Foreign banks, which are

perfectly aware of our overall solvency, limit their commodity credits. Whereas in April, let us say, the question of the annual credit was resolved quite simply, now the companies say, "forgive us but we cannot extend credit for 360 days. The maximum is 180."

Sizov: The problem is becoming increasingly aggravated. Recently V. Gerashchenko, chairman of the board of the USSR Gosbank, said in an interview given to Reuter that we sold gold and other assets worth 1.5 billion rubles in foreign exchange, i.e., worth more than \$2 billion. Actually, this is not a sale but a mortgage which could be redeemed. This was done to prevent the prices of gold from dropping. The foreign exchange factor has today obviously become the most important one in grain purchases.

Klimov: The world practice is to grant commercial credit for the duration of the existence of the commodity itself. Fodder and grain, however, are consumed relatively quickly. In the grain business a 360-day credit is very long. In this area we cannot rely on long-term loans.

I am confident that in the future as well the commercial companies will extend normal credit to us. All that our association needs is to submit on time bank guarantees. "Unfortunately, the risk of trading with you has increased," is an opinion which is heard with increased frequency during talks. Naturally, all of this cannot fail to affect the stipulations of the contract.

Ulyukayev: My impression is that the food scenario for 1991 is developing quite adversely. Although this year we are expecting a decent harvest, it may turn out that the volume of domestic purchases for the Union grain stock will be lower than during periods when harvests were mediocre.¹ This is explained by the lack of interest by the farms in increasing their volume of sales at high prices and the impossibility to spend the money earned normally. The dependence of the balance of payments on income from oil exports is quite high (according to estimates, a 3 percent reduction in oil extraction, let us say, results in a reduction of petroleum exports by approximately 12 percent). Therefore, it is not excluded that the foreign exchange possibilities for imports will be quite limited while internal purchases will decline. Could the specialists refute my unpleasant expectations?

Sizov and Klimov: We would like to but we cannot. The likelihood of the development of such a situation is high and we are not entirely prepared to handle it.

Klimov: Here is yet another aspect of the situation. The Gosplan and the State Commission are giving us the structure of imports. However, their decision is one thing and the condition of the market an entirely different one. Last year, for example, we were asked to purchase more barley than was available on the world market.

Sizov: Does it mean that the State Commission has no idea of the real situation on the world grain market?

Klimov: It proceeds from what it considers necessary for domestic consumption and supplies. Naturally, if something is lacking on the market, they discuss with us how to substitute it with something else. However, it would be better to make a specific decision, immediately at that.

Now as the quality of the purchased grain. This question is being heatedly discussed. I must point out that the commodity purchased abroad is consistent with the standards of the producers and, at the time of shipment, must meet the requirements of our own procurer and the conditions of the contract. Otherwise we simply refuse to pay. Nonetheless, deviations exist such as, for example, the existence of live pests in grain. We have begun to treat the grain along the way and this year the percentage of contaminated grain dropped to 0.4 percent; as late as 1985, it was 6.8 percent.

Take the question of seeds from quarantined plants. We encountered this problem in 1972, when we began to import large volumes of grain from the United States. The entire grain was polluted with the seeds of plants which are not considered weeds in that country but are to us. If we import such grain for baking bread, everything is in order. However, its use as seed is strictly prohibited. We held talks with the United States. We were told that in the case of the United States and some of its other customers this is not a problem. If this worries the Soviet Union so much, we shall assign, they said, special areas in Kansas and Oklahoma, where we shall use herbicides, eliminate all weeds, sow clean grain, lease special trains and a couple of elevators, and you will pay the full cost. This will be an additional \$20 per ton. Where could we invest this money better: in American agriculture or in our own? The answer is clear.

We must say that, as a whole, the quality of imported grain is superior to ours. Incidentally, at the time that the familiar 620th Resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers on Domestic Purchases of Grain for Foreign Exchange was being drafted, we tried to include in it the stipulation that the grain procured domestically should be of the same quality as the imported grain, or at least consistent with the State Standard. All this, however, was crossed out, for we were told that otherwise we would be unable to procure anything at all.

Ulyukayev: Let us shed light on yet another feature. What are the prices paid by the organizations which participate in this process? Understandably, the prices paid by Eksportkhleb are determined by the market. What prices do you set to the suppliers? Are they different from the prices of grain produced domestically?

Klimov: We purchase at world prices and sell to the customer at domestic wholesale prices which are quite low. Therefore, when world prices are high we sell at a loss. Currently wheat and corn are showing a slight profit, all of which, however, goes to the budget.

Ulyukayev: The result is that it is much more advantageous to purchase grain with your help than to make do

with our own production. This suits both kolkhozes and sovkhozes, departments, and processing enterprises. The quality is high, the price is low. There are loading and unloading conveniences. Everything is in favor of increasing grain imports. It turns out that what is unprofitable to the country at large is profitable to everyone within this chain, from Eksportkhran to the consumer's table. Whether I work as a transportation worker, chief of a bakery, director of an elevator or a sovkhoz, it is always better for me to deal with imported grain. This creates a conflict between the national economic interest and various individual advantages.

Klimov: Such is the case indeed. The processing enterprises pay the same price for grain, whether purchased from the domestic or the foreign market. However, they naturally benefit from handling imported grain. The enterprise will even pay us a bonus for imported grain, for its quality is better and will yield more flour.

Sizov: The result is that by importing we have undermined the incentive to upgrade the quality of domestic grain.

Klimov: You are once again confusing the supplier with the producer. There is no excuse for producers who have messed up our agriculture. There is no excuse for VASKHNIL, which has totally neglected grain quality improvements. There are no excuses for Gosagroprom. All of them must be held responsible for this.

Sizov: Let me say that there exists a chain of interlinked interests, linking Gosagroprom with VASKHNIL and the State Commission. For example, why should Gosagroprom work for quality when it could fulfill its plan through gross output?

Ulyukayev: Naturally, many specific agencies are responsible for the catastrophic situation in which our food sector finds itself. However, they are all united in one thing: they found it easier to fail in the implementation of their direct obligations because they could cover themselves with imports. VASKHNIL, for example, does not find it necessary to be particularly concerned with the quality of the grain, for it is not being pressured by the government. The government is not pressuring because it can solve the problem of obtaining quality grain. Easy imports signaled to all units: loosen up, no questions asked. Yet the problems remain numerous.

Klimov: Yes, in the 1970s and subsequently this played a negative role and we are now suffering from the results.

Sizov: We also found ourselves trapped. We cannot immediately and sharply reduce imports, being exceptionally dependent on them.

Klimov: Naturally, no drastic changes are possible. This applies not only to the overall volume of purchases but also to their structure. Changes must be adapted to the market but the market as well should adapt to our changes. Such changes must be made gradually. Sharp changes could create major fluctuations in world prices.

Ulyukayev: In other words, we must pursue a systematic foreign trade policy. We must know, in the final account, what we shall be needing 5 or 10 years hence and, gradually but firmly, advance in our chosen direction.

Now as to the efforts to "come out of the trap." Tell us, please, your feelings concerning domestic purchases in foreign currency, for last year's resolution on this subject brought much hope.

Klimov: Yes, there was such hope but no results were achieved. We purchased slightly more than 300,000 tons. To begin with, the resolution was late in coming out. Second, the traditional conservatism of the peasant played its role, the fear that this money will be taken away from him. Third, the sellers were unfamiliar with the real value of the foreign exchange ruble. What was better: 16 rubles in foreign exchange or 300 Soviet rubles? Furthermore, not all farms are sufficiently strong. If you earned foreign exchange you could buy something with it only after a certain period of time. Not everyone could meet his financial obligations during that interval. Earnings in rubles are paid immediately. The system itself was by no means impeccable. From my viewpoint, it must be modified. For example, the amount of the state order or the tax-in-kind, over and above which one would have the right to sell for foreign exchange, should be defined more accurately.

In general, with a normal economy and a normal monetary circulation, there should be no internal purchases for foreign exchange. Such purchases are a confirmation of the extreme situation. Should this situation remain, the validity of this resolution should be extended by 1 or 2 years.

Ulyukayev: I would like to hear your view on intergovernmental grain agreements and, particularly, on the latest one. To what extent is such a practice good and useful to us? The question arises whether we should enslave ourselves for 5 years. Perhaps (anything may happen), in 1 year our agriculture would straighten out and yield an unparalleled crop and the need for imports would vanish.

Klimov: Above all, let me point out that such agreements are not of a commercial but of a commercial-political nature. For example, we traditionally purchase a great deal of grain from Canada. Whether a long-term agreement exists or does not, we shall continue to purchase from Canada. This benefits both sides.

The agreement with Argentina is roughly similar. We have bought and will continue to buy food from Argentina. The agreement is like a superstructure. Incidentally, let me point out that the Argentine agreement has not been kept by either side even once in the four years of its existence. Either Argentina is unable to procure the necessary amount or we find the deadlines unsuitable or else the price too high.

The agreement with France (which, essentially, is a simple exchange of letters) is totally unrelated to strictly

grain problems. Grain purchases here are made simply in order to balance the high French deficit from trading with us. I shall not comment at all on the recent agreement concluded with Australia. It was not dictated by the interests of our grain policy. Australian grain has a low protein content and its price is higher. Today it is noncompetitive on the market.

Ulyukayev: In other words, were these agreements simply political gestures?

Klimov: Naturally. Take the latest American agreement. How can we refuse it if we are trying to conclude a trade agreement? The more so since every year we purchase from America 15 to 20 million tons of grain. On the other hand, this grain agreement is commercially profitable for us because it enables the Americans to pay subsidies as part of its program for the development of exports. Since 1986 we have purchased from the United States more than 21 million tons of subsidized wheat, and benefited from this agreement to the amount of some \$600 million. On the other hand, American subsidies encouraged the EEC as well to grant subsidies. Everything is interconnected. If we are granted the status of most favored nation we could rely on addition benefits, the so-called export credit guarantees.

Sizov: Let me add that this agreement is advantageously different from other. First, it provides a certain freedom to maneuver. Depending on the situation, we can buy not a stipulated type of grain but any kind: barley, sorghum, or corn. Second, it is stipulated that grain purchased from the United States will be based on world competitive prices and not on the prices on the American market. Third, naturally, are the financial advantages we noted. Fourth, it is linked to the trade agreement. We have finally begun to make use of the principle of linkage.

Let us look further. Talks within the GATT are drawing to an end. It appears that agreement will be reached on a gradual reduction of agricultural export subsidies. We must be prepared for this as well as for the possibility that the competition between the European Community and the United States will diminish.

Furthermore, according to the agreement with the United States, we must purchase some 50 million tons over a five-year period. This will cost \$7-8 billion. Sadly, these figures appeared without any whatsoever discussion. It is not a matter of whether this agreement is bad or good. It is a matter of the basic approach taken to its conclusion. The USSR Supreme Soviet looks at the budget and discusses each line almost down to 100,000 ruble items. Here it is a question of billions in foreign exchange.

Ulyukayev: Let us sum it up. We agree that although there have been examples of successful grain agreements, in principle they are more of a political than commercial nature and their executor, such as Eksportkhleb, could do very well without them.

Klimov: Yes, excluding the latest American grain agreement, all the others are not commercial but more of a commercial-political nature. Like good will gestures on our part.

Ulyukayev: We come now to the question of the independence of importers, of grain importing organizations in particular. How do you view it? How does one work under these circumstances?

Klimov: So far we remain quite dependent on government decisions. We have no right by ourselves to engage in commercial operations. Let us assume that we know that today a certain commodity is inexpensive while the government in our country has still not made a decision concerning its purchase. We could have bought a batch of this inexpensive commodity and either bring it home, once the decision has been made, or else resell it to another country at a profit. Or else, for example, we are displaying initiative, although not much, but are doing some work on the stock market and earning some money. However, we have no right to make use of our earnings. Together with VASKHNIL we have even done some work on organizing grain commodity stock markets in the USSR. The idea was suggested of converting the association into a stock holding company. Eksportkhleb was, indeed, founded as a stock holding company 65 years ago. We need independence. We need our specialists to be trusted, and the personnel of Eksportkhleb are one of a kind. We have excellent contacts with other companies. Our trademark has a reputation throughout the world. My hope is that a stock holding company would help us make better use of the possibilities at our disposal.

Sizov: I believe that this will not only yield commercial benefits but also will serve as an organizational foundation for rebuilding our export potential, for as an independent stock holding company, Eksportkhleb will operate not only abroad but also within the country, seeking customers and sellers and simulating our grain exports.

Klimov: To this effect, Eksportkhleb must work as a broker. At that point, like any brokerage company, we shall be interested in turnover.

Sizov: The experience of large foreign companies indicates that they not only function on a brokerage basis but also deal with grain processing. They have their own storage bases and transportation facilities.

Klimov: That is what Eksportkhleb was at the start of the 1920s. Nonetheless, we must remain a foreign economic company and not turn into yet one more department. In my view, a network of elevators, and grain reception centers should be set up as an independent association. Incidentally, such associations could purchase some of our stock and we could purchase some of theirs. I believe that this would help to rebuild Russian grain activities.

Ulyukayev: We are already discussing work under market conditions, when your customers and you yourselves will work on the basis of commercial principles, not simply ensuring the implementation of resolutions but serving the entire market chain which expresses the interests of consumers. However, a market is impossible without free exchange of information. What is your view on glasnost in the foreign economic area?

Klimov: We are fully in favor of it and I would hope that our organization cannot be blamed for the lack of it. It is true that many comrades who publish materials on the grain problem prefer to use foreign rather than domestic sources.

Sizov: In our country foreign trade statistics are such as to prevent us from making a professional analysis. A huge amount of data are classified. Why? From whom are we hiding?

Klimov: Naturally, we are not about to advertise our commercial intentions, plans, decisions and means. These are commercial secrets. However, the moment a contract has been signed, the data immediately find their way into the computer of the partner company, and from there begin to travel around the world. It is at that point that being secretive is totally useless. Unquestionably, foreign trade statistics must be much more complete and detailed.

Ulyukayev: Probably we need certain legal guarantees for declassifying information which is neither subject to governmental nor commercial secrecy. We cannot rely in this case on the good will of one official or another. Some show good will while others do not. Foreign economic glasnost must be given legal status at which point, incidentally, there will be less clashes among officials, scientists and journalists.

Footnote

1. This material had already been ready for the press when the announcement came to the effect that by the middle of July the state had purchased within the country almost half the amount of grain compared to last year, which had had a substantially lower harvest (7.5 million tons as against 12.7 million).

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Science of Information in the New Economic Mechanism

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[Article by V. Makarov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member and director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Central Economic-Mathematical Institute]

[Text] The new economic mechanism is taking shape under the influence of a number of factors: democratization of society, changes in the political system, and existing historical, national, cultural, religious and other features. One such factor is the new technological world in which mankind lives or, to put it better, is beginning to live. The economic mechanism and its structural components can be fully consistent with this technological world or else clash with it. In the latter case, neither the mechanism will start working properly nor will there be any technical progress.

The most important feature of the new technological world is the extent of available information. The appearance of new products and the updating of most components of information technology are occurring exceptionally rapidly, literally in terms of months. Under the conditions of a highly centralized planning, when all decisions are made at the top, it is impossible to achieve this kind of dynamism. This is being proved to us constantly by economic life and statistical data. We have fallen far behind the United States in the use of modern information technologies (by more than 10 years, based on the method of "lagging behind," i.e., by determining how many years ago was the leader in an outsider's position) and is continuing to grow.

Other methods used in determining the lagging will provide even higher numbers. Thus, according to various assessments, the number of personal computers in the United States ranges between 20 and 50 million, compared to 200,000-500,000 in the USSR, which is about 1 percent. Computer resources in the USSR, assessed on the basis of the sum of computer memory, the number of processors, their speed, the number of peripheral systems, the volumes of software and databank, the number and length of computer networks, and so on, are extremely insignificant (less than 1 percent of the U.S. level).

That is not all, for the information industry includes anything which produces, processes, distributes, transports, and provides information to consumers in a convenient fashion. A society based on centralized planning develops with great enthusiasm information elements which strengthen vertical connections, from the center to the masses. That is why in our country both radio and television are in very decent shape. The situation with telephone communications is entirely different. Whereas in the United States there is nearly 100 percent availability of telephones, in our country only 37 percent of urban and 13 percent of rural families have a telephone, not to mention the fact that our telephone network is based on extremely backward equipment. In this case, it is not a question of the shortage of funds. Enough funds are available to create a variety of specialized telephone networks for restricted use.

It is simply a question that full telephone facilities were not needed to the state. The administrative-command system needs only the type of information environment

which would ensure receiving commands from above and transmitting them downwards.

The bottlenecks of the existing information structure are clear. Statistics comes first. We are sometimes amazed why in a country with centralized planning statistical data on economic and social processes are much poorer compared to countries with a market-oriented economy, for, as planned, administration from the center should be based on the knowledge of what is taking place in the local areas. The paradox is explained by the fact that each department needs only its own information for the indicators of which it is responsible. The department tries to keep secret this information by means fair or foul, in order, on the one hand, to escape supervision and, on the other, to enhance its importance and to have a resource which it could use in negotiations. The administrative-command system could be presented as a kind of stratified pie of departments, not horizontal but vertical. Information barriers have been erected between the different layers, about which we cannot claim lack of conflict or the existence of a sufficiently complete system of indicators. The State Committee for Statistics is essentially not different from the other departments. It too was characterized by the aspiration to hold a monopoly status and fear of glasnost.

The aspiration of the administrative-command system to block the horizontal flows of information is confirmed by the total secrecy on banking information, which reflects economic interactions among economic organizations. This is a priceless source of the most reliable and current data on economic processes. In the Western world, it is precisely banking information that is the foundation of all economic statistics. In our country, to this day this is a secret hidden behind seven seals. Yet computerization of banking is one of the most important areas of information which could yield the greatest results. In the course of 1 year, banking operations in the country amount to more than 3 trillion rubles. Most of them are the result of corresponding material shifts, such as commodity procurements, and so on. The average delay here is 10 or more days. It is as though we live in a different financial world, operating at a slowed-down speed. In order to be in step with the West, the only way is to create a (technically) similar banking system in which any type of operation takes a few seconds and in which the system of cashless account operations, using magnetic cards and other means are increasingly taking over from cash and according to which the banks make the basic economic decisions rather than mechanically process them.

The information infrastructure which has developed in the country hinders the dissemination of democratic methods of management and the shaping of the new economic mechanism. This mechanism is based on the principles of total economic autonomy and responsibility of the primary units and on market connections, for which reason it requires an essentially new information environment. Let us illustrate this with the example

of increasing economic independence in the development of wholesale trade as one of the market elements.

The study recently conducted by the USSR Academy of Sciences TsEMI [Central Economic-Mathematical Institute] indicates that many enterprises are unwilling to convert to wholesale trade, clinging to centralized supplies and funding. It seems as though enterprises are being given the right to choose their own suppliers, a right which they refuse. This situation is understandable if we consider the financial situation. However, another factor is that under the conditions of wholesale trade the enterprises find themselves in an information vacuum. The old (vertical) information connections are being eliminated while the new (horizontal) are still not in place. They are to be created and an information environment of a different nature, huge in terms of scale and complexity, is to take shape. This applies to wholesale markets, fairs, sale exhibits, exchanges, information services, databanks, etc. Each enterprise must develop thousands of information contacts and have its own dynamic and, at the same time, stable circle of suppliers and consumers.

A real conversion to the market presumes radical changes in the attitude toward intermediary activities and the very person of the broker. Without him the market cannot function efficiently. In a market economy companies engaged in brokerage operations hold a leading position at present. In our country such activities are considered unproductive and almost parasitical.

Nonetheless, global trends indicate that a shift is beginning to take place from a scale to a nomenclatural economy. What does this mean? The currently dominating scale economy professes the principle of production efficiency. This requires production output on a large scale and, perhaps, of a rather limited variety. The economics of mass production (scale) created classical capitalism. Let us recall Henry Ford with his conveyer belts. Socialism took up the slogan of "big production at low cost." This was the path of accelerated elimination of economic backwardness. To this day it retains its significance in the developing countries. The developed countries, in producing commodities for the population, try to satisfy the individual features of consumer demand and reach every consumer. Increasingly, commodities are becoming individualized.

In order to combine the steadily updated variety with the economic efficiency of output, we need an essentially new type of infrastructures of material and technical procurements. We are seeing the birth of the infrastructure of the future, based on a computer information network and its corresponding transportation system. For the sake of the consumer, based on his individual requests, the product is assembled from components the production of which is dispersed throughout the world for reasons of economic efficiency and for when it is needed. The essence of the task is to organize and to synchronize the search for components, their procurement and the assembling of the individualized product.

Major diversified transnational corporations are already beginning to use this labor organization method.

Such computerized logistical systems are among the most outstanding examples of how and in what direction is the global economy developing and the reason for which its individual units are becoming increasingly interdependent. The logic of economic development, the competitive struggle in particular, leads to interdependence. The user of such a system has an advantage over those who organize production and marketing according to the older methods. On the other hand, he becomes essentially dependent on the rest of the world. The internationalization of economic relations inevitably leads to a rapprochement among the individual components of the social system. This involves the economic mechanism strictly speaking, legal control and protection of ownership rights, including intellectual ones, as well as uniform communications standards and rules, standardized business documents, etc.

It is exceptionally important to learn how to predict the results of the impact of information on economic structures and on daily life. The foundations of the future are being laid today. Huge capital investments are being made, based on our present concepts of the future. The consequences of decisions made today will be felt for many decades into the future.

Let us consider the classical question of what to build? What comes to mind immediately is the building of the USSR Academy of Sciences TsEMI, in which I work. It was designed in the mid-1960s, when computers were conceived in terms of spacious halls with window-lined walls, with humming computer machines, halls which were similar to a plant shop. Now we are struggling on problems of the efficient utilization of such halls, for computers are becoming increasingly compact and demand ever less cumbersome auxiliary equipment. The big computers of the recent past are now being replaced by computers which could be carried in a briefcase and plugged in an ordinary electric outlet.

The various areas of the information sector are developing so rapidly and the dynamism with which new developments occur here is so high that even the most daring assumptions do not appear fantastic. If each apartment has its computer, which will be a window to the information world of the planet, the people employed in the information sector will use their own home as a work place. This will mean that no offices or other work premises will be necessary. Funds and capacities for their construction could be concentrated on housing and make it more comfortable. The huge daily flows of people commuting to the center of town will dry out, which will influence the ecological situation, the way the people feel, and the work of transportation companies. This will also affect family life, for working at home becomes like running a family business and the fact that spouses and children will spend more time together will have both advantages and disadvantages.

It is worth considering, therefore, whether we are accurately developing urban agglomerations today. Do we need so many office premises? Is it worth building residential cellular homes?

The information-computer infrastructure reflects the entire social system and its political and economic institutions. It cannot be designed in advance from above and subsequently applied. Such a method can lead to nothing but the creation of administrative-centralized structures.

Developing the information industry from below is not simply the fastest and most economical democratic way. It includes yet another equally important aspect: the feedback, the way the information industry influences the building and development of democratic institutions in society. Man develops, improves, "structures" himself as he consumes information. If information is limited and one-sided, this development as well will be one-sided and even distorted. An information barrier is the most terrible thing. Reducing the information variety can be done imperceptibly, without the person feeling it. The individual becomes aware of the restrictions only when such restrictions are lifted. What is happening today in our country is a good illustration of this fact. Suffice it to recall the Congress of People's Deputies and the 28th CPSU Congress! Thanks to rather lengthy telecasts of the sessions, the people received a huge flow of information, views and suggestions. Many viewers and listeners felt something like a shock. The people's deputies themselves felt the great build-up of a variety of materials which exposed them to different appeals, declarations and references. It was not all that simple to interpret these flows knowledgeably. If in assessing the value of one "paper" or another requires ordinary common sense, this is good. But what if this "paper" requires specialized knowledge, sometimes very extensive one? All of this occurred (one of the rare cases in our history) when the need for professional information jumped outside the walls of scientific institutions. There was a daily, rapid and public reassessment of values. Yet this entire process essentially means the expansion of information space.

Today it is difficult to speak of concretizing the democratic information structure. In my view, its parameters should not be planned from above. We should not instruct ministries to produce by the end of the current five-year period more than a million personal computers. Today this method is unsuitable, perhaps for the unparalleled dynamics of production renovation alone. Already now, according to rough estimates, for each personal computer produced according to the plan, three to four computers are received from abroad, assembled from Western and domestic components and produced without any plan by enterprises, including joint enterprises, cooperatives, or private citizens. We must create an open sector in the information-computer area and lift all artificial obstacles. Ideally, our worker should function in the same type of economic and information

environment as his Western colleague, for otherwise falling behind becomes inevitable.

Today a great deal is being said about free economic zones. The open sector is a somewhat different concept. Whereas a free zone is territorially limited, the open sector is limited functionally. In terms of information products, the concept of borders becomes increasingly eroded and conventional. The first breach was made by radio. The job was finished by the telephone, television, satellite communications and computer networks.

For a long time a strategy of economic development oriented toward self-sufficiency in everything, a peculiar philosophy of economic autarchy, dominated in the country. This led to the opposite results. In a number of sectors it became necessary to repeat Western technology and production. A characteristic inferiority complex developed in designers and engineers. Information integration inevitably destroys the ideology of self-sufficiency. It becomes possible to engage in joint studies and organize joint production in different countries but working within a single collective.

Currently a discussion of the various choices in the concept of developing an information industry in our society is taking place. I believe that under the circumstances, such a discussion is quite meaningless. The information industry affects everything and everyone. The strategy of informatization is inseparable from that of the development of society as a whole. It makes sense to discuss only specific projects in this area and the necessary cost of their implementation. Major and more basic projects must be considered by the Supreme Soviet, for they will be competing for investments with projects formulated in other areas. One thing is clear: the contemporary economic mechanism is inconceivable without corresponding information industry facilities. Conversely, contemporary high technologies, information in particular, demand an adequate economic mechanism.

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PUBLIC OPINION

The Reader Thinks, Argues, Suggests

915B0001G Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 12, Aug 90 (signed to press 1 Aug 90) pp 56-63

[Text] V. Kramnik, candidate of philosophical sciences, Leningrad: "Taking a New Look..."

Let us recall Lenin's warning concerning the power of habit and tradition during a crucial transitional period. Let us apply it to the present, when the processes of renovation and revival of society demand of us to take a new look at ourselves and at the world around us. Yes, in the final account it is the way of life that defines awareness. What about the specific conditions, the specific moment? Does awareness not stimulate or does it

obstruct social change, does it help or hinder various activities, ascribing them a certain pace and specific shape? Does not each one of us have examples of the way traditional thinking dictates a vision of the world based on the "either-or" formula, which is the heir of the rigid and extreme assessments which prevailed in the past: "Ours-not ours;" "enemy-not an enemy?" Such is the situation today as well: either capitalism or socialism; the party—a debate club or a real political force? Social justice or cooperatives and private property? Repentance or action...?

When do we abandon this essentially confrontational approach and begin to think in terms of multiple dimensions, variety and an overall approach? When shall we learn how to benefit from the variety of interests and values and areas and forms of activity of individuals, groups, strata, nations and ethnic groups? When shall we truly become aware of our strength and our wealth!

In the traditional awareness, simple ideas and concepts prevail over the complex ones. Man is structured in such a way that he finds it difficult to adapt to new developments. He is particularly apprehensive of radical major changes, even more so after so many years of inertia and stagnation.

Having become accustomed to a simple and schematic way of thinking, we keep stumbling in the face of a complex way of thinking and are very hesitant when it comes to surmounting it. Mathematical logic dominates the logic of algebra. Such was the case with the NEP, such was the case with the changes initiated by Khrushchev and such is the case today. Hence the task of abandoning habitual approaches and means and understanding that "clear stipulations," "clear objectives," "the only true solutions," "centralism," regulating society "from above" from a "single center" or on the basis of a "single plan" will solve our problems and take the country out of the crisis and ensure a new quality in its development. It is only the organization of a democratic self-management mechanism, a flexible market-regulated economy and steady checking and rechecking of our guidelines in a changing multidimensional world that would enable us to start a gradual yet real advancement toward well-being and progress.

The old awareness tend to rely on power, coercion and prohibitions. In the past, the effort absolutely to redo the world justified coercion, for the sake of a higher justice, a happy future and a new life on earth. This was the ideological source of the revolutionary formula according to which violence is the swaddling nurse of history. However, the social, the human environment opposed this formula and made violence a sporadic local phenomenon. Yet the reflex of prohibitions and restrictions endures. We find it difficult to understand the efficiency of independent, initiative-minded and interested activities in all areas of life, although it is only free, creative and innovative work that can ensure the salvation of the people and the country.

So far, the elimination of the gross neglect of the laws of human nature has not led to their total acceptance. It is only very recently that they have begun to be considered in social practices. So far, however, many natural human features are proclaimed either "alien" or unacceptable under our circumstances. Normal material interests are described as greedy and egotistical; the aspiration to earn a high income is described as the thirst for profit and enrichment; the desire to own the means, objects and products of labor is qualified as an attraction to private ownership and private enterprise. It is on this basis that many vital radical reforms are being rejected.

In general, the traditional type of thinking is firmly entrapped by words and concepts which may be sacred, accepted and natural for man but which reflect more the past than present reality. The old concepts are superimposed on reality and turn into a self-seeking value. Theory and ideology prevail over practice and take its place. Dialectics, the purpose of which is to bring to light and to explain this contradiction, in fact presents wish as reality, the ideal as material, performing not an analytical but an apologetic role. The main function was actually assigned to propaganda. Hence the endless discussions concerning definitions, criteria and indicators, and their consistency with the letter and spirit of the "doctrine," and the dreams of an ideal society.

It is difficult for the traditional mind to surmount the transition from monopoly on truth to a universal search for the truth. How frequently have we witnessed claims of infallibility and the formulation of final opinions and the right to instruct others to follow the true way. This particularly applies to the "sensors" of socialism, who alone know what socialism should be. Therefore, I find unacceptable slogans such as "those who are not against socialism are with us." This presumes that someone has been granted the supreme right to decide who is for socialism and who is against.

Socialism is distinguished by a variety of forms and many ways of development. Ideas about it have been constantly changing: as long as we live we shall keep refining its content, as Lenin himself convincingly proved. As the live creativity of the masses, socialism must be above all an expression of the needs and interests of the masses themselves. It is only the free competition among ideas that can determine the true influence of one socialist concept or another. This requires an atmosphere of equality, tolerance and compromise, when we rely on consensus, cooperation, and that which brings us closer to each other. The center of gravity shifts to organizing a democratic, a voluntary unity contrary to a mandated and coerced unity.

Therefore, the task today is to nurture in our conflicting times the so greatly necessary standards of dialogue, talks and conclusion of agreements. This applies to reciprocal understanding among people as well as between authorities and public organizations. It is not only social groups that should adapt themselves to the authorities but the authorities themselves should take

into consideration everything that is valuable and useful in the social groups. In this connection, has the time not come to organize a roundtable, to gather around it representatives of all social forces, to discuss vital problems, to find mutually acceptable features within one another and to develop a constructive program for joint action, which would enjoy the support and assistance of the broadest possible popular strata? This would be a display of a truly new thinking, a new approach to social affairs.

Perestroika enabled us to develop a more realistic attitude toward the party. Dependence on the party suppressed the people and restrained the process of reinterpreting the party's place and role in society. Of late an awareness which is becoming increasingly clear is that the party is not a church, it is not something holy, it is an instrument for action and, therefore, it should be totally demystified in order to be able to engage in a rational critical and self-critical analysis. Such an attitude must become the standard and will benefit above all the party itself and society as a whole. The pre-congress discussion and the congress itself became major steps in that direction.

The process of conversion from the old to the new thinking is comprehensive and complex. We would like for the traditional awareness to disappear faster and for the new awareness to become traditional.

V. Bakharev, engineer, Ivanovo: 'I Have Decided to Speak Out'

For the past three years I have subscribed to KOMMUNIST. During that time I read the articles on economics and now I have decided to speak out. I am a heat engineer by profession and have done a great deal of work at cellulose-paper industry enterprises. At one point, I set myself the following task: to work honestly, productively and usefully, in order to earn my wages through my labor and have the possibility to live like the "mean-statistical" person. I planned the present letter as a kind of report on an assignment to a sovkhoz. Let me begin with some other aspects of life which I have had the opportunity to observe.

I am currently working as an engineer in the scientific research sector (NIS) of an institute's department. I was promoted to leading engineer. This is the ceiling. I am 40 years old, have no scientific degrees (I was deprived of the opportunity to acquire them). It is usually considered that the NIS is something like a penal battalion. Therefore, anyone who works in this area should be "graded" in order to earn a decent salary. The lack of a degree dooms one to doing all the "menial" work related to economic contracts with enterprises. Most frequently, the entire work is "menial," for the customer is usually not interested in long-range prospects and general ideas.

For example, before perestroika my wages were 205 rubles (165 + 40); now they total 230 rubles. I cannot earn more, for I have no rank title. With such a system, the amount of knowledge is of no interest to anyone. A

person may have tremendous experience but if he is merely a graduate of a technical school he is, generally speaking, noncompetitive. He may receive a salary for anything one wishes but not for his labor. In this area many people are pursuing their own interests. They do not find it easy to abandon their "gains."

Now as to my assignment to a sovkhos. For 1 month, at the start of this year, I provided sponsorship assistance to the Novyy Byt Sovkhoz, Ilinskiy Rayon (approximately 100 kilometers from Ivanovo and Yaroslavl and 250 kilometers from Moscow). We worked in the Lazartsevo-Fomino Village Brigade, which was one hour away from the main farmstead. The view about this village is that it is "without a future." It is said that before the revolution there were five small oil mills here; now there are two farms raising calves (less than 200 head). They are serviced by four villagers who earn 2.82 rubles per head of cattle. If we consider that there are 50 head of cattle per person, their salary is 140 rubles monthly. Twice daily the calves must be watered and fed: the water is carried by hand in buckets and poured into the trough and so is the silage. The manure is collected with rakes, manually. This takes 3 hours every evening and 2 hours every morning. There is a miller (his wage is 40 rubles) a night watchman (approximately 25 rubles) and a cleaner (40 rubles).

Our sponsorship obligations included bringing the grain and the hay to the farmyard and doing various petty jobs. In five weeks I earned 57 rubles and a few kopeks (everything was based on existing rates). Within that time I spent 150 rubles.

Every week I filled approximately 120 bags with grain which I stacked up. A tractor would come and I would load everything by hand in the trailer. We would then drive to the cattle yard. I would load a bag on my back and walk some 20 meters (I am familiar with this work, it is not harmful but imagine this being done by an 18-year old person).

Or else we went to the field for hay. In the winter, the hay was wet or frozen and then thawed out, so that the bales had to be separated (the regulation weight of each was 20 kilograms). One would break the bales up and pass them on to Vasya who, in turn, would pass them on to Sasha, in the trailer, and Sasha would stack them up. One hundred bales weigh two tons; two tons at 1.80 rubles is 3.60 rubles and 1.20 rubles per person. In April 1989 I worked in the same brigade and I earned 50 rubles; in August 1988 I earned 80 rubles in harvesting the grain. All in all, the work went well and wages were decent.

Is it possible in our country to earn 15 kopeks for one hour of work? It is. This applies, for example, to sewing bags. You put four patches (the time is not counted), you earn 15 kopeks, and so on. To the best of my knowledge, no one among the peasants is willing to work in a sovkhos brigade, neither a cattle breeder nor a milkmaid. They would agree to do any other work but not work in a brigade.

All villages are drowning in weeds; unstacked straw lies around in the fields and there is dislocation everywhere. In order to bring order to the land it is precisely in brigades that it is essential to work. Will this situation continue in the future? Are we doomed to live in such abominable neglect?

Naturally, the rural people as well know how to make due (I shall not discuss this). What is left to them? Some are paid for work they have not done, others are cheated out of their wages, double and triple the amounts. Tell me now: Does the state want for everyone to live well? What is it doing for those people to be sweating it out? Even if someone at one point invented this system with a built-in error, could it be that even now nothing can be changed?

I am not a party member. I do not support any kind of informal organizations. I have not been a candidate for elections. This letter is sent by a simple, an ordinary person. Before you throw it away please read it first and realize what is happening.

O. Ivanchenko, senior scientific associate, All-Union Scientific Center, USSR State Committee for Labor: Are We Expecting a Miracle?

When debates on the types of ownership and laws on ownership and the land were taking place in our parliament, unwittingly I caught myself thinking that deputies and heads of all possible organizations and fronts, state personalities and journalists were ignoring the main thing: ownership—state, republic or even private—must be knowledgeably handled. All this time we failed to learn how to take care of state property. Therefore, what guarantee do we have that we shall start sensibly to manage tomorrow?

The main question applies to the type of people who will manage property on all levels, the question of the "technology" of their work and the methods they will use to achieve the set targets. Obviously, such cadres must be trained in advance, demand for them must be known and proper facilities provided. However, virtually nothing is being said about this: "Let us first solve the question of ownership and then...." How similar this is to the age-old dream of the magic wand. Have we not learned anything from past experience? "We shall pass a law....," "we shall have a market economy....," "we shall have a boss and the boss will decide for us...." How can we surmount this fixed expectation of a miracle? The successful functioning of the national economy under market conditions requires special mechanisms—legal, organizational, information, and other. For many decades on end capitalism developed and improved them. We, however, as we call for an immediate conversion to a market economy, remain virtually unprepared for it.

In my view, the fact that virtually all enterprises have abandoned preparations for the production of new goods and reduced the pace of technical retooling are very alarming symptoms. Everyone is waiting. For what?

What about the laws! Unwittingly, discussions break out: "An owner would not allow this to happen...." Today the collective must become such an owner but this is no simple matter. It is important, finally, to break through the apathy of people who have become tired of endless discussions and have no specific objectives and prospects for development, both of their own enterprise as well as of themselves personally. Under such circumstances skills are lost, the knowledge of young specialists is wasted, working time losses increase, and indifference and resentment appear. All that is taking place despite the tremendous volumes of forthcoming changes and the huge tasks which face the country!

Why is it that so little attention is being paid in our country to this destructive phenomenon? Are we waiting in the hope that tomorrow all problems will be resolved by themselves? However, under the conditions of a market economy, the collectivistic ideology should prove its viability through competitive struggle. It would be exceptionally difficult to win this competition, precisely because today what the people need first is a long-term goal, an objective, a concept which must be clearly earmarked. Inertia and vagueness can reduce to naught any innovation. If we wish to achieve real changes in society we need a radical shift in party activities, in all of its cells. In this most difficult situation of the transitional period the party must be a time catalyst.

**G. Zapryagay, surveyor, and G. Mikheyev, war and labor veteran, Krasnokamensk Settlement, Krasnoyarsk Kray;
A. Belov, Krasnoyarsk: Reports... Reports...**

There is no end to reports. All enterprises and organizations submit reports: monthly, quarterly, semi-annual and annual. Most frequently, everything in such reports seems to be "up to date," and yet what is the actual situation? It would be interesting, probably, to estimate how much time is being wasted throughout the country to this effect. We know from personal experience that at enterprises the drafting of the monthly reports takes 2-3 days; the quarterly, 3-5; the semi-annual, 4-6; and the annual, 7-14. On the association level, a significant share of the administrative apparatus is practically removed at the start of the year from production affairs for a full month! Therefore, out of 240 workdays, 40-70 (or 17-28 percent of the time) are spent by managers on reports. Each enterprise drafts a thick annual report, duplicates it into 3-5 copies, after which some of them are sent to the association. Characteristically, however, should the association all of a sudden require any kind of figure, it becomes apparent that it takes much longer to find it in the volume than to ring up the "subordinate" at the same enterprise.

Unfortunately, resolutions, the purpose of which is to reduce accountability, proved ineffective. If we wish to be successful in perestroika, this system must be abandoned, at which point there will be substantially fewer officials on all levels who would require useless paper shuffling on the part of others or engage in such shuffling themselves.

[A. Belov] I have repeatedly submitted suggestions to the State Committee for Labor on problems of paper shuffling. The State Committee for Statistics is our department. However, so far there has been no change. The "paper wall" is continuing to hinder perestroika, blocking the creative initiative of enterprises and tying them hands and feet, preventing any essential reduction in the size of the administrative personnel.

One of the main reasons for this "paper wall" is the totally unnecessary and, sometimes, far-fetched accountability, letters, instructions, etc., generated on the upper levels of management. Is this not costly to the country? We realize that a certain amount of very little accountability is needed. However, we have a great deal, an excessively great deal of unnecessary and unneeded information.

Let us take as an example the "I-RM" Statistical Accountability (report on certifications and rationalization of jobs; brigade forms of organization of labor and manual labor). The enterprises decide themselves how to achieve the production of necessary goods, on a high-quality level: either by improving work places, through brigades or else as a result of reducing manual labor. What matters is the end result and not the intermediary one, further accompanied by accountability. The process of certification of work places itself is imperfect and the sectorial methods are cumbersome. Classifying jobs by groups of professions is an extremely complex and, in the final account, inaccurate method.

What about the paper which is needed for certification? About 2,000 standard-size sheets of paper are needed for 700 work places in a small enterprise. Furthermore, additional consolidated reports are drafted: balance of jobs, draft plan for the utilization of work places, plan of steps for improving the efficiency of work places, etc. Furthermore, there are the inventory recommendations of the new sectorial regulation on the certification of work places! There is a 12-digit classification of indexing! It boggles the mind why and for whose sake is this needed?

Z. Yasman, senior scientific associate, State History Museum: With Respect for History

It is a universally known fact that a disrespectful attitude toward culture, underestimating education and the "residual" principle of financing them take a fierce revenge on society: the intellectual and moral potential of the people declines. It would be unnecessary to provide numerous examples from our recent and not so recent past, for this subject has been repeatedly written about and discussed. Suffice it to recall the speech delivered by Academician D.S. Likhachev at the congress of people's deputies. Time limitations prevented him from discussing in greater detail individual aspects of the problem but his list nonetheless included museums.

I would like to draw attention to a museum of prime significance: the State History Museum, and to the

prospects for its development. I believe that there is no need to mention its uniqueness and the fact that it is the only one which can systematically and fully present the entire history of peoples inhabiting the country's territory, from the Stone Age to the present, and that its collections and exhibits are our pride, our national wealth which exceeds 4 million stored units, and that thanks to this the museum has contacts with the national museums of many countries. The History Museum is currently closed for capital repairs. Although the deadline for the completion of repairs keeps being extended, the year and day will come when, once again, its doors will open, people will come and the new exhibits and displays will offer their treasures to domestic and foreign visitors.

So, where is the problem? It is the lack of the necessary space which the museum needs. When the museum opened, in 1883, it had no more than 11 halls. The stock was small and the visitors infrequent. After the revolution the collection was increased significantly and the range of exhibits was broadened. During the Soviet period the History Museum became a true educator of patriotic and internationalist feelings, a center of historical education, a treasury in which the true monuments of material and spiritual culture were assembled. That is precisely why today the question of the need to expand the area of the museum has become so pressing. This would enable us to expand its exhibit and displays, and increase its stock and scientific-educational activities.

The time has come to help our History Museum. This coincides with the tasks of perestroika and the aspiration to abandon the "residual principle" in the realm of culture. In my view, this problem can be resolved by allowing the museum to take over the neighboring GUM building, for in addition to everything else, GUM activities on the main square of the country, surrounded by splendid monuments of history and culture, create a glaring disharmony. No one would even conceive of putting a store on Palace Square in Leningrad, which is carefully preserving its integral ensemble. Moscow as well should protect its Red Square.

By gaining possession of the GUM building, the History Museum would be able to display many unique collections: manuscripts and old printed books, numismatic collections, domestic glass and porcelain wear, jewels, graphic materials, etc. It could promote an exhibit on the history of Soviet society and exhibits on specific topics, based on anniversaries, new items, etc. Furthermore, this would enable the museum to open a sociocultural and historical-educational center, a part of which could become the museum's theater.

Currently the foundations are being laid for determining the appearance of the historical center of the capital, the revival of its historical-spiritual significance and the strengthening of its patriotic, ideological and moral influence. Like many of my colleagues, I believe that awareness of the significance of the History Museum and the proper assistance provided by Soviet and state

authorities in providing the museum with the conditions it needs would reflect the new spiritual criteria of a reorganizing society and enable us to increase our contribution to the enlightenment and education of the people.

B. Rozhkov, Kola Nuclear Power Plant: Let the Engineers Speak

The debate on the future of the power industry, which began under the influence of the Chernobyl accident and suitably put on the agenda the need for a critical analysis of the situation in the nuclear power industry sector, brought to light and submitted to the judgment of the public all the difficult problems of this sector. However, despite the criticism, so far we cannot see the desire to find constructive solutions.

One can understand the emotionality of writers, journalists and other public figures. Their task is to excite public opinion and to draw attention to important problems. How to react to the epidemic which has become widespread even among specialists, of selecting from objective reality exclusively facts which support one's own viewpoint?

If one wishes to substantiate the abandonment of the use of nuclear power plants (AES), one cites the examples of the United States and Sweden. Countering this by citing the real standard of the availability of energy in countries such as the United States and Sweden is not a suitable example. If one wants to convince others of the realistic nature of "clean" thermoelectric power plants (PES), one cites Japan without, however, mentioning that the basis of energy in seismic Japan consists of AES or, worse, blame our own operational personnel who, allegedly, are much below world standards. One speaks loudly of the seas of alternate energy and mentions more quietly that we are unable to take energy out of such seas.

We do not have to look far for examples. Suffice it to study the roundtable materials published in the journal NASH SOVREMENNİK (No 1, 1990). What strikes is that "antinuclear" have, for some reason, assumed the role of infallible judges. They scornfully reject the statements by Ye.I. Ignatenko, chief of administration, USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry, and his readiness to assume responsibility for everything. The sentence passed on him and other managers is as follows: "...We have little faith in the fact that the activities of our nuclear power workers can be explained in terms of their economic, ecological and social ignorance: all too obvious here is their tendentiousness in assessing the significance of the nuclear power industry. In order to promote it they stop at nothing: they conceal objective information, they mislead the public, they speculate on the economic and social difficulties of the country, they defame honest scientists and specialists, they forge data and engage in social demagoguery. They use all available means.... It would be entirely proper to assume that the nuclear magnates in foreign countries try to earn profits while the managers of our nuclear departments and

establishments are trying to save their social status, high positions and salaries, social privileges and shaken up reputation."

Perhaps the public at large is not aware of the fact that this so-called "deceiver," "speculator," "forger" and "social demagogue" Ye.I. Ignatenko was at the line beyond which there was death during the events related to eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. As a professional, he knew perfectly well what exposure to radiation means (according to the logic of some people one would risk anything for the sake of a salary or social privileges!).

Therefore, to Ye.I. Ignatenko personal responsibility is not an abstract concept and if we wish to think of ourselves as decent people, we should pay proper due to the courage and dedication of this person and others, who survived or died, regardless of whether we are proponents or opponents of nuclear energy.

The fact that personal responsibility can satisfy no one in problems of universal human significance is a different matter. Judging history on the basis of our current situation is neither difficult nor dangerous. There always are people wishing to shine with their hindsight. However deep one can dig in files one would find nothing other than the process of the shaping of a collective opinion on the subject of new problems which have never faced society in the past or processes which always include proponents and opponents of decisions which are being made. Naturally, these considerations do not pertain to crimes committed in the course of official duties, for which there must always be an extent of personal responsibility. I suggest to the doubters to seek personal responsibility for the miracle which is developing in front of our own eyes (is it a monster or is it a benefit?)—thermonuclear power. This question is immeasurably greater, in my view, than the answers. The sun is a benefit when it is millions of kilometers away. How comfortable would it be to live next to millions of degrees of heat?

Sad though it might be, it is not individuals but society as a whole that is held responsible for errors on such a scale. However, at this point it becomes entirely pertinent to ask oneself about the responsibility of the "antinucleics." For example, they are familiar with the conclusions reached by many scientists throughout the world to the effect that the greenhouse effect may, in the forthcoming decades, raise the level of the world's oceans? However, they believe that raising this level not only "does not present any serious threat" but, conversely, for many countries, including the territory of the Soviet Union, this will create more favorable weather conditions than the present ones. "If such is the case, it is necessary to draw the respective conclusions concerning changes in the energy strategy of our country." Since we are discussing the energy strategy of our country, I believe that Belgium and Holland will not be invited to participate in this discussion. But can we discuss this alone?

My dear fellow countrymen in Murmansk, you are justifiably showing concern that as a result of the work of the Kola AES, the temperature of the water has increased by 1-2 degrees centigrade in a small part of Imandra Lake, which is the largest on the Kola Peninsula. What would you say to the fact that in the forthcoming decades, as a result of the global warming, the temperature throughout the lake (and not only in that lake) could increase by 5-6 degrees centigrade? I am concerned with the question of whether the presumed changes will simply be limited to a rising of the level of the oceans and the temperature, the more so since this will take place in the course of a few decades and not tens of thousands of years, as has been the case so far.

Equally interesting is another consideration: "In the next few years we must obviously be oriented not toward new AES but new TES, powered by natural gas, entire rivers of which are flowing along the dozens of gas pipelines crossing the country. We have fuel gas in our country to last 150 to 200 years. Should it become scarce, the new thermoelectric plants could use coal of which we have reserves lasting a thousand years." What could one object to this? The demand is put on the agenda of putting an end to the barbaric devastation of the ground and blocking the rivers of petroleum and natural gas flowing to foreign countries. Why is it that now the optimal suggested variant is for such rivers to flow into boiler furnaces and TES! This would extend the plundering of future generations and the ecological consequences of it would be more than questionable!

Considerations on the low cost of electric power generated at TES with natural gas make a strong impression. This is, so to say, a view on a historical future, looked at from the "hummock" of today. Is it possible, when we speak of a priceless nonrecoverable natural resource, to discuss its cost and to relate it to any whatsoever monetary unit, not to mention today's ruble!

What is the cost of fuel? We cannot use reference manuals, for they say nothing on the subject. The most we have at our disposal is information on the cost of the extraction of fuel which we take from nature, for the time being free of charge, and with no knowledge of the real cost to mankind. Could it be, therefore, that we should not aspire to extract ever more? Perhaps one should be more modest in order not to have to pay the bill which will be eventually submitted by nature?

Here is another example of "responsibility." M.Ya. Lemeshev, the United Nations environmental expert, does not agree with the fact that nuclear power turbines must be stopped as the capacities replacing them become completed. He believes that they must be stopped immediately. To this effect he has some arguments. He believes that "the country's economy can painlessly do without nuclear energy (which accounts, in the overall balance, for no more than 11 percent), abandoning the totally unnecessary huge power-intensive production facilities." In general, he is ready to apply this to 60-80

percent of such facilities which, according to his computations, is the amount of unnecessary production facilities in our country.

This is impressive. It is interesting to determine who else among the critics of nuclear energy is prepared to assume responsibility for such figures? This dear expert, who has become accustomed to handling averaged figures, does not pay too much attention to this simple earth with its prosaic reality. The reality is such that in the virtually isolated Murmansk power system, for example, nuclear power accounts for more than 50 percent of the total. So, should we or should we not immediately stop the turbines? Actually, I am ready to help. If we close down the ecologically extremely adverse ore mining and metallurgical production facilities, this would indeed account for 60 to 80 percent of the production capacities of Murmansk Oblast. At that point it would be possible to stop the turbines. Once again I turn to the people of Murmansk: Are several hundred thousand people willing to leave settlements and join the ranks of already existing refugees in our country? Here is another question: Which area is ready to develop the iron-nickel and apatite-nepheline production facilities to replace those we are closing down? I do not believe that such output has become unnecessary.

Such is the case concerning responsibility. Or else, could it be that I have failed to understand a few things and that the "antinucleics" are ready to assume only some of the responsibility for the future?

The result is a picture of clash between the supporters of the what is ecologically pure and the supporters of the "dirty" nuclear power industry. The latter are criminals who are trying, motivated by egotism, to mislead and convince the people that this industry is safe and advantageous. Is such the case?

It would be unlikely to find a mentally sane person who would claim that a harmful and dangerous production is better than a clean and safe one, particularly if the latter proves to be, furthermore, profitable. It is a question of the fact that today there is, generally speaking, no harmless power industry and that no one knows how soon such an industry could or would appear. The TES are poisoning the biosphere with relatively small concentrations of emissions, but steadily! The AES are ecologically clean under normal operation but bear the potential danger of an accidental emission of radioactive materials and have created the problem of the burial of such materials.

In addition to these most visible differences, one finds, on either side, an entire array of "charms" which make the already complex picture even more complex. Mankind must seek acceptable solutions to specific situations.

No prosperous country can solve this problem through its wealth. By purchasing from others electric power or energy carriers (fuel), it can only buy a delay. This is because all of us are residents of a single earth. Most

likely, there neither are nor will there ever be any simple decisions which would satisfy everyone. We must walk "on the razor's edge," and the greatest danger which threatens society is not strictly nuclear or any other power industry but the frenzy displayed in finding the proper option for the development of the power industry, which would protect us from taking a wrong and, perhaps, fatal step.

Such an awareness would enable us to surmount the impasses of confrontations, ignorance and quarrels and understand that there is no universal solution. A solution is always specific and must take into consideration the specific conditions and that the implementation of such a program for the development of a power industry in our country is impossible today. The ministries are incapable of doing this. The question here is not one of technology or scientific support or bad or unconscientious people, but the existing national economic mechanism and the monopoly power of the sectors. Designing, building, installation, operation, repair and, supplies and scientific support are concentrated within a single pair of hands.

The ministry itself is the customer, the contractor and the worker; it plans its own work, reports to itself and rewards itself for "high achievements." A study of this situation was convincingly presented by Yu. Koryakin in issue No 2 of KOMMUNIST for 1990. After the Chernobyl events, the administrative-economic system made a number of convulsive motions aimed at creating the impression among the public of an allegedly profoundly planned reaction. As a result, the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry was separated from the Ministry of Power Industry. The economic mechanism itself, however, remained totally unaffected by such "perestroika." We must realize that a monopoly status is not simply a condition of the sector. Monopoly is a condition of society. A tragicomic situation develops in which a monopoly tries to palm off on society electric power plants which it needs and is sincerely puzzled as to why all of a sudden they are being refused. In turn, unaccustomed to weighing the innumerable "for" and "against" reasons, society capriciously demands the immediate halt to harmful production facilities, obviously simply believing that the problem of generating electric energy is limited to plugging a power cable into an outlet. As a result, the monopolies are threatened with a paralysis of activities while society does not realize that it is standing on the threshold of a severe energy crisis.

The solution is quite simple and is consistent with the changes occurring in our country. Furthermore, strange though it might seem, the situation which has developed today concerning the two power ministries, makes it possible quite successfully to make use of this solution. In my view, it would suffice to remove from the ministries any concern about the plan for the generating of electric power, which should be transferred to the regional economic structures which would become either lessees or owners of power generating enterprises and would have the right to determine by themselves the number and

type of power plants to be built. In other words, the individual regions should assume the functions of customers and operators. It is precisely they who should decide whether they find existing capacities adequate or build new ones and of what nature. Let the two ministries compete among themselves as to who can submit a plan which would be better and less expensive, taking local features into consideration, and would be able to build faster and better an electric power plant and provide a better service. In that case either ministry would be oriented toward the consumer and, consequently, toward society. A competition of designs should be based on the needs of society which, in the final account, means finding the most sensible and acceptable variant for the development of power production.

One can sympathize with those who try to find mercenary motivations in their opponents: the status of the personnel at the Kola AES offers few opportunities to do so. However, after a consideration of this topic, I have determined that some grounds for this nonetheless exist.

I freely chose the nuclear power energy as my lifetime project, when I joined the MIFI and, to this day, have not been sorry a single time. I love my profession, I am proud of the victories of this sector and I suffer severely from its failures. I am satisfied with the normal and healthy working and living conditions of which I would have been deprived had I been, let us say, a resident of Monchegorsk, Kirisha or Moscow. I realize that my work involves a certain risk but I consider the risk acceptable, compared to the inevitability of a steady slow death in the cities I named.

I am quite impressed by the fact that many children with defects come to the Murmansk Oblast Home for Children (in Kandalaksh), from the various settlements of the Kola Peninsula but not one child has come from the settlement of the power workers of the Kola AES, throughout its entire existence. I am also very impressed by the trend which appeared among the personnel of the Kola AES after retiring to remain beyond the Polar Circle, because of the difficulty of finding adequately comfortable housing, safe from the ecological viewpoint, in other parts of the country.

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SOCIAL PRIORITIES

Social Justice: The Idea and Its Implementation

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[Articles by Viktor Matyushenok and Pitirim Sorokin]

[Text] We are offering two articles for the readers' attention. One of them came to the editorial office "on its own," in the regular mail. The other was written in 1917, in the period between the February and October

Revolutions. They have an almost eternal theme in common: equality and social justice.

The formulation of the idea of progress and definition of the watershed between social justice and injustice has always been considered the prerogative of intellectuals, the ideologues and social thinkers of all times and peoples. However, in periods of radical social change and social and cultural transformations, discussions on this subject, as a rule, leave the narrow framework of academic auditoriums and encompass all of society. In such periods of history, cultural, ideological and political conflict is often the result of different understandings of the essence of social justice.

A society is just only when the people do not suspect that the laws by which they live are unjust. No matter how paradoxical this thought, expressed more than 3 centuries ago by Blaise Pascal, may seem, one gets the impression that all attempts to implement the idea of social justice in practice have led in the final account to precisely such a result. Whether it is inherent in the nature of theory or related to practice... apparently, we cannot answer the question so simply. One way or another, today it is obvious to us: a by no means unified model of social justice exists in our society. There are at least three models (we conditionally call them: status-distribution, egalitarian, and liberal-market). Possibly, the quintessence of today's socioeconomic, political and cultural crisis lies in their conflict.

The article which the editors received from V. Matyushenok to some extent coincides with the journal's concept: returning to the discussion of the problems of social justice at a new level, under new conditions. Most likely, the reader can recall the 1986 article in *KOMMUNIST* by Academician T. Zaslavskaya. In summarizing the results of that discussion, we noted that it helped us to come closer to a modern understanding of social justice, having revealed the urgent need for the attention of social scientists to the real problems and contradictions of our life. The author also proceeds from this discussion. In past years, neither the problems nor the contradictions have diminished. Rather, they have been aggravated. Yet, close study reveals that in one form or another they all contain the same theme of social justice and equality as a component part of the socialist idea. It has also become obvious that their propagandists—be they people's deputies, scientists, or journalists—give these concepts a very different meaning, depending on their ideological and political biases, as well as other considerations (as happened, for instance, in numerous pre-election campaigns, where the positions of participants, often mutually exclusive, invariably took cover behind the banner of social justice).

The editors have decided to turn to this discussion once more because, in our opinion, precisely the sphere of social justice to a significant degree contains the answer to a question: what kind of society do we want to have, and what values should we assert in it? Understandably,

the author's viewpoint is only one of the many possible, but it is fairly broad and reflects the mood of a significant share of society.

The other document is an article by the great modern sociologist Pitirim Sorokin (1889-1968). One of the founders of the Russian sociological school, he was deported from Soviet Russia in 1922 along with a group of noted leaders in science and culture. Having finally settled in the United States in 1923, P. Sorokin founded the famous sociology department at Harvard University and trained a galaxy of brilliant scientists. In the United States, he is rightly considered one of the "founding fathers" of American sociological thinking as well. In the 1950s and 1960s, P. Sorokin also gained a reputation as a social activist, speaking out against the establishment and the Vietnam War. His works in theoretical and applied sociology were created during his American period of scientific work, in particular "*The Sociology of Revolution*," the multi-volume "*Sociocultural Dynamics*," "*Culture, The Individual and Society*" and others.

This article is an independent section from his book "*Problems of Social Equality*," written in a complex period full of political events, extraordinarily similar in terms of its contradictions, it seems, to our own perestroika. P. Sorokin's attention to this theme is no accident, since the Russian period of his biography was marked not only by a dizzying academic career from student at a teacher's seminary to professor at Petrograd University, but also by the most close connection of his creativity to the professional revolutionary movement (he followed the path from ordinary member of the socialist revolutionary party up to personal secretary to A.F. Kerenskiy and a deputy of the Constituent Assembly of 1917).

In publishing these documents, we would like, proceeding from today's reality, to continue the discussion of the problems of social justice. We hope for the participation of supporters of various views, both theoreticians and practical workers. Let us examine one of the most complex questions of our life.

Are We Looking for a Panacea?

[Article by Viktor Matyushenok, party organizer, Latvian Communist Party Ludzenskiy Raykom]

Recent events in our country and in Eastern Europe ever more often are sparking arguments not only about the crisis, but also about the failure of the communist idea as such. The once-seditious question, "Was Marx wrong?," now seems rhetorical. In fact, we are hearing appeals to reject the "communist utopia" and throw ourselves into the lap of good old capitalism, which will finally lead us to the main road of world civilization.

Let me immediately stipulate: the author does not intend to defend the "gains of real socialism." In fact, he questions the rightness of considering our system socialist. After all, ideological incantations and writing this in the state's name and in the Constitution are not

enough. In order to be called socialist, a society must have certain objective features: a higher level of labor productivity and well-being of the people than under capitalism, more refined, democratic institutions of power, and the absence of social reasons for negative phenomena such as crime, drug addiction and prostitution. Finally, the main thing in identifying a society as socialist is the triumph of the principles of social justice.

Therefore, there can be no doubt of the need for cardinal reforms of the existing system. Yet, the direction of some of these reforms and their ideological formulations do create doubts.

For instance, what does "depoliticization," which everyone who considers himself a liberal or a democrat now demands, mean? Does it mean that state bodies, the court, the prosecutor's office, and the army should be politically neutral? That would be good... However, the experience of Eastern Europe, or even of our own Baltic region shows that this means only the "decommunizing" of these bodies: the communists are leaving and representatives of other parties and "fronts," whose political neutrality evokes even greater doubts, are joining them.

What does "de-ideologization" of society mean? That there will be no ideology in society? Or will there be some sort of unified "common human" ideology? In our rather strongly socially differentiated society, this is hardly possible. That which is happening now is not de-ideologization, but simply a rejection of one ideology in favor of another.

Rejection of the priority interests of any class, most likely, will in no way abolish the existing class structure as such, the class relations and interests. If the working class is not declared in one or another form to be leading, the vanguard, the "leader" and so forth, either some other class should be this, or political life in society should be structured on the basis of a consensus of the basic classes.

Moreover, opponents of the proletarian ideology take past ideological stereotypes as an item for criticism, although under objective examination the policy conducted in previous decades and the ideology which defended and expressed it in no way conformed to the interests of the working class. Since the discussion between supporters of "genuine Soviet socialism" and "fair capitalism" is happening not in academic auditoriums, but on the streets of a country crawling toward the abyss of economic and political chaos, it seems extremely necessary to examine both viewpoints from the positions of the main criterion of socialism—social justice, in this regard not only avoiding the now-fashionable rebukes for excessive ideologization, but, conversely, directing attention to:

The Shortage of Ideology

The optimistic concepts of social harmony and justice that form the foundation of our ideological postulates

began to collapse in the first gusts of the winds of glasnost. Having looked at their own lives without bias, people became horrified and indignant: in terms of emotional stress, this indignation compares to the ethnic problem. The success of the informal movements, which declare the principle of social justice in their programs, and the "phenomenon of Yeltsin," who spoke out sharply against the privileges of our leaders, show what great significance the working people give this problem.

Indignant letters and articles from scientists are appearing in the press, and a special commission on privileges functions in the Supreme Soviet. However, the mechanism of injustice, of the theoretical interpretation of the problem of social justice and of the ideological interpretation which evaluates social reality from the viewpoint of the interests of certain classes, has not been studied much.

No one has yet identified justice and equality, at least not at the level of theory. At the same time, it is considered indisputable that a society cannot be just without ensuring equality in certain areas. This includes equality with regard to the basic means of production, in the eyes of the law, equal opportunities to protect one's health, to get an education, and so on. Traditionally, these problems were considered resolved in our society, where the equality of its members with regard to socially significant benefits was guaranteed by the Constitution.

Unfortunately, a declaration of equality does not mean real equality. Indeed, certain changes in the laws and the Constitutions evoke questions. For instance, as a result of the passing by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet of the 4 May 1990 Declaration on Restoring the Independence of the Latvian Republic, essentially, the start of a conversion to a social order with completely different production and distribution relations was constitutionalized.

Of course, as life has shown, these relations in our society not only are not perfect, but are flawed in many ways. The need to change the principle for the distribution of benefits from social funds has been under discussion ever since T. Zaslavskaya exposed their unfairness in the party's theoretical journal ("The Human Factor in Economic Development and Social Justice," KOMMUNIST, No 13, 1986). Many authors have supported and developed the thoughts expressed by the academician. However, it is indicative that from the very start the discussion headed in a rather definite direction.

In considering the principles of justice in the provision of housing, the economists A. Bim and A. Shokhin wrote: "...It would be proper to examine the problem of gradual distribution of the principle of full payment for housing by the entire population" ("The Distribution System: On the Path of Perestroyka," KOMMUNIST, No 15, 1986). At that time, the authors had not yet proposed how to do this. However, in the past three years the idea has not only been formulated theoretically, but has also obtained a certain practical implementation

in the form of the decisions to sell apartments into private ownership. The supporters of this reform of social funds, apparently, assumed that consumers would actually receive apartments as a gift from the state. Meanwhile, for a long time the cost of housing, treatment, and everything else distributed through social consumption funds was paid for by workers. After all, the state can have nothing, except that which the workers give it, above the necessary product. Indeed, not only "above:" after all, part of what is necessary is also taken, to be returned later through social funds. Even if we consider overall proportions, only one-fourth of the created cost, according to calculations by some economists, is given to the worker in the form of wages. Not one modern capitalist country knows such dimensions of removal of surplus value. Therefore, even in the traditional version, our so-called social consumption funds are obviously unfair: a worker who gives 70-75 percent of the value he created to the state budget and the enterprise funds has to wait about 10-15 years for "free" housing.

As far as selling apartments into private ownership is concerned, this variant essentially assumes paying for them twice: first in the form of deductions into the social consumption funds, and second, in cash from the very modest sum that one receives in the form of wages. Even if a certain segment of citizens, tormented by apartment epics and having the requisite money (is it really possible that they have accumulated it?..), agrees to purchase housing, it is impossible to consider this method in any way fair.

By the way, Academician A. Aganbegyan believes that "about 250 billion rubles are in savings accounts, a part of which people are willing to spend in order to improve their conditions." Of course, these billions are impressive, but let us be so bold as to object: according to the official data of USSR Goskomstat, in July 1989 only 54,000 depositors had more than 25,000 apiece in accounts, and 0.6 percent of the overall sum of the population's bank savings belonged to them. The average size of a deposit is only 1,514 rubles. Of course, there is still money in the "money-jars," and one person might even have several accounts. Therefore, the number of well-to-do citizens, naturally, is larger. However, those whose accounts number not in the hundreds of rubles, but in the tens and hundreds of thousands, are hardly in need either of housing, or of the government's touching concern.

It goes without saying, a housing market (and a market for other goods and services) in a society with normal economic relations is not only possible, but also inevitable. However, in this regard there should be no impersonal deductions whatsoever for the state budget, and the money now taken by the state to construct "free" housing should be returned. Incidentally, justice will thus be restored with regard to the owners of cooperative apartments and personal homes, who in this case are generally paying for nothing.

A similar picture also exists in health care. Right now, many people are writing about the varied access to medical services (as well as to culture, education, goods subsidized by the state budget, etc.), which depends on social status, job and place of residence. Unquestionably, differences in the level of urban and rural health care, or in regular and in departmental hospitals do exist and violate the principle of social justice. However, the basic reason for this lies not only (and not so much) in the varied material possibilities of the territories and departments. Departmental structures only circulate and repeat the principles of the state-wide consumption funds, making them more acceptable and fair "for themselves and theirs."

The reason lies in the existing and legislated system, which presumes the impersonal removal, uncontrollable by the workers, of the surplus (and part of the necessary) value created by them, and its later distribution and use. Precisely due to such a system, the existence of those special departments in Minzdrav (now neither abolished, nor renamed) and a great deal else which evokes such indignation is possible.

The area of health care is the most painful sphere of social inequality, since here it is sometimes a question of an equal right to life. If the members of society are not equal in this right, discussion of equality in other areas simply loses all meaning. The successfully developing system of cooperative medicine (which has stood its ground even after the well-known Council of Ministers resolution) is solving the problem of fairness for doctors, if we have their salary in mind, but is in no way solving it for the patients, who (as with the purchase of apartments) have to pay twice.

At present, one can consider S. Fedorov's variant optimal, where the state pays for each specific patient (or rather, transfers money, given earlier by the workers to the state budget, to the hospital). Since every worker sooner or later becomes a patient, such a system is the most fair. However, we only have one of Fedorov's complexes (even with branches), and those who propose payment for medical services or the purchase of state apartments do not intend either to return the money already taken for this, or to halt such withdrawals in the future. Why? Let us seek the answer from those who support paid goods and services.

Let us return to 1986, to the above-mentioned article by A. Bim and A. Shokhin. The authors write that the main requirement (in any case, in the material production sectors) is the "earned nature of any increase both in the wage fund, as well as in individual earnings." Since then, this argument, which could be called the "theory of insufficient diligence," has been used repeatedly by various authors on the most diverse topics, although there are neither scientific nor moral grounds for elevating the correlation of the growth of salary and of labor productivity to some kind of economic law. After all, in principle the workers (precisely "in the material production sectors") have "earned" not only that part which is

issued to them in the form of salary (the necessary product, and not all of it), but also everything else that goes into the state budget (the surplus product and part of the necessary product, which should be returned through social consumption funds).

It goes without saying, there are examples of meaningless (and even harmful) labor, but, first, the sum total of material goods that we consume is nonetheless not created in this manner, and second, meaningless work is never initially performed on the initiative of the worker. Claims should not be made against him in this regard.

As far as "unearned salary" is concerned, of course, in individual cases people may receive more value of the product produced by them at the expense of their colleagues' labor (at a neighboring plant or in the sector). However, on the scale of the entire economy, the workers can never receive more than they earn. In hearing other arguments, it is hard to understand: How do "lazy" people who enjoy "unearned salaries" not only feed themselves, but also manage to feed the managers, the army, and the great number of organizations and institutes that subsist on the state budget? Therefore, when in the Supreme Soviet they declare: "We live no worse than we work," it becomes necessary to decipher the word "we"...

If we speak of formal, juridical equality and of ethical standards, these are, unquestionably, the most important features of a just society. Yet the materialistic world outlook presumes the recognition of the fact that neither right, nor morals can be higher than the production relations prevailing in society. After all, even Engels wrote that "appeals to morals and rightness in a scientific regard will not advance us at all; in moral indignation, no matter how just it may be, economic science sees not proof, just a symptom" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 20, p 153).

Alas, the recognition of socioeconomic and socioclass bases of inequality in our society is not typical of our domestic scientific literature. For instance, in a book by V. Davidovich, "Sotsialnaya Spravedlivost: Ideal i Printsip Deyatelnosti" [Social Justice: The Idea and Principle of Operation]. (Politizdat, Moscow, 1989) social justice is treated as a moral and ethical category. No, when it is a question of capitalism, the author is a complete materialist: "...The roots of justice lie in the economic order, in the system of exchange of activity." The class approach is expressed rather clearly: "The inequality and opposition of classes inevitably entails the inequality and the confrontation of all other elements of differentiation of social life." However, in our society, in the author's opinion, "genuine justice in relations is inseparable from tolerance, from the ability to understand the position of others, ..to come to a compromise." This can be accepted as an ideal for marital relations, but, after all, the author is writing about social justice, and social relations and their basis—production relations—depend, above all, on the equal rights of their subjects, not on "tolerance."

However, the inequality eating away at our society, in the author's opinion, "is unfair only from the viewpoint of the communist ideal. Being profoundly historical, historically specific, it is entirely just." To put it lightly, this is a debatable claim. It goes without saying, any understanding of justice should be historically specific—that which seems unfair to us now was perceived as quite normal 300 years ago. Of course, it is curious how the author manages to look at our existence from the "communist perspective," but nonetheless millions of people are living at the present time and by no means consider the individual's humiliating lack of economic rights, the difference in the levels of incomes and the entire complex of previously paid-for "free" goods, which many do not even manage to enjoy, to be fair.

Let us note: both the supporters of the reform of social consumption funds, as well as the adherents to the "socialist" justice of the present system are similar in terms of their ideological positions. This similarity lies in the fact that the ideas of both the one and the other are far removed from the interests of the working people. After all, under the existing system the benefits are really free only to those who may, due to social position, receive them without delivering an equivalent share of their own labor in exchange (the elderly, children and invalids, of course, are not included).

Preserving such a system means preserving injustice. However, implementing a reform of social consumption funds in favor of paying for services without changing the system of payment for labor is just as unfair. This lets us speak of the lack of an ideology that expresses and protects the interests of the working people. Turning to strictly economic reforms, let us ask the question:

Reforms for What and Whom?

Recognizing that in solving the problem of social justice it is not enough to work only on the distribution system, we realize the need to examine production relations, ownership relations and the socioclass structure. What do scientists suggest for solving the fundamental problem of basic relations—the alienation of the worker from the means of production and from the produced product?

Strange as it may be, most often they suggest the same as for the reform of social consumption funds: selling a certain part of these resources. Matters have not yet reached the practical implementation of the idea, but it does have solid support.

For instance, Academician O. Bogomolov suggests putting "land, homes and apartments", the basic inventories of certain enterprises (especially small and mid-sized), and certain individual machines and equipment "into commodity circulation." Yet, here is the opinion of N. Shmelev: "Everything that is purchased should be sold: ...housing—with the right of inheritance, buildings and farms—in the countryside, and land—in the city, including to foreigners." In this regard, it is believed that

the state will play the role of seller on a legal basis, and any worker who so wishes may become a buyer. It is hard to agree with this.

First, because putting the state (in real life, the ministries and departments) in the role of the seller means ignoring the fact that many production resources, land above all, had once been in the possession or even ownership (in the Baltic, for instance) of the direct producers. The fact that these resources were later in fact usurped by the administrative-command system is by no means a basis for proposals to sell them today.

Second, most likely, nonetheless not everyone who wishes may become a buyer, but only those who, besides desire, also have money. The accompanying idea of thus decreasing the state budget deficit confirms the fact that a great deal of money will be necessary. Taking into account the above-considered situation with the population's "monetary savings," imagine **who** will become the owner of the means of production that are being sold and how, after this, it will ever be possible to ensure an "equal start" for all members of society.

These suggestions are unacceptable not because, as a result of their implementation, the material differentiation of society will begin (under normal economic relations it is inevitable), but because our society is so differentiated. Some scientists believe it is even more so than in other countries.

The attempt to reform ownership relations on the basis of selling the means of production will lead to the strengthening and intensification of the existing structure of stratification of society according to the principle "the rich get richer, the poor, poorer." Even if the share of poor people here, for instance, is 40 percent, a question cannot help but arise: is it fair to them, if we take into account that most of the poor are by no means parasites? For whom, then, is this variant of economic reform advantageous?

Alas, in the first place, for those who managed to put together a certain initial capital in various (and in many cases criminal) ways in the years of "stagnation" and for whom the future economic freedoms will make it possible to painlessly "launder" it.

Behind the ardent discussion of how to remove the means of production from the administrative command system, it seems, we have forgotten that even in such a difficult situation as ours, it would be worth thinking not only about looking for an owner (of what?...) for "no one's" property, not only about the abstract budget deficit, but also about observing the principle of social justice in solving these problems.

Today ideology is unpopular in the economic sphere, yet we cannot get by without it. There should be no economic sacrifices in favor of ideological postulates, but a conformity of economic policy to the objective interests of the working people. Having set the solution of purely economic problems as the goal of perestroika, having

established the thesis "everything that helps feed the people is acceptable," it is possible to conclude the need to sell nation-wide property (remember N. Shmelev's "including to foreigners"?).

Unquestionably, in order to eliminate the alienation of the producer, it is necessary to transfer the means of production to him. Almost everyone agrees with this. The bone of contention is the question: sell into lease, possession, or ownership? If into ownership, then in many cases it becomes private (in our traditional understanding), i.e., the owner will employ hired labor and in one or another way exploit his workers. Moreover, with the sale of the basic inventories, as we showed above, a rather specific part of our society will become owners.

True, the USSR Law on Ownership does not allow for the possibility of existence of private ownership, but in principle the question remains open and discussion continues among scientists as to whether individual ownership should be considered private and whether it would be socialist in this case.

Some see it as a panacea for all our ills, others—as the offspring of the capitalist system, which is inevitably followed by exploitation, poverty and unemployment. As far as poverty and exploitation are concerned, they can also exist without private ownership. After all, the basis of exploitation is not the form of ownership as such, but the alienation of labor. K. Marx wrote about this in "The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844:" "Although private ownership seems like the basis and cause of alienated labor, on the contrary, in reality it is a consequence of it..." (ibid., vol 42, p 97). Therefore, no matter what we call a person's ownership of means of production—personal, individual, labor, peasant, private or anything else—there is neither more nor less exploitation because of this.

Furthermore, regardless of the mention of citizens' exclusive rights to utilize their own abilities, the Law fails to mention the ability to work as an object of ownership, although Marx recognized not only this, but also the worker as the possessor, so long as he has not sold his ability to work to a capitalist. If we accept this system, the problem of exploitation starts to look entirely different. After all, if not only machine tools and equipment are considered an object of ownership, everyone has ownership: the worker has his skills and qualifications, the engineer—his designs and calculations, the manager or administrator—ideas and organizational decisions. The material means of production (machine tools, machines, installations, and so on) in this regard could be leased or owned by the entire labor collective.

This system makes it possible, without putting the working class in a pseudo-priority position with regard to other categories of workers ("hegemony!"), at the same time to support its historical significance as the basic producer.

Furthermore, the definition of indicators, given the presence of which the subject can generally be considered the owner, seems no less important in this regard. In determining these indicators, the rights of possession, use and disposal are usually singled out, being considered exhaustive characteristics, albeit not quite political and economic. Meanwhile, there are still the conditions under which these rights may be realized. The subject who defines these conditions and the subject who possesses the indicated rights are by no means one and the same. When this occurs, the subject who defines the conditions for realizing the owners' rights in fact determines the ownership relations in the society. Experience of historical development confirms this: in the 1920s, the bureaucracy, having appropriated for itself the right of accounting and supervision, easily managed to crush the NEP, and later also the one-man peasant farms with all their rights of "possession, disposal and utilization."

In other countries (both socialist, as well as capitalist) where this has not occurred, where the state (i.e., the subject which determines the conditions) allows diverse forms of realization of ownership, the level of economic development and well-being of the people is higher. The examples of Hungary or Sweden are sufficiently indicative.

It seems that precisely on the basis of a combination of ideas, the workers' hands, and the material means of production, under fair conditions for this combination, ensured by social control through a system of state regulation, the normal development of the economy and a social consensus of the participants in production relations are possible.

In this regard, the role and significance of class or the strata of social bureaucrat-administrators significantly decreases due to the absence of any obligations to the state whatsoever on the part of the direct producers, with the exception of payment of taxes.

That part of the profit (of the converted form of surplus value), remaining after the payment of taxes and other mandatory payments (percentages for credit, fines, etc.), could be distributed among the members of a labor collective in proportion to their significance to this production or could be used in some other way through mutual agreement.

In any other case, one can be as indignant as one pleases about the existence of poverty and privileges here, about the unfair distribution of housing and "special benefits," and demand the passing of yet another resolution "on improvement" or appeal for morality. This will have no effect whatsoever. Yet, the situation must change. Indignation about social injustice has reached a critical point and the events of past months show that the working people not only do not want to live this way, but will not.

However, the suggested path for the transfer (sale!) of state property not to labor collectives, but to individual people, will only replace the state hiring of manpower

with private-capitalist hiring, without eliminating either the alienation of the direct producers' labor, or exploitation.

Of course, the management methods of the new owners will be more refined and effective than those of state bureaucrats, and the labor of their hired workers will be more productive than it is now. However, it will not become more productive than the labor of owner-workers, co-owners, united on the basis of joint-stock, shareholding or other cooperative relations. Even more important, such relations will not be fairer. The feeling of unjustness is directly related to society's social stability. Right now, it is already obvious that the attempt to allow the limited development of private enterprise has led to serious social tension.

The version which permits the conversion of all participants in the labor process into co-owners of the means of production seems more attractive, since it is capable of ensuring social agreement, which is the main condition for the successful course of any reform.

The Problem of Social Equality and Socialism

[Article by Pitirim Sorokin, prepared by A. Sogomonov, candidate of historical sciences. The article is to be reproduced in the book: "*Sorokin, P.A. Problema Sotsialnogo Ravenstva. Petrograd 1917*" [P.A. Sorokin. The Problem of Social Equality. Petrograd, 1917]. The text is given in accordance with the author's corrections, stored in the USSR Central State Archives of the October Revolution, and is reprinted in slight abbreviation. Politizdat is now ready to publish a single-volume collection of selected works by P. Sorokin, representing his works during both his Russian and American periods]

Money not only circulates in the monetary market. It also exists on the exchange of spiritual values, of which there are many. Everyone enjoys them, everyone uses them, but (alas!) few know the genuine value and sometimes, perhaps, no one knows. The concept of social equality is also included among such "moneys." It is constantly being quoted on the spiritual exchange, but have many tried to understand its meaning? Indeed, of those who have tried, how many have managed quite clearly to decide what should be meant by this slogan of our time? Have they given us a precise formula for this basis of democracy and socialism?

Regardless of the venerable age of this slogan, legalized even before the triad of the 1789 revolution, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," and the "Declaration of the Rights of a Man and Citizen," its true face, unfortunately, has not been fully revealed to this day.

Let us briefly touch on a few aspects of this problem, not so much as to solve them, as to formulate the purpose of this essay. Time itself will advance this question and, consequently, sooner or later it should be raised.

Without going into details, social equality can be interpreted in two ways: in the sense of the absolute equality

of one individual to another in all regards: both in the sense of rights and responsibilities, as well as the mental, moral and economic sense, etc. In short, this understanding equality means the full identity of one person to another. Every individual should be just like all the others, no more and no less. Everyone should be identically intelligent, identically moral, should possess an equal share of economic benefits (wealth), work to an equal extent, be happy to an identical degree and enjoy an equal amount of respect, recognition, love, talent, etc., etc.

Given the consistent implementation of equality of this type, no inequality whatsoever would be tolerated, no matter with regard to what. Its ideal is to cut all people from the same pattern and to the utmost make them entirely identical to each other, like serialized publications with one and the same issue. A society built on such a plan would be similar to the society described in one of Jerome's stories: all the individuals in it, in terms of clothing, height, and even the shape of their noses or lips, should be as like to each other as two drops of water. Obviously, such equality is a sheer utopia. It is impossible, impracticable, and hardly desirable from the viewpoint of most people. The fact that it is impossible does not require proof. That it is undesirable is also obvious, because it leads to the moral "it is shameful to be good," a moral hardly acceptable for anyone. In fact, if everyone has to be equal to each other, one must not be intelligent if there are foolish people; one must not be honest, if there are criminals; one must not be healthy and well-fed, if there are syphilitics and hungry people; one must not be pretty, if there are ugly people, etc. "Equality means equality in everything!" "Justice, justice to the end!" In this understanding of equality, there would have been no place in the world for Socrates, Christ, Newton, Kant, Leonardo, Michelangelo, not one of the "great men" whatsoever. Mediocrity and ignorance would have ruled. In other words, the moral of this type of equality is to hand out rewards for ignorance, disease, crime, etc., and would lead to the complete stagnation of culture and all its gains.

Enough has been said to discard this concept of social equality. It is utopian, unfeasible, regressive and socially harmful.

However, only one possibility then remains: equality should not be understood in the sense of identity, but in the sense of the proportionality of social benefits to the merits of one or another individual. According to this formula of proportionality, rights to social benefits (wealth, love, fame, respect, etc.) cannot and should not be equal between a simple painter and a Rembrandt, between an ordinary scientific worker and a genius, between an unskilled laborer and an Edison, etc., etc. "To each according to his merits," "to each, in terms of his strengths and abilities," "to each, by the measure of his talent"—these are brief formulas, advanced by this concept of equality. This, in its basic features, is the second understanding of equality, which breaks down into a number of subdivisions, as we will see below.

Besides these two types, no third exists. It is either the one or the other. The first is hopelessly unsuitable. It remains to turn to the second.

Many authors view equality in this second meaning as something more or less new. However, in its general form, the principle of proportionality of merits and benefits (rights and privileges), reading "to each as he deserves," is as old as mankind. We need only turn to the history of privileges or inequality, and from its very first pages we can see this proportionality of merits and privileges or benefits. In primitive society, full-grown men were the most privileged, and among them—the shamans and leaders. Why? Because they were the bearers of strength, the guards and protectors of the group and the most experienced individuals. In the belief of these groups, the shamans and leaders were people gifted with unusual abilities and offering tremendous services. Hence, they were also the most fully privileged individuals. Although from our viewpoint these were false services, in fact useless (as they often were), from the viewpoint of a society of that time, due to its lack of development and knowledge, they seemed valuable and useful. Consider the history of the estates: the nobility and the bourgeoisie, or the history of the Catholic Church, or simply of people who enjoy "popularity" in one or another society, and you will see that in each society the amount of rights and the advantages of one or another estate are generally proportional to their merits (in the estimation of said society).

We can also observe the same truth in our time as applied to entire groups and individual people. As society begins to value the services of the nobility less and less, and the services of the "third estate" more, the privileges of the former decrease while the rights of the latter grow. If a certain X or Y has a high "exchange rate" among one or another group, it is simply because this group values them for something, recognizes them for certain merits and talents. If this is so, it is clear that **equality, interpreted in the sense of the proportionality of services to privileges or benefits, is not some kind of new slogan, not something specifically inherent to the democratic era and culture, but as old as the world, having always existed and still existing in our day.** Therefore, it is hard to define our time through the slogan "to each according to his merits," the more so to consider it a distinctive feature of democracy and socialism.

Does it follow from the above that all discussions of equality as a sign of our and of the future culture, of its growth and its inseparability from socialism, represent a misunderstanding? Does the above mean that the growth of equality is a myth, that everything remains and should remain as before?

No, it does not. The above speaks only of the fact that, in such important issues, one cannot limit oneself to general formulations like "to each, according to his merits." It is necessary to go further, to study the details and

precisely clarify these general phrases. Otherwise misunderstandings are inevitable. Unquestionably, the principle "to each according to his merits" is not new. It is true that it is as old as mankind, that it has functioned in all times and, probably, will also function in the future. The essence of contemporary equality and its novelty does not lie in its general formulation. To reveal the nature of the latter, we must go farther and raise a number of questions. Only then can we comprehend the "holy of holies" of contemporary equality. Otherwise, it will crawl away through the wide net of this general formula, and we will be no better off than before. Let us try (of course, in brief) to take these next steps.

The formula "to each according to his merits" is old. Yet, the content that is put into this formula is new, or rather, the **criteria, the yardstick by which these merits are measured and this proportionality is established between the merits of a group or an individual and the corresponding share of social benefits (rights and privileges), due to them for these merits or, broadly speaking, for the social functions that they perform, is new.**

Proportionality in history is more or less constant, but its bases and criteria are mutable and different. The essence of the changes that have occurred, if you will, lies in the change of the assessment criteria for merits and privileges. He who manages to accurately understand the specific features of the assessment criterion, prevailing in an egalitarian society, will thus also be able to understand the basic features of a society built on the principle of equality.

Now, we ask ourselves, what is the change that has happened here? In other words, what were the criteria by which social benefits were distributed "to each according to his merits" in the past, and what are they now? Has there been some kind of change here or not?

Without claiming an entirely exhaustive answer, knowingly impossible within the bounds of this article, let us point out only the basic features of the shift that has occurred.

In comparing the method for establishing the proportionality of merits and rewards in ancient societies and in new ones, the first thing that comes to mind is the fact that **long ago, the assessment criteria were not individual and not equal.** One or another act by an individual was evaluated not by itself, but depending on **which group this individual belonged to.** In other words, the measure of the individual's merit was not the sum total of his personal qualities and merits, but **the nature of the group of which he was a member.** If this group ranked at the top of the social ladder, if it was surrounded by a halo, all its pluses, all its light and all its privileges also fell to the lot of a member of it, no matter how worthless or insignificant this individual himself was. Conversely, if this group occupied the bottom rung, a member of it was without rights, even "be he a Solomon."

Figuratively speaking, the ancient social differentiation was reminiscent of a building with apartments, tightly

separated from each other, sharply different in terms of wealthiness and luxury. In some there are an abundance of benefits, in others there is poverty, disease and shame. An individual born into a wealthy and "higher" apartment was the favorite of fortune; a slave, born in the basement, was "declassé" and stayed a slave. Moving from one apartment to another was not allowed, just as moving from heaven to hell was not allowed. All communications were tightly closed, and religion, law, and social power stood on guard, armed with all their apparatuses, fire and swords, and a rich arsenal of earthly and heavenly punishments.

Considering the contemporary system for evaluating merits and distributing rewards in this regard, we cannot help but see a tremendous difference. This difference lies in the fact that now the degree of an individual's merit is no longer determined by his membership in one or another group, but by his personal qualities, his individual services. Regardless of the mass of remnants from the old order, existing even to this day, this is the overall trend of development. Both individually and socially, as a general rule, we now value "a good man" "not for his father, not for his tribe, not for his city, not for his race, and not for his estate," but for him himself. It is decidedly unimportant to us whether he is "of white skin or black," a lord or a son of the proletariat, but it is important who and what he himself is, what he has done and what merits are attributed to him personally. If such merits do exist, be he "Greek or Jew, slave or free," we acknowledge them. If not, be he the son of a nobleman or prince, his titles mean nothing to us. Thus, the criteria for evaluating merits have now become individual and equal. In principle, the yardstick is one and the same for everyone.

Turning to our model, we could say that contemporary social differentiation is like a conventional building with the usual apartments. However, the difference is that these apartments communicate with each other and there are, essentially, no religious or legal barriers. Today, one person may occupy a luxurious apartment, but tomorrow, a "resident from the basement" may occupy it, if he has fulfilled a number of conditions and has performed a number of "feats." Those born in luxurious apartments can move into the basement now, and vice versa, from basements—to palaces and castles. In principle, everything depends on individual, personal qualities.

Hence, the following: 1) the disappearance of the inheritance of privileges or of lack of rights (the decline of castes, estates and of legal statuses in general); 2) the decrease in religious and legal grounds for social differentiation.

Due to the first, the son of a councilor could (in principle) end up being without rank. Conversely, the son of a laundress could become a minister and councilor. Due to the second, the boundary between groups (estates or classes) is now only actual, and not legal. Moving from one to another is not prohibited and is possible. Public

and state offices are not inherited and are not the monopoly of a select estate. Access to them in principle is open to everyone.

All this means that the individual has been released from the supervision of his group, race, tribe, caste or estate and, bit by bit, has cast away all these wrappings. Now, the individual himself is the goal, acts as such, and is evaluated as such.

This is the first basic difference between the old order and the new. The basis for evaluating merits, from unequal and non-individual, has become uniform and individual.

The slogan "to each according to his merits" is still the same, but its meaning has changed. In its contemporary form it distributes social benefits quite differently than it did previously.

Obviously, I briefly sketched only the difference between the contemporary evaluation mechanism and the old, so to speak, the yardstick for distributing benefits and establishing the proportionality of merits and rewards. Now, let us raise a different question. Let us ask ourselves: has that for which we gave "rewards" changed? Many acts and qualities, previously considered "feats" and highly rewarded, have declined in value in the process of history. Conversely, now a great deal that was previously "not worth a cent" has become highly valuable.

Although in ancient times the scale of assessment was collective and unequal, it is now individual and uniform. This still does not explain why the brahmin caste itself possessed such privileges, yet the untouchables were so without rights. Apparently, in the beliefs of society at that time, the brahmins fulfilled social functions which were so important that they deserved the high privileges. Whereas now they have been deprived of the latter, apparently it is due to the fact that these functions have become worthless in the eyes of modern society. In view of this, it is interesting to see what was valued in the past, which social functions were considered especially important, which lost their value, and which ones acquired value. In other words, what was the "substance" of value itself in the past, and what is it now?

A brief answer to this question is as follows: long ago, neither the individual nor even the group in and of themselves were highly valuable, an "end in itself." However, the "deity" or "divine force" was, whatever it may have been called ("totem," "spirit," and later—deity, God, etc.).

Both the individual and the group (caste, estate, etc.) were the higher, the closer they stood to the deity, the more they were party to divine force, the more they participated in it. The slogan "to each according to his merits" in those days was interpreted: "to each according to the degree of divine grace bestowed on him." This is the first historical form of this slogan.

Switching to our own time, one cannot help but notice the enormous shift, already quite obvious in the 17th and 18th centuries in the works of thinkers of that time, and which reduced to the formula: "the greatest value is the human individual," or "man is the goal itself and cannot be a means for anything or anyone." These are the basic criteria for the values of our time, heard here, there and everywhere. All modern systems of morals and law adhere to it. This is the second characteristic change, accomplished within the limits of the very same formula "to each according to his merits." This means that the views themselves of value and merit have changed radically. From religious, the basic value has become human, earthly. The religious actions and functions of a shaman or priest, due to their religious nature, were sacred, great and valuable for societies of that time, which believed in their strength and evaluated everything from the viewpoint of divine values; for contemporary society, these actions are useless and a foolish waste of effort, warranting no privileges or rights at all. Of course, now the existence of privileges for a religious caste, like the brahmins, is quite impossible and inconceivable. The basic value has been "humanized" and, depending on this, the "price" of an individual's acts has changed. That which previously was highly valued has declined, and that which was not valued before has acquired a high rate of exchange. Its valuation has been converted from religious to earthly. The amount of reward is now measured not by the degree of "divine grace" bestowed on an individual or caste, but the degree of social usefulness of this individual or group.

Previously, if a person lacked this grace he also lacked rights. Now a person, due to the very fact that he is a person, cannot be without rights, for "the individual is sacred and valuable in himself."

This has destroyed one of the main elements of inequality.

Now, in proportion to the decline of the religious assessment of social functions and their executors, we are seeing a developing growth in the practice of an economic price list for the distribution of social benefits.

Warriors and the service class, the feudal aristocracy and nobility, who defended the country's integrity and security, arrived in place of holiness and castes of priests, at first together with them, but later already independently. The social exchange rate for their role grew rapidly. Therefore, their privileges also increased. The slogan "to each according to his merits" took the form "to each according to his participation in defending the country from enemies, his martial service and participation in management."

However, time went on. Cities grew. The role of capital also grew. The feudal militia was replaced by hired armies or people's troops on the basis of universal military obligations. The growth of outlays for state management increased and, in short, money became a great force, determining a state's military might.

Thanks to this, the martial merit of the service class itself, moreover having been made the duty of all subjects, gradually lost its social weight and was crowded out by the growing significance of capital. Hence, the "third estate," the "gentlemen of capital," began to win more and more rights and, by the late 18th century in France, overthrew the "scepter" of the nobility and occupied its place itself; the same happened in other countries as well.

The slogan "to each according to his merits" acquired the form: "to each according to his capital." These are the meanings that history has given this "eternal" formula. We are now right in the middle of this process, when capital has reached its highest assessment and already signs of replacement of this value with a new, different, future one are being noted. What content does history intend to give the formula? What should rise in place of capital and be made the basic criterion for measuring merits and privileges? Like any forecast, my answer will, of course, be a guess: however, it is nonetheless highly probable. The answer is: "to each in terms of his personal socially useful labor." This, it seems, is the future meaning that history will read into the formula. If we look carefully at the changes occurring around us, we cannot help but notice that the growth of non-labor incomes is gradually being limited in the most diverse ways: through direct taxation, changes in laws on inheritance, confiscation of market-related increases in the value of capital (land, etc.), the growing monopolization of production and exchange by the state, etc. This is occurring mainly via a direct struggle between labor and capital. Since the time that the fetishism of capital was exposed, when the labor theory of value announced that capital itself is merely a product and symbol of labor, the kingly dominion of capital has wavered. As time goes on, the more and more strongly it wavers. I personally have no doubt as to which of the two opponents will win. Sooner or later, of course, the victory will go to labor.

If this is so, it is easy to draw practical conclusions from this fact: since labor currently falls mainly to the lot of the "lowest" masses, the peasants and workers, then, since it is becoming the main type of social merit, by the general law, this should entail the distribution of full rights to these "lower classes."

Since the "lower classes" make up the majority of people, the distribution of full rights to them means nothing other than the distribution of rights and benefits to almost all of mankind.

This fact of expansion of the group of people enjoying full rights becomes even more noticeable if we take into account that this process concerns men and women identically. The role and function of the latter in society is gradually becoming equal to the role of men. Therefore, it is entirely natural to expect that their rights will also increase, that we are in fact also seeing the emancipation of women and the quite clear, even in our time, growth of their legal capacity.

These are the basic forms that the slogan "to each according to his merits" has taken in the course of history.

Earlier, we concluded that in our day the formula "to each according to his merits" is becoming the formula "to each in terms of his personal socially useful labor." Hence, another conclusion: since labor falls mainly to the lot of the working people, they should inevitably also possess complete rights and a full share of social benefits, which to this day on the whole belonged only to the rather privileged.

The fact that in the 19th and 20th centuries labor has begun ever more and more strongly to be advanced as the basis of social merit serves as direct proof of this. The "labor principle" is ever more sharply infiltrating all theories, both political, economic and social. The whole 19th century is marked by labor theories, beginning with the labor theory of value in political economy and ending with the numerous structures of socialism, where labor is the cornerstone on which the building of an entire future culture is based. Both in science, as well as in everyday awareness, the principle of socially useful labor has become the main and basic criterion for public merit. It has been turned from humiliating employment into an activity that ennobles man.

If this is so, in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries we should also find a corresponding increase in the rights of the working people, an aspiration to equalize their rights to those of other classes. Was there really such a trend?

Yes, it seems so. The increase in the rights of the working classes was displayed in the indicated period: 1) in the proclamation of the equality of all citizens before the law, as opposed to the legal inequality under old law; 2) in the elimination of the estates and estate privileges, and in the proclamation of the principle that representatives of the working classes have a right, equal to that of the privileged, to hold any public office, which previously did not and could not occur; 3) in political equality, in equalization of the working classes to the privileged classes in the use and amount of the public rights of a person or citizen (electoral rights, freedom of speech, of the press, of union, and of belief, the inviolability of the individual, etc.); 4) in a number of facts, aimed at the equal distribution among all classes of the basic spiritual wealth—**knowledge** (hence, universal free education, free classes, lectures, libraries, which was not allowed before), and the trend of intellectual equality; 5) in the aspiration toward equality of economic benefits, manifested in the gradual increase of wages, in the union of workers for the struggle to raise wages, and in state insurance against unemployment, old age and illness. Collectivization of the means and tools of production, entirely logically and rightly proclaimed by the socialists, serves as the natural completion of this process.

However, it would be wrong to think that this process of equalizing the rights of the working masses to those of

the non-working, on the one hand, and the process of establishing the proportionality of labor and the ensuing rights to social benefits, on the other, is complete. No! It is only just beginning. Along with individual inequality, there is the inequality of classes. Moreover, there is the inequality of ethnic groups, there is religious, state and professional inequality, etc., etc. In all these relations there are the privileged and the short-changed, the exploiters and the exploited, the oppressors and the oppressed.

True, as indicated above, in the gradual course of history all these barriers are crumbling, but... it is still long until their final fall. A great deal of time must pass and many sacrifices will be required...

Now, let us ask ourselves: how should social equality be interpreted in its ideal perfection? Does it signify only the establishment of a certain proportionality between the merits of the individual or group and the social values (benefits) for these merits? Or can it be interpreted as the equality of one individual's benefits to the benefits of everyone else?

Earlier, we rejected so-called absolute equality. We also reject it now. However, this does not mean that the principle of "proportional equality" itself, with proper development, cannot and will not lead to absolute equality.

Let me explain. From the brief historical study of the formula "to each according to his merits" we saw that 1) the yardstick itself, by which these merits are measured, has become equal, has been turned from unequal and group into individual and personal; 2) we saw how the content of social merit itself has changed, undergoing several stages: public service is first nearness to a deity, then it is military service and management, then the possession of capital and fulfillment of trade and industrial functions; and finally, it is socially useful labor. Each replacement of one form by another also involved expanding the number of people entitled to receive legal and social benefits. The formula "to each according to his labor" means, essentially, the distribution of full rights and benefits to almost the entire people, to a large part of mankind. Moreover, since employment in one or another socially useful job is accessible to almost everyone, it is not prohibited for anyone but, conversely, is recommended and in our time is even beginning to be introduced mandatorily (labor obligation), since laziness, idling and parasitism are being ever more and more sharply censured by social awareness. We can and should expect that the percentage of working people in the course of history will grow increasingly, and the percentage of idlers—decrease. The limit can and should be a society in which everyone (of course, excluding those absolutely incapable, such as infants and cripples) will work and where there will be no one who "does nothing."

If this is also so and if the theorem of proportionality of merits and privileges is correct, a conclusion follows: in

the society to come, full rights and social benefits will belong to everyone, i.e., each will have the right and opportunity to receive his full share both of economic, as well as of spiritual and any other benefits. If the assumption that everyone will work is not implemented, the indicated consequence cannot happen.

Such is the first conclusion. However, this still does not presume that the share of these benefits will be equal for everyone. Let us note: the labor of everyone will be far from identical. One may work to create a new machine, another will break cobblestones, another will make splendid works of art, and yet another will perform purely mechanical tasks. Will all these types of labor really be valued identically?

Moreover, at one and the same time one more skillful worker will work more productively than another, less skilled. How can they be equalized, and how do we measure their abilities to work?

Hardly anyone is in a position to answer these questions categorically. It is possible that the society of the future, proceeding from the assumption that the simplest forms of work are no less necessary or useful than the most complex (invention, etc.), will find it entirely fair to equalize their value and, accordingly, the share of social benefits. Such an assumption can be allowed, because in the future, apparently, one or another form of labor will not mandatorily be thrust on anyone, but will be chosen more or less freely by each individual as suits his characteristics and inclinations. Under such conditions, any work will be a form of art and creativity, and thus should be assessed as creativity.

However, a different valuation is also possible. A number of works of labor, for the creation of which a special talent or gift is required (for instance, a work of art or science) may be evaluated higher than ordinary products of labor, and thus the performers of such work will receive a greater share of social benefits (economic benefits, fame, respect, praise, etc.), than the share due to ordinary workers. Such a state of affairs will be more likely in the near future. Only at the end of this path can this turn into the preceding picture of equal assessment of all forms of socially useful labor.

The possibility of equal distribution of economic benefits (economic equality) is allowed and, in principle, is not contended. It is the cornerstone of socialism. Socialism itself is usually thought of as a system of collectivization of the means and tools of production. In "Anti-Duhring," Engels indicates that exclusively social equality, understood in the sense of eliminating the classes, is the content of a proletarian equality. "Any demand for equality, crossing these limits, inevitably is foolishness," he states. Thus, Marxism significantly restricts and narrows the nature of equal distribution of social benefits, and thus also the concept of equality itself. From its viewpoint, only a more or less equal right to economic benefits is permissible, but it cannot be a question of more or less equal distribution of benefits of

one type: rights to knowledge (intellectual equality), rights to honor, respect and recognition, rights to maximum morality (moral equality), etc. From the viewpoint of Marxist dogma, such equality is inconceivable and absurd.

However, is this so? Can socialism really speak only of equal distribution of vital economic benefits, and can not demand a different equality: moral, intellectual, etc.? In its essence, is the requirement, for instance, of intellectual equality actually absurd?

I would not answer these questions as categorically as Engels. Conversely, I would be inclined to think that socialism should demand all these forms of equality, and I would not consider such a demand to be absolutely utopian. Socialism, the basic element of which is the principle of equality, should and can not be limited to requiring economic equality alone (equal distribution of economic and material benefits), because it would then be a half-hearted teaching, not demanding equal distribution of the most valuable types of social benefits. Really, does the benefit of knowledge, or public recognition, or goodness cost less than an economic or material benefit? Are these types of social blessings really no more, or not as valuable as that of material security, comfort, prosperity and other material blessings?

Moreover, is material equality itself really conceivable or possible without equal distribution of knowledge and of moral and legal blessings? Is equality of individuals with reciprocal freedom and security really possible in a society where there will be intelligent people and fools, scientists and ignoramuses, moral people and criminals? In such a mentally and morally differentiated society, are there really any guarantees that the intelligent, under new forms, will not once again deceive the ignorant? Really, in such a society, will not "decent people" once again drag criminals off to prison, and criminals once again murder the former? In other words, in such a society is genuine freedom really possible; will the exploiters and exploited, thieves and victims, prisons and crimes, in short, all the evils of modern society, not appear again?

One can hardly deny such a possibility. That is why, since socialism is declaring war against all these troubles of mankind, it should inevitably also exhibit a demand not only for economic equality, but also intellectual and moral and legal equality.

The history of the 19th-20th centuries shows that mankind values such blessings no less, if not even more than purely economic benefits. If it were otherwise, we would not now be witnessing the persistent struggle of the toiling masses for legal and intellectual benefits (equality before the law, equality in holding public offices, right to equal political benefits—electoral rights, freedom of speech, of the press, of union, of conscience, etc.—the struggle for universal and free education, the struggle for equal respect of each person's good name, etc., etc.), with which the history of the 19th and 20th centuries is full,

and which was valued not only as a means of achieving other benefits, but also as a valuable thing in itself. Is it conceivable that mankind will cease to value these blessings in the future and turn away from the struggle to fully endow each person with them? No, it is inconceivable. Willy-nilly, socialism should also secure these forms of social equality. Otherwise it will be a half-hearted, backward ideal, not the lofty embodiment of the highest comprehension and cherished aspirations.

This means that Engels understood the meaning of socialism narrowly and incompletely.

However, people tell me in response: "Let us assume that you are right. We agree that socialism should demand equal distribution not only of material, but also of intellectual and legal benefits. However, after all, we cannot demand the impossible! Such a requirement clearly is absurd and utopian. It returns us to the 'absolute equality' that you yourself examined earlier and deemed absurd." Let me answer this. Above all, this demand for the equal distribution of intellectual and moral blessings is not at all equivalent to demanding "absolute equality." The latter would have been true, if I had said that since X knows Sanskrit, everyone else should also know it. Since Y knows the theory of differentials, all others should know it. **Intellectual equality is interpreted as the possession of a more or less identically developed logical and reasoning apparatus, not the possession of identical knowledge.** The knowledge could be different. One person cannot know everything. This is both harmful, as well as impossible. However, each can and should master all logical and scientific methods, with which he would be able to "process" any "intellectual food." The task of any instruction reduces precisely to this, above all, not to filling the memory with all possible information. Since such an apparatus exists, potentially the possibility exists to master any field of knowledge and, consequently, there is a possibility of mental equality and mental independence. It is the business of each to choose a sphere of knowledge for himself and study its problems. Such "intellectual equality," as we can see, is far from "absolute equality" and is not at all aimed at setting Newton on the level of a savage or, conversely, elevating the latter to the height of the former.

The same also applies to moral equality. It does not mean that, since in the name of duty I treat the wounds of syphilitics, everyone is obliged to do this. No! There are infinitely many forms for the manifestation of altruism, and each can and should do that which conforms to his own inclinations. It is important only that **all behavior on the whole be evoked by and conform to the commandments of real love.** Thus, moral equality does not require lowering Christ to the level of a murderer, but striving to raise the latter to the level of the former.

The above answers the first objection.

Now, we ask ourselves: could such forms of equality conceivably be implemented? Is it really an axiom that

people are born unequal, some with good heredity, others with a different heredity, some with innate talents, others without? Is it really utopian to think that all this can be overcome? Moreover, would not such equality mean suppressing individuality and originality, as well as rejecting the usefulness of differentiation and the struggle for perfection and mastery?

Let me answer. There is no suppression of individuality, since a society consisting of Goethe, Hegel, Kant, Beethoven and other such people cannot be considered a society which suppresses individuality. This means only that the whole society will consist of geniuses, and each of them will be free in his own creativity. Unquestionably, the biological bases of inequality (heredity, the struggle for existence, differentiation) are serious and tremendous, but not insuperable obstacles.

History itself and life are leading to the indicated forms of equality. True, full mental and moral equality is the limit, an absolute ideal which might never be achieved. However, the wheel of history is unquestionably turning precisely in this direction and no other. That is why the ideal of social equality and of socialism would be incomplete without these forms of equality. That is why socialism cannot fail to make this demand.

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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS

Boundaries of Cosmology

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[Article by Leonid Grishchuk, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, chief of department, State Astronomy Institute imeni P.K. Shternberg]

[Text] For many decades, scientific policy in our society has suffered distortions and deformations, the more extreme manifestation of which was the persecution not only of individual scientists, but also of entire scientific fields. To make up for this, there was no shortage of optimistic forecasts and expectations that science would become a direct production force and, when this happens, would scatter benefits as though from the horn of plenty.

Today, we are realizing our lag behind the world level in a number of directions of basic research, the loss of interest in the achievements of various areas of knowledge, the spread of a skeptical attitude toward scientists, who are forced to substantiate the need to develop science via references to the fact that its current level determines tomorrow's equipment, technology and material progress. Recently, there was talk of a need to stop financing space research. It was saved by showing

its contribution to the economy. Of course, this utilitarian approach is in many ways stipulated by the labor structure of our economy. However, we must not forget about the influence that the advancement of knowledge has on man's intellectual and cultural level. In the big picture, this is really the main result of assimilating the achievements of scientific thought!

In turn, the attitude toward basic research and the understanding of its role in social progress depend on the level of culture. In a rule-of-law state, this dependency is obvious: the opinion of the masses shapes scientific policy.

There are serious flaws precisely here. As experience with giving popular lectures indicates, even in an environment of people with higher educations, questions about "flying saucers," "space aliens," etc. are most widespread. A segment of the audience believes that basic science studies these things. Another manifestation of the disoriented understanding of science's role and place is the persistent call for its universal conversion to cost-accounting. Here, it must be said that cost-accounting relations in science are needed to some extent, yet they do conceal a threat to basic research. Cost-accounting increases the priority of applied development work, leads to an outflow of capable people and creates a threat to basic work, which does not promise rapid application in the economy. Such an approach could undermine society's intellectual potential. To put it directly, basic science needs and will need state protection and support in a social atmosphere which is favorable toward its development.

Under this new situation, we cannot get by with just repeating and illustrating the truth: science is useful. Broad discussion is needed, not only on the problems of effective organization of research and on the moral and social responsibility of scientists, but also, probably, to illuminate the boundaries that have been reached in our understanding of the surrounding world. This was noted at the 19th All-Union Party Conference. There is no shortage of appeals for central publications to set aside more space for the problems of science. However, the matter is at a standstill for the time being.

These are the motives which direct me to talk about what the Universe is, as well as about cosmology, the science of the Universe and the subject of my own professional work. I am certain that there is a deep general human interest in its structure, its past and its future.

What We Know About the Universe

For more than 20 centuries, people put the Earth at the center of the universe, surrounding it with immobile stars. The Sun and planets were given a secondary role. It was believed that the Sun revolved in strictly circular orbits around the Earth. It was hard for people to become accustomed to the idea that the Earth is an ordinary planet.

The explanation of the motion of the heavenly bodies and even the prediction of new planets in the Solar System was the triumph of the Newtonian theory of gravitation. Later, the study of the stars and star systems followed. The idea that the Sun is an ordinary star did not come easily either. Relatively recently, scientists presumed that the Sun was located near the center of our star system, our Galaxy, beyond the boundaries of which, possibly, there was nothing. Nothing was known for sure about the existence of any formations whatsoever beyond our own Galaxy. Only in the 1920s-1930s, thanks to rapid progress in the development of observation equipment, was it finally proven that there are a number of other stellar systems and galaxies outside our Galaxy.

Approximately in these years, it was discovered that the Sun is located in a by no means remarkable area, almost on the edge of our own disk-shaped Galaxy. (Looking at its basic mass of stars at night, we see the Milky Way in the sky.)

The understanding that things in space are not at all calm also came with difficulty. The stars are moving within the galaxies, and the galaxies are moving relative to each other. Explosive processes, releasing a tremendous amount of energy, often occur in space.

In the area of space accessible to modern optical and radio telescopes, many, many millions of galaxies are observed. Although they differ in terms of form, mass, and star content, they can be considered the basic structural units of the Universe. Galaxies are combined into groups, accumulations and structures on an even greater scale. In the distribution of a number of conglomerations, stretched and flat elements are being discovered, as well as great empty spaces where, with the achieved level of sensitivity of observation equipment, no galaxies at all are visible. Graphically speaking, the distribution of galaxies has a porous or net-like structure, i.e., the empty areas alternate with "walls" and "threads," where the basic share of luminous matter is concentrated. The galaxies themselves are fairly flat and distinctly outlined formations, but as one moves to structures ever greater in scale, the outlines and localization of these structures become ever more vague. There is no designated place whatsoever in the distribution of these galaxies that could be considered the center of the Universe, and there is no designated direction whatsoever that could be considered an axis of symmetry for the Universe. On this grounds, we say that the observable Universe is homogeneous and isotropic.

The most distant of the observable objects is about 10 billion light-years away us. It is several light-years to the closest stars in our own galaxy. The intermediate distances could be described as follows: the diameter of our galaxy is almost 100,000 light-years. This number exceeds the distance to the nearest stars by a factor of several tens of thousands, and our galaxy is not one of the smaller ones. The dimension of the average concentration of galaxies is even larger, by a factor of 100, and

may exceed tens of millions of light years. The dimensions of the most distinct details in the distribution of "thread" type galaxies and of empty areas is greater still, by a factor of 10 or several tens. However, the sizes of these parts are nonetheless smaller by a factor of 50-100 than the sizes of the entire observable part of the Universe. According to existing data, the hierarchy of structures does not continue without limit, but gradually disappears.

There are data about the possible existence of nonluminous matter in the Universe, the so-called hidden mass. Its average density may exceed the average density of luminous matter, concentrated in stars and galaxies, by a factor of about 10. For the time being, it is unknown in what form this matter (concealed mass), which is hard to observe, exists and whether or not its spatial distribution coincides with the distribution of galaxies.

It is an observed fact of great significance that the system of galaxies is not static, but expanding. Of course, individual galaxies and compact concentrations form stable gravitationally-related systems and do not expand. The law of expansion is more clearly established for the system of accumulations of galaxies. Usually, the brightest members of these accumulations, usually located at the center, and individual galaxies, which are not part of groups or accumulations, are visible. The sum total of all such galaxies forms a sort of grid, extending uniformly on all sides. From a tremendous number of observations, it follows that for any pair of such objects the speed of their separation from each other is proportional to the distance between them. We can at least apply this simple law to galaxies for which the speed, entering into this correlation, is less than the speed of light. For more remote objects, the effect of the special and general theories of relativity are important and the concepts of speed and distance require elaboration.

The coefficient of proportionality between the speed of dispersion of galaxies and the distance between them is called the Hubble constant. The inverse value has the dimension of time and is called the age of the Universe. This name is used because, in flying apart with a constant relative velocity, any pair of objects would in this time manage to increase the reciprocal distance from zero to the value now observed. According to contemporary data, the age of the Universe is about 10-20 billion years. Independent estimates of the age of individual astronomical systems are known: of the Solar System, the stars, stellar concentrations, and galaxies. These estimates are based on data about their relative content of different chemical elements and on the theory of stellar evolution. The estimated age of the Solar System is five billion years, and the age of the oldest spherical stellar accumulations and, indirectly, of the galaxies is 11-13 billion years.

During expansion, the average density of matter decreases and, consequently, it was denser and hotter in the pre-galactic epoch. It is possible to say with certainty that 10-20 billion years ago the Universe was not at all

like that which we now observe. This conclusion is persuasively confirmed by the existence of the so-called relic radiation, discovered using radio telescopes in 1965. It is distinguished from the radiation of isolated objects by the fact that it comes not from separate sources, but from all directions, uniformly filling the entire celestial sphere. Its temperature is about three degrees on the absolute scale. The properties of this radiation are identical everywhere, regardless of at which point in the sky the instruments are aimed. Only slight variations in temperature have been discovered, on the level of a tenth of a percent, caused by the movement of the Sun and Earth relative to the background of this radiation. In the direction in which the Solar System is moving, the temperature is slightly greater, and in the opposite direction—slightly below average. The relic radiation could not have been created by the activity of individual stars and galaxies, but remains as a trace (relic) from the pre-galactic epoch. In this epoch, the average density of matter was greater by a factor of billions, and the temperature of radiation was greater than it is now by a factor of a thousand. During the expansion of pre-galactic matter, the relic radiation cooled down and its temperature decreased to the value now observed. Due to gravitational instability, slight heterogeneities developed in the matter itself, which finally led to the formation of separate objects and the now-observed structures in the distribution of galaxies and conglomerations of them.

The idea that pre-galactic matter was quite homogeneous is confirmed by the high degree of similarity of the temperature of the relic radiation on all angular scales. It should be recalled that light and radio waves, which give the basic observational information about the Universe, travel at a finite velocity, the speed of light. Therefore, the further away their source is located, the earlier the stage of existence at which we see it. To put it figuratively, in observing a source, far from us at a great distance, we are looking into the past. Relic radiation covers tremendous distances, spreading virtually without absorption or dispersion. It actively interacted only with the primary pre-galactic plasma, after which it began to spread freely. If there had been significant variations in density and temperature in pre-galactic matter, right now the observed temperature distribution would be heterogeneous and "spotty."

Yet another set of observed information, an important component part of our concepts about the contemporary and early Universe, concerns the chemical make-up of the matter surrounding us. The most common element is hydrogen. It makes up about 75 percent of the overall mass of matter. Virtually all the rest is helium. The numerous light and heavy elements encountered in nature are represented only in parts of a percent. Altogether, they barely contribute two percent to the overall mass of matter. From this point of view, planets and life on them, built out of heavy elements, are an extraordinarily great rarity.

Elements from carbon to iron arise as a product of thermonuclear reactions in the cores of stars during the calm stage of their evolution. The heavier elements are formed during supernova-type explosive processes. As the result of the explosions of massive stars, rapidly ending their evolution, various chemical elements enter the interstellar gases.

Helium and certain other light elements have pre-stellar origins. This follows from the fact that, during the entire existence of the Galaxy, only roughly 15 times less helium, than that which is in fact observed, could have appeared. The required quantity of helium could easily have been formed in the epoch of so-called primary nucleosynthesis, when the density of pre-galactic matter reached values typical of the density of nuclear matter. Let us recall that relic radiation began to spread freely about 10-20 billion years ago.

Theory and Extrapolations

The basic physical theories form the theoretical foundation for cosmology. Historically, the concept of a non-stationary universe was first suggested by our fellow countryman A.A. Fridman, even before experimental evidence of the phenomenon of "dispersion" of galaxies. In his theoretical works, A.A. Fridman proceeded from the simplest assumptions about the homogeneity and isotropy of the continuous distribution of matter with a positive density and a very slight pressure. Using the equations of A. Einstein's relativistic theory of gravitation, A.A. Fridman proved that the corresponding solutions mandatorily depend on time. It was not immediately realized that the non-stationary nature of such systems is completely natural and inevitable. It is identically warranted both in relativistic theory, as well as in the usual Newtonian theory of gravitation. In the absence of decreases in pressure or any other forces capable of opposing gravity, no ordinary substance can be eternally in a state of rest. Depending on initial conditions, it can either slowly expand or contract. The final fate of an expanding gravitational system depends on whether the average density of matter is great enough that the forces of gravity will slow down the expansion and, in the future, turn expansion into compression. If the average density of matter is greater than a certain value, called the critical value, expansion will be replaced by compression: otherwise it will continue without limit. Obviously, the critical value of density is determined by the rate of expansion and is expressed in the Hubble constant. According to contemporary data, the average density of all types of matter (including the hidden mass) in the observed Universe is close to the critical value.

The averaged, smoothed-over distribution of matter of the galaxies in the observed Universe is well described by Fridman's cosmological solutions and Fridman's models. Why we are observing precisely expansion, and not compression, is a separate question, which cosmologists are now examining.

According to Fridman's solutions, it is possible to calculate the course of the change in both density and temperature in the future, as well as in the past. Using these calculations, G. Gamov designed a theory of primary (pre-stellar, pre-galactic) nucleosynthesis and predicted that the contemporary Universe ought to be full of electromagnetic radiation at a temperature of about six degrees. Although the actual discovery of three-degree (relic) radiation occurred accidentally, beyond any connection to G. Gamov's prediction, in principle its existence was expected. Interpretation of the relic radiation has not caused serious difficulties, the more so since the actual value of the temperature does not differ too greatly from the predicted value.

The successful prediction of the relative content of chemical elements, coinciding with the content actually observed, also relies considerably on the laws for the change of density and temperature with time. In turn, these laws on the whole depend on the forces of gravity, since precisely gravity determines the behavior of large masses of matter. Thus, gravitation field theory plays an important role in cosmology.

It is possible to roughly describe the volumes of the Universe with small dimensions using ordinary classical mechanics and the Newtonian theory of gravity. However, for distances comparable to the scale of the observable Universe, the Newtonian theory is not suitable. Cosmology has to be relativistic and relies on the conclusions of the special and general theories of relativity. Here, the concepts of time and space hold an especially important place.

The special theory of relativity has changed the old concepts of pre-relativistic physics concerning time and space. Absolute time, "flowing uniformly and independent of anything external," turned out to be overly idealized. According to the special theory of relativity, the judgments of observers about the interval of time and the segment of distance between one and the same pair of events depends on the movement of the observers. For different observers, the time intervals and segments of distance between one and the same pair of events, generally speaking, are different. There is no one correct set of values whatsoever: all sets of values are right, and each of the observers is correct to an equal extent. Only a certain combination, consisting of the time intervals and segments of distance, remains identical for all. Therefore, it is said that unified space-time has an independent value, but not time or space separately. The change of views of space and time has occurred, in part, because the procedure itself for measuring spatial segments and time intervals has been analyzed.

The general theory of relativity, i.e., the relativistic theory of gravitation, introduced even more cardinal changes in the concept of space and time. Once again, certain questions hold an important place in understanding it: What, with what and how is it measured? Observers who are resting with respect to each other, yet

are located in places where the gravitational field is different, will discover by comparing their observations that the rate of flow of time for them is different. Such conclusions also occur with regard to segments of length. The conclusions of the general theory of relativity conform quite well to all existing experimental data, both under laboratory conditions, as well as in space.

Judgments about the geometric properties of a given surface are made on the basis of correlations between segments of length which connect points of this surface. Judgments about the geometric properties of space-time are made on the basis of how the time intervals and segments of length between events in space-time behave. Since, in the presence of a gravitational field, length and durations do not behave as they do in the absence of a gravitational field, the geometric properties of space-time change. That is why the concept of warped space-time, the idea of its curvature, arises. Giving a detailed description of a gravitational field is the same as giving a detailed description of the geometric properties of space-time.

In cosmology, the concept of warped space-time plays a central role. In geometric terms, one could say that the cosmological model in which the average density of matter is greater than the critical value conforms to a closed space, similar to the surface of a sphere. A model in which the average density of matter is less than the critical value conforms to the so-called open or Lobachevskiy's space. On the boundary between these two cases, i.e., in a situation where the average density of matter equals the critical density, there is a model where space has ordinary Euclidean geometry. As already mentioned, the estimates of density in the observed Universe give a value, close to the value of the critical density. For now, it is impossible to choose between these three geometries of space. In any case, the definition of the geometry of space would be local in nature, i.e., it would directly relate only to the observed part of the Universe.

Fridman's cosmological solutions postulate homogeneity and isotropy as universal and eternal properties. Direct observational information about the Universe relates only to a limited area, both in time, as well as in space. In the area encompassed by observations, these properties really exist, although only with a certain degree of precision. However, cosmology is interested in the structure of the Universe on the whole, i.e., with the utmost conceivable distances and time intervals. Therefore, extrapolations are often used, true, inevitably of limited trustworthiness. Nonetheless, in using the observational data and a theory, tested in other observations and experiments, it is possible to draw meaningful conclusions about epochs and areas of the Universe which are not observed directly here right now. In this manner, for instance, we succeed in drawing conclusions about the structure of the Universe on scales exceeding its observable dimensions by a factor of 50-100.

On the grounds of this analysis, it can be claimed that on the tremendous scales mentioned, inaccessible to contemporary observations, the deviations from homogeneity and isotropy are not overly great. More accurately, the relative deviations of all cosmological values do not exceed one unit. On even greater scales, it is no longer possible to say this. The above argument does not rule out that the properties of the Universe on such great scales may be considerably different. There are interesting theoretical considerations to the effect that, on the utmost greatest scales, the structure of the Universe may be extraordinarily complex. Even violations of the properties of connection of space, the appearance of differences in the dimensionality of space, a change in the numerical values of fundamental constants, etc., are also not ruled out. Although, at this level of knowledge these considerations are highly hypothetical.

The question of the structure of the Universe on very large scales is supplemented by the question of the properties of the Universe at the very earliest stage of its evolution. The uncertainty in the answer to this question partly relates to the fact that the properties of matter under tremendous densities, exceeding nuclear density by many orders, are unknown. It would be especially important to clarify the amount and the sign of pressure in this matter. The point is that pressure is capable of creating gravity, just the same as it creates the energy density of ordinary matter. This is an effect of the relativistic theory of gravitation: it does not exist in the Newtonian theory. Under ordinary conditions, pressure is insignificant and additional gravitational forces are small. In any case, pressure which is positive in sign can only slow the rate of expansion through its gravitational influence. Given other identical conditions, a gas possessing a high positive pressure will expand somewhat more slowly than under conditions of the same energy density, but less pressure. However, the situation changes significantly if states of matter with negative pressure are possible, moreover, great negative pressure in terms of the absolute amount. Then, matter would expand not with deceleration, but with acceleration.

Modern elementary particle theories predict that in the very early Universe a state of matter with a negative pressure really could have existed, and it would have been equal to the absolute value of the density of energy. In this case, an accelerated rate of expansion occurs, known as inflationary expansion. If such a stage really occurred in the evolution of the very early Universe, it explains several fundamental facts. Let us point out some them.

As already stated above, the temperature of the relic radiation coming from different directions in the celestial sphere is identical with great precision. This fact in itself is rather surprising. According to the ordinary Fridman solutions, not involving the hypothesis of an inflationary stage of expansion, the indicated elements of the primary plasma would not be in a cause-effect relationship to each other. No physical process whatsoever could ensure the identical nature of conditions in

these elements, yet nonetheless for some reason they had an identical temperature. Therefore, one must assume that the initial conditions were such. The inflationary expansion hypothesis offers a more natural explanation for this fact. The entire volume of primary plasma could have developed in the stage of accelerated expansion from matter, which had occupied a small cause-effect area. In other words, the causal connection between all elements of the primary plasma, now observable, could have been established in the inflationary stage of expansion. This makes the sameness of the observable temperature more understandable.

Another advantage of the inflationary hypothesis relates to the explanation of the origin of primary perturbations in the density of matter. As already noted, in the pregalactic epoch of expansion such perturbations should have existed, so that in the future they could lead to the observed objects and structures. In the usual approach, the properties of such perturbations do not proceed from general theory, but are postulated. In particular, the amplitude of perturbations is selected such that we obtain the observed structure. The inflationary hypothesis offers a more natural explanation. In the inflationary stage, it turns out, perturbations could have developed from inevitable fluctuations of a quantum nature. This decreases the number of necessary assumptions. Comparison of all conclusions from such a concept to what is observed is one of the most actively developing fields of cosmological research today.

Finally, the existence of a stage with a great negative pressure gives hope for explaining cosmological expansion itself. As already stated, at this stage the forces of gravitation accelerate expansion, not slow it down. The gravitating system is brought from a state of rest to one of expansion, not of compression.

The hypothesis of an inflationary stage of expansion is just one example of the close intertwining between modern cosmology and modern basic physics. The problems relating to the micro- and macro-world connect into a unified set of problems. Possibly, here we must seek an answer to the question of how the Universe was born. In recent years, this has become the object of specific research.

There are at least two groups of ideas. First, there is a set of theoretical and observational arguments supporting the idea that the history of the Universe began from a kind of special state, not subject to description within the framework of the classical relativistic theory of gravity. Really, extrapolations of the observed expansion into the past, according to ordinary Fridman solutions, in the end lead to infinite values for all physical quantities: density of energy, pressure, strain of the gravitational field, etc. A state characterized by such values is called a singularity. Classical concepts of length and duration no longer apply for its study. This area of research has been singled out as an independent discipline, quantum cosmology. Thus, a concept arises about the quantum birth of a classical Universe and classical space-time.

The second group of ideas relates to persistent attempts by theoreticians to create a unified theory for all physical interactions. The inclusion of gravitation in existing theoretical schemes makes it necessary to involve complex theoretical constructions, such as multidimensional spaces, super-symmetry, super-strings, etc. It is important that, as for other fields, quantum laws should form the basis for describing gravitational interaction. The classical gravitational field and the related classical space-time are approximations, justifiable under certain conditions.

Both above-mentioned groups of ideas are being actively developed right now. In the first, the emphasis is placed on cosmology; in the second—on microphysics. It may be possible that the secret of the origin of the Universe will be discovered when both approaches merge into one.

The boundaries of the known and the hypothetical, which I have tried to talk about, are very mobile. It is possible that tomorrow they will be different: such are the rates of our renewal of knowledge.

It must be said that research on the Universe has always been accompanied by the appearance of questions, going beyond the framework of cosmological science. Let us recall the fate of the Dominican monk Jordano Bruno, burned at the stake by the Inquisition in 1600. The mercilessness of the reprisals against him were not immediately understood. After all, it would seem, the conflict was based on highly abstract ideas about the infinite nature of space and the multiplicity of habitable worlds! It is hard to establish the connection to everyday life. Nevertheless, his opinions undermined established concepts, sanctified by the Church. If the heretic was not condemned, doubts would arise not only in the accepted picture of the world, but also in the infallibility of the Church and power.

This tragic page of history illustrates the sharp world-outlook and ideological struggle surrounding cosmological assertions, also occurring in our time, for instance, surrounding the question of the causes of a singular state (is this the work of God?). Man began to think about the origin of the world long ago. The images from the material culture of primitive societies attest to this.

Mankind has been living in the space age, started by the flight of Yu. Gagarin, for almost 30 years. We are seeing farther and we know more, we are approaching a fundamentally new understanding of the Universe that is now facing the "world of men." Researching it requires the participation of representatives of almost all sciences, including humanitarians. It is a question both of ensuring space flights, as well as of resolving a whole number of fundamental problems, for instance, the problem of the existence of non-Earth civilizations. Certain experience in interaction and some practical scientific experience has accumulated here. However, this is a topic for yet another author.

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Science and Cost-Accounting

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[Two articles, one by A. Shchéglov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and one by I. Chebanenko, UkSSR Academy of Sciences academician]

[Text] Almost three years have passed since the passing of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution "On Converting Scientific Organizations to Full Cost-Accounting and Self-Financing." What has changed in the financing and organization of research? How much do the adopted measures contribute to the development of science, to its restructuring? These questions were discussed in February at the All-Union Scientific and Practical Conference on Problems of Managing Scientific and Technical Progress, and in March, at the annual General Assembly of the USSR Academy of Sciences. These questions also trouble our readers.

We are publishing two opinions of representatives of one science, geology: A. Shcheglov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, and I. Chebanenko, UkSSR Academy of Sciences academician.

We Have Not Received Independence

[Letter by A. Shcheglov, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, director of the All-Union Order of Lenin Scientific Research Geological Institute, USSR Mingeo, Leningrad]

Realistically evaluating the overall situation in the country, the entire multifaceted nature and complexity of the existing problems, it would be unrealistic to assume that the state, with its significant budget deficit, will find the possibility of significantly increasing allocations for scientific research. If this is so, apparently, for the time being one path remains: to reveal science's internal reserves, to eliminate the factors which slow down its development. The question of creating favorable conditions for the maximum display of creative activeness, of independence in all links—from individual scientific associates up to scientific collectives of various ranks (laboratories, departments, institutes)—is raised especially sharply. Does the conversion of scientific organizations to cost-accounting and self-financing, now being implemented, contribute to this?

Let us examine this question using the example of the All-Union Scientific Research Geological Institute (VSEGEI) of the USSR Ministry of Geology—the country's oldest geological institution. It employs three USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding members, 80 doctors and more than 350 candidates of sciences, and many experienced specialists, "unburdened" by scientific degrees. The institute has a scientific council in which all-Union societies, scientific councils and specialized councils on defending doctoral dissertations function.

The main task of the collective is to develop the scientific bases for solving problems in regional geology and to reveal the laws for the location of useful mineral deposits. The institute's geological, photograph, paleontological-stratigraphic and metallurgical schools are well-known in our country and abroad. It has already been a year since we converted to cost-accounting. Some experience has been gained, from which we can draw conclusions, in our opinion, of a general nature.

Above all, these concern the conclusion of contracts with organizations. Right now, VSEGEI is doing a certain share of research through such contracts but, as a rule, this is petty work in terms of its scientific significance, rather the fulfillment of ordinary production assignments by skilled specialists. It would be possible to increase our assistance to industry, but in this case a large scientific collective would essentially be converted into a contracting organization for the fulfillment of petty, private orders. The institute would provide itself with financing, but then exploratory research of Union-wide and general scientific significance would come to a halt. Territorial production organizations, due to their limited financial possibilities, and sometimes underestimating them, cannot consistently finance the latter.

Realizing this, the USSR Mingeo is allocating resources to support such research. But how! We are signing contracts (at the present time, more than 150) with numerous ministry administrations. Allegedly for purposes of improving supervision, the department prefers small sums of allocations for each contract, indicating the number of executors in it. As a result, research which is unified in terms of its concept is broken up into little themes, and the scientific council and board of directors has no right to practically increase the funds and number of executors, if a definite scientific success is achieved or, conversely, to decrease or in general halt work on a theme if it is revealed to be unpromising. Moreover, the fate of the scientific plan is in the hands of individual associates at the administrations, who may or may not want to agree with the institute's proposals. On each contract, it is necessary to give reports not only on the whole, but also during the stages of its fulfillment. A business-trip frenzy has become the center of our life: representatives of the board of directors, the departments, laboratories, and scientific groups rush from Leningrad to Moscow with reports for the quarter, half-year, and year—and this is for 150 contracts! The role of the scientific council has been shamefully degraded—in fact, it is not needed, and the board of directors could be represented only by economic managers.

Moreover, financing according to contracts makes it possible to use part of the resources saved to form a residual wage fund, distributed among the executors according to the coefficient of labor participation. This has generated an aspiration in some scientific associates to obtain an elevated salary at any price, leading to unjustified reductions in laboratory research and rejection of the use of the latest equipment and computers.

Moreover, in converting to self-financing, elevated amortization deductions for scientific equipment were determined. It is impossible to say how all this affects the quality of research.

What is happening as a result? For the indicated reasons, we cannot effectively use the funds allocated by the state for the creation of scientific bases, or the surplus for solving practical tasks. The conditions under which scientists and the collective on the whole are placed restrict their independence and activity. The depth of development of problems and the responsibility for end results is decreasing. After all, it is important to report to the ministry officials, whose skills (to give them their due) cannot replace a collective discussion in the scientific council of the work that was done, and does not enable the assessment of its significance for theory. Succession in the development of scientific knowledge is being disrupted. This is not just my opinion. Specialists who gathered in February at the All-Union Conference (held at our institute), devoted to raising the efficiency of geological photographic work, also considered it necessary to note the negative influence of contract relations with the ministry on solving fundamental problems of geology.

For the time being, the consequences of introducing the new system of financing are not fully clear. However, as is already obvious, the main goal has not been achieved. We have not received independence.

In all likelihood, perestroika in science cannot be reduced to cost-accounting alone: we cannot view it as a panacea for all ills. A standard approach, fitting all the country's institutes into one mold, is intolerable. The resource supply conditions for basic research, applied research and experimental design work cannot be identical. They should take into account the specific features of these three different types of activity. It seems to me that basic science, in principle, is not cost-accounting. For institutions, engaged in exploratory research, above all, institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences, conversion to cost-accounting will mean their complete collapse. Financing ought to rule out the need every day to think about where to get money and how to account for it. Without this, it is impossible to provide the collective with a work atmosphere and psychological mood for creativity, which is of decisive significance for success.

Scientific organizations of an applied nature can work according to economic contracts, but within reasonable limits. It is necessary to show concern for the unity of applied and basic research—in the final account, the level of development of any science depends precisely on this. One possible way is to clearly determine the main directions of scientific research and the organizations responsible for their development, having granted them the right to raise and solve problems themselves. It should be reinforced by the direct goal-oriented financing of their activity. Head scientific institutions should have the possibility of distributing part of the

allocations received in favor of contracting institutions, belonging to different departments. This will make it possible more thoughtfully and economically to utilize material and monetary resources, to raise responsibility, to eliminate petty supervision by the ministries, and to ensure the unity of basic and applied science.

Determination of the main directions and basic problems of a specific science is within the competence of specialists, not administrators. A system of contests among scientific ideas and projects should form the basis for accepting scientific programs at any level.

In any case, it is impossible to reduce the genuine restructuring of science merely to the conversion of scientific organizations to full cost-accounting and self-financing. We need alternative suggestions and a broad discussion of them. By this criterion for selecting variants, there should be an increase in the independence of institutes and in the democratization of scientific life.

A Question of Primary Importance

[Letter by I. Chebanenko, UkSSR AS academician, UkSSR AS Institute of Geological Sciences, Kiev]

[Text] Today, there is a widespread viewpoint that we must convert only the sectorial scientific research organizations to cost-accounting and should finance VUZs and the academies of sciences, as before, directly from the state budget. This is because they are called on to create basic science and should not be troubled with petty things like seeking orders for contract work. It is impossible to agree with this opinion for many reasons. Above all, because science as a specific form of the social division of labor is united and indivisible. When it is a question of determining its economic relations with industry, it is inappropriate to proceed from the fact that there are theoretical (academic), applied (sectorial) and VUZ sciences. Preservation of the old organizational structure has been suggested before: precisely its existence will obstruct serious changes in the activity of our scientific research institutions.

Everyone knows that each ministry has one or several head institutes in its structure and, under them, a large number of small scientific research subdivisions, called on to provide "their own production" with scientific development work. Many of the head organizations long ago lost their independence and the possibility of developing exploratory scientific problems, having been turned into "manufacturers" of practical documentation.

One could avoid directing special attention to this phenomenon, by way of justification referring to our state's wealth and the need for ministerial leaders to have everything at their disposal, including scientific data, if these sectorial scientific organizations had not appropriated the lion's share of material resources allocated by our state for science and new equipment. The basic shortcoming and main problem of today's science lies precisely in this! A paradoxical situation has formed.

Sectorial scientific organizations have money and other material resources, yet cannot perform genuine science because they are forced to expend their knowledge and efforts on trifles. Academic institutes, which have a freer choice of scientific themes and enjoy great scientific forces, are considerably limited by their material possibilities.

So as to be properly understood, let me cite examples from a field close to me, geological science in the Ukrainian SSR. There are four geological institutes in the UkSSR Academy of Sciences: the institutes of Geological Sciences, of Geochemistry and the Physics of Minerals, of Geology and Geochemistry of Mineral Fuels, and of Geophysics. They employ about 100 doctors of sciences, representing all scientific fields of geology without exception, capable of solving any geological scientific problems. However, one day this must have seemed insufficient to someone. As a result, in parallel with academic geological science in the Ukraine, a most enormous host of sectorial geological science has also grown. Two large institutes (the Ukrainian Scientific Research Geological Prospecting Institute and the Institute for Mineral Resources), with branches and departments in many cities in the republic, as well as a large number of so-called scientific-thematic subdivisions within associations and expeditions, are subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Geology. However, this is not all. Institutes like UkrgiproNIIneft, NIIshelf, the Kiev Department of the Moscow Institute of Geology and Development of Mineral Fuels, and UkrNIIgaz also serve the petroleum and gas industry. The Kharkov Scientific Research Coal and Chemical Institute belongs to the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy, yet the Donetsk Scientific Research Coal Institute belongs to the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry. Furthermore, if we add the geological and scientific exploratory subdivisions of the UkSSR Ministry for Land Reclamation and Water Resources and the subdivisions of the republic's construction organization, then in the Ukraine the overall number of workers (scientific, engineering and technical, and auxiliary), involved in sciences of a geological and technical nature, exceeds 8,000 people by our estimates, which is several-fold more than their number in the UkSSR AS. By comparing the scientific themes of academic and sectorial geological institutes of the UkSSR, it is obvious that they more than 75 percent redundant.

Why do Ukrainian production organizations have their own "home" geological science, when nearby there are the powerful geological institutes of the Academy of Sciences, capable of meeting virtually all their needs? Such economic management is nothing other than wasteful. Every one of our economic leaders wants to have his own science, which is reminiscent of the flawed practice of accumulating above-standard reserves. Such use of geological science costs the state too much!

The above-noted proportion between academic (theoretical) and sectorial (applied) sciences is not only observed in geology. To the same extent, it is expressed in many other scientific fields in the UkSSR AS. If this situation

is viewed from the position of converting science to cost-accounting and self-financing, things may turn out quite badly for academic geological institutes. The cultivation by ministries and departments of their own scientific geological organizations long ago became an obstacle in relations between academic geological science and geological industry. When offering production organizations their services for the conclusion of economic contracts, the geological scientists from the UkSSR AS have repeatedly received the typical answer: "We do not even have enough money to support our own geologists, never mind you."

Really, what exactly are we, the academy scientists? Under the new conditions, how should we get orders for scientific development work from production organizations, which now are no longer in a condition to provide financing not only for academic scientists, but even for their own sectorial scientific workers?

Today, this is a question of primary importance. So long as it has not been answered, we cannot even speak of the converting science to cost-accounting, if, of course, we suggest implementing this conversion seriously, not just in words. Here, two extremes are possible: either we convert all sciences, including academic, entirely into production enterprises, which will turn them even more into an appendage of industry and will slow down the development of basic problems, or we must separate science on the whole, including sectorial science, from industrial associations, having placed both industry and science under equal economic conditions.

Science has been converted from a predominantly contemplative-cognitive to a cognitive-practical sphere of human activity. It has become an active force in the production of material goods. If this is so, the attitude toward it should be different. Science must no longer be considered a dependent of the basic production links of the economy, such as industry, agriculture and others. Without science, these links are in no condition to develop successfully. They perform certain production and economic functions for society, science performs others. Between them, there exists that which political economy calls the social division of labor.

In the first place, we must answer the question of the status of science, its position in the overall system of the country's economy. In which category should scientific labor be included—production or nonproduction? The further development of the organizational structure of science both on the whole, as well as of academic science in particular, depends on the answer to this question. If we include them in production, science should then receive full production-economic independence and should arrange its own business relations with other units of the national economy under equal conditions, giving industry the results of its labor on the basis of economic contracts. If science is considered nonproductive as before, then it should remain, as before, in the

service sphere, living on state subsidies and organizationally increasingly subordinate to the purely production subdivisions of the economy.

Here, I wish to voice my disagreement with the opinion of those who assume that academic science must not convert to cost-accounting. Any result of labor which is in demand, be it material or spiritual, is a commodity. Otherwise, all our plans to place science under economic conditions, equal to other spheres of the social division of labor, lose meaning. Of course, as the sum of methods for studying nature that scientists possess, united in scientific subdivisions, science itself cannot be a commodity, since it is neither sold nor exchanged, yet the results of the work of scientists is a genuine commodity.

It goes without saying, in business relations with science, production workers approach with their orders only those scientists who will be able to fulfill them at the highest level. The mechanism of competitive selection functions here. On the one hand, this way leads to a real increase in the quality of scientific development work, because no one will pay for poor results, and on the other, it leads to a reduction in the number of unproductive scientific employees and of entire scientific collectives, about which our planning and financial bodies have dreamed for so long.

Currently, there are some 70 institutes working in the earth sciences in the USSR Academy of Sciences and the academies of Union republics. In parallel with academic institutes, many of them also work in various geological production organizations. A question arises: Is this many or few? If we answer from the viewpoint of the economic approach to managing science, this is too many. Yet, if we answer from a noneconomic viewpoint, perhaps, it is not nearly enough. After all, not all of our academicians have their "own" institutes yet!

Even if we do not make a detailed analysis of the scientific themes and quality of work being done by academic and nonacademic geological institutes, directing attention only to their names and geography, in this regard we discover flaws that should not exist. If it is still possible somehow to justify the extreme number of geological institutes via reference to the enormous dimensions of our state and the diversity of geological structures within its territory, it is then impossible to explain the confusion with their names and, hence, also with the directions of their research.

It is also impossible to understand and explain the motives for the appearance of geological institutes with names such as the Institute of the Lithosphere (Moscow) and the Institute of the Earth's Core (Irkutsk), which are based not on specific scientific directions of geology or methods of studying it, but simply on parts of the earth. However, do not other geological institutes also study the Earth's core and the lithosphere? The name "Institute of the Lithosphere" carries a meaning which seems as though we should have created an Institute of Mendeleev's Table, instead of the Institute of Chemistry.

A similar confusion is not only observed in the Earth sciences. It is typical of our entire science, especially of its sectorial part, where institutes named NII plus every possible suffix have literally filled the entire applied sphere of science. It seems, even such purely mechanical work as the compilation of a complete list of all the country's scientific research institutes, which, there can be no doubt, does not exist either in the USSR Gosplan, or in the USSR State Committee on Science and Technology, would lead one to conclude the need to put this system in order.

As regards how science on the whole and its subdivisions will gain full production-economic and legal independence and will prepare for conversion to full cost-accounting and self-financing, a question immediately arises: How will they get orders for scientific research? Through private contracts, as is now done in most cases, or in a centralized manner? The success of the whole idea of restructuring science depends on how this is answered. Today, one can understand that part of the orders, concerning basic scientific research and development work for assignments along the lines of scientific and technical programs, will be distributed directly by the USSR GKNT and by ministries on the basis of competitive principles, and the rest will have to be sought out by scientific research organizations wherever they may. However, no fundamental innovations whatsoever will be achieved under such a mechanism for economic management. For example, even now the subject matter of academic institutes consists of three parts: 1) a small number (5-10 percent) of goal-oriented assignments, received from the USSR GKNT and the USSR Council of Ministers or the Union republics; 2) economic contract work (25-30 percent), concluded through direct ties with industrial and other organizations, and finally; 3) inter-departmental scientific subjects (60-65 percent), performed on the basis of budget financing.

How will our institutes look for theme-assignments? In any way they can, or by creating a centralized system for collecting requests for scientific research work? After all, it is a question of 90-95 percent of the current burden of scientific institutions, especially of academic institutions! A state committee and its branches under the councils of ministers of Union republics should, in a centralized manner, provide institutes primarily with a scientific theme of the appropriate profile and with financing, collecting requests from interested ministries and departments for this. The USSR Academy of Sciences and the academies of Union republics would carry out general scientific leadership of the activity of institutes, determining the main scientific directions, evaluating the level of the research being done, and training new, highly skilled scientific cadres. The last item to which I would like to call attention, in discussing the problem of perestroika of science, is the need for a change in the attitude toward our science and toward scientists not only in an economic, but also in a moral and psychological sense. We must protect scientists, above all, from two abnormalities: 1) the endless rebukes

aimed at them to the effect that they are virtually idlers and spongers in society and 2) the humiliating journeys by scientists, especially those from academic institutes, through the ministries and departments in search of economic contracting work. Due to unfortunate articles in the press, the concepts of "scientist" and "scientific employee" are becoming almost vulgar now, and many scientists are embarrassed even to use these highly respected titles in describing themselves.

You cannot, they say, make omelets without breaking eggs. Yet, good managers ought to make the omelets with fewer eggs. What reproach can it be a question of, if the salary of a junior scientific associate with a candidate of sciences degree today is less, than that of a trolleybus driver or a store stock-boy? After all, their labor is far from equivalent. For this reason, many young VUZ graduates are refusing to go into science and the influx of fresh, creative forces is decreasing. Of course, there are cases of unconscientious attitudes toward their duties on the part of scientific employees, as well as the employees of other spheres of the economy. However, this is explained not by the fact that scientists, figuratively speaking, are bad people, but by the fact that conditions do not exist in all scientific collectives which would contribute to ensuring high discipline and exigency.

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THE STATE AND SOCIETY

'State Will' or 'Measure of Freedom?' Two Concepts of Legal Regulation

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[Text] What is law? The creation of power, the state will of a class, or the expression of the traditions and consciousness of the people? A tool for implementing policy or a means of protecting people from dangerous fluctuations in the political system? A guarantee of freedom, or a way to compel people to follow a need which is recognized by someone? These are extraordinarily important questions in juridical theory, above all, with regard to the correlation between law and power. However, life itself also answers them: the practical functioning of a political and legal system, which always personifies one or another vision or law, is "sanctioned" by the prevailing ideology. Such an ideology and such practice are inseparably related to the nature of the political regime existing in the country and act as an expression either of democratic and liberal principles in the interaction between society and the power apparatus, or of authoritarianism or totalitarianism. The purpose of a law and the role which it plays with regard to the state, society and the individual may seem entirely different.

In our country, the prevailing concepts about the role of law and the practice based on it have always to a great extent conformed to the authoritarian, rather than the liberal tradition. So it was in pre-revolutionary Russia when, as the noted specialist on comparative government R. David remarks, the law was an arbitrary creation of an authoritarian leader who stood above the law, and jurists were more the servants of the tsar and the state, than the servants of the people (see R. David "Osnovnyye Pravovyye Sistemy Sovremennosti" [Basic Contemporary Legal Systems]. Moscow, 1988, p 158). As far as "proletarian law" and the "revolutionary sense of justice" are concerned, even since the first years of their existence they have acted, above all, as an expression of "class will" and, relying on the organizational force of the state, have served as tools for social transformation. As a consequence, this role of law was theoretically and ideologically reinforced in a definition, proposed by A. Vyshinskiy, which has been "official" since its unanimous approval by participants in the 1st All-Union Conference of Scientific Workers in Law in 1938. Law was defined as the state expression of the will of the ruling class, subordinate to the tasks of preserving, strengthening and developing social relations and systems advantageous and convenient for it. As applied to Soviet society in a later period, this definition, broadly recognized in our jurisprudence, was elaborated on by an indication to the effect that law is the state will of the working people, headed by the workers' class or the will of the whole Soviet people, guided by the CPSU, set into law. However, it is more important that for decades the concept of law as a command or order, the execution of which was compulsory, was retained.

Even today, such views are common here. For a long time, they had grounds, since they conformed to juridical practice under conditions of the command-administrative system. This practice expressed a special, specific concept of juridical regulation of social relations which could be called "revolutionary-transforming," keeping in mind that law in this case serves mainly as a tool for creation, an instrument for the transformations being executed by political power. The alternative to this is a concept of legal regulation in which the main purpose of law is not to thrust certain procedures on people at the discretion of power, but to ensure normal life for civil society, the harmony of relations which form within it naturally, the prevention or, at least, lessening of conflicts, and the protection of human rights. And, of course, to ensure the legal establishment of the organization and activity of the power apparatus itself, which places its functioning into a strict framework of law and puts it under the control of civil society.

One of the important differences between these concepts relates to the "amount" or "proportion," in the legal regulation of that which is power or state within it. In general, the state-power principle is always present in legal regulation. After all, precisely the state and power create law, issuing legislation and other normative acts. Precisely they make law generally mandatory, ensuring

the action of its norms and subordinating people's behavior to them. However, in the "liberal" interpretation of law and the corresponding concept of legal mediation of social life, the amount of that which is state-power in law and in legal regulation basically is limited to this. One could say that the state-power principle here is reduced to molds, into which the content of law is "poured," and to means, thanks to which law is put into practice, when the source of law is no longer the state, but civil society. As far as the authoritarian concept of law and the concept of legal regulation based on it are concerned, here not only its form, but also the content itself turn out to be state and power: to a significant extent, it is a product of the arbitrary rule of those who have power, the "creation" of a power apparatus. Such law, it seems, fully deserves to be called "statized" or "statist."

It is possible to explain why precisely the authoritarian vision of law, above all, became predominant here as an instrument for creation in the initial period of building socialism. One can also understand why the functioning of the entire juridical superstructure in subsequent periods of our society's history was based in many ways on this concept. Here, of course, the traditions of domestic political and legal culture were telling, but the main reason, most likely, is that this concept was organic for the pre-perestroika model of Soviet socialism. For instance, nothing conformed better to the idea of socialist production as a "unified factory," where the administration, the body for economic management, has considerable freedom to dictate its will to the participants in economic activity, and the latter to a great extent are subjects of production discipline, rather than economic freedom. Statized law also turned out to be a fairly successful juridical form for the sociopolitical existence of pre-perestroika socialism: the "barracks" organization of social life, the role of "common will" and "unified interests" within it, allegedly personified by political power concentrated in the hands of a few, and disdain for the person, individuality, freedom and human rights. In connection with this, we must specially emphasize that precisely the concept of "revolutionary-transforming," "creative" legal regulation, relying on a state will that expresses class interests, creates an entirely real danger of crowding general human problems out of the juridical sphere. From the viewpoint of this concept of the principle of freedom, justice and humanism easily become "unnecessary," just like the legal principles guaranteeing them: the presumption of innocence, the impossibility of retroactive force of a law which makes punishment stricter, proportionality of the act and of retribution, as well as the institution of constitutional supervision, effective control over legality, legal protection of citizens' rights, etc. In any case, nothing prevents sacrificing all this to the measures carried out by power. There are more than enough examples of this in our history.

A commodity economy, a socialist market, pluralism of interests and of the institutions in civil society corresponding to them, a state bound to law, the separation of

powers, acknowledgment of the absolute value of every person, and guarantees of individual freedoms—these are the main features of the new image of socialism, which ought to be a genuinely democratic and truly humane social order. It is clear that the old concept of the place and role of law here is unacceptable. This is not only because, being based on it, it is impossible to genuinely guarantee a humane attitude toward the individual or his reliable protection from whatever arbitrariness there may be on the part of power. It is no less important that, as has now become obvious, the effective, full-fledged functioning of all aspects of social life can be achieved only under conditions of freedom, incompatible with total control or strict supervision over the people by power. Which path juridical practice should follow henceforth to a large degree depends on which concept of legal regulation prevails.

Their differences begin with the interpretation of the essence of law. In one case, priority is given to ensuring freedom and limiting arbitrariness, in the other—to principles expressing the arbitrary will of the state. I. Kant, for example, defined law as the sum total of conditions, under which the arbitrariness of one entity is compatible with the arbitrariness of another from the viewpoint of the overall law of freedom (I. Kant, "Works" Vol 4, part II, p 139). Marx wrote that "laws are positive, clear, all-round norms, in which freedom acquires an impersonal and theoretical existence, regardless of the arbitrariness of a separate individual" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 1, p 63). However, in noting the class nature of bourgeois legislation, the founders of Marxism emphasized: "...Your law is only made into law by the will of your class..." (vol 4, p 443).

In modern Soviet jurisprudence, there is a widespread viewpoint that the essence of law is contradictory: both class and overall social tasks are resolved via juridical means. Moreover, law is seen not only as a tool for implementing state will (its inherent contradictoriness also lies in this), but also as a means, guaranteeing a certain measure of social freedom for the members of society. If this theoretical scheme is used to explain the essence of Soviet law, one must admit that its main aspect is state-will. In this regard, the corresponding "creative" influences of legislation, as a rule, had a class ideological motivation. They were justified by the interests of the "workers and peasants," the "working people headed by the workers class," and "all Soviet people, guided by the CPSU." All this meant nothing other than the statization of law, of its essence.

Using such law, the state guides social development. Moreover, it "leads" society along a path, outlined for it beforehand by political power. Hence the rather unique nature of its influence on the will of the addressees of legal norms. The free activeness of members of society is an obvious hindrance for such authoritatively assigned movement: above all, obedience and enthusiasm in fulfilling the instructions of power are demanded. Under these conditions, juridical influence was also called on to

limit the freedom of the individual, so as to create grounds for subordinating everyone to a unified will. Such limitation of freedom tends to strive to eliminate freedom, to reduce it to naught. This is the primary aspect of the influence of statized law on people's will and consciousness. The second aspect, just as important, lies in the thrusting of the demands of the state and of power, expressed in the laws, on subjects who are "deprived of freedom."

The specific nature of the influence of statized law on the will of its addressees also determines the specific features of the juridical means used in this case. Above all, it is a question of the general principles of legal regulation or of what the theory of law calls the *types* of legal regulation, characterizing its overall "permissive" or "prohibitive" orientation. In this regard, juridical regulation has two types: **generally permissive**, which is based on general permission to which specific prohibitions correspond (on the whole, it follows the principle "everything is permitted, except what is directly prohibited"), and **authorizing**, based on an overall prohibition, to which specific permissions correspond (on the principle "everything is prohibited, except what is directly permitted").

To what logic is the use of the given juridical means subordinate, under conditions of statization of social life and absorption of civil society by the state? Here, power on the whole takes upon itself concern for society and its members which, incidentally, also justifies its total leadership and control over all social life. As a result, the state and the political power apparatus turn out to be free in their relations with citizens, placing the latter in the position of the unfree. Under such conditions, it is disadvantageous to strictly bind the activity of the power apparatus with legal forms. Therefore, it is regulated in the generally permissive way. Here, freedom of the individual is either a forced concession from the state to the citizen (in the best case), or a means of resolving the tasks raised by the power apparatus, but it is never seen as an absolute, independent social value. Thus, the supervisor-state issues it to the citizens under its supervision "in pieces," in little portions, i.e., in the form of specific permissions against a background of overall prohibition, in other words, by giving authorization.

The use of this type of legal regulation by the state creates a suitable legal atmosphere for attaching the method of so-called **positive obligation**—yet another juridical means, extraordinarily important precisely for statized law—to the regulation of people's behavior. Positive obligation is an instruction to perform actions required by the law under the threat of application of punishment or other measures of compulsion. Among the basic methods of legal regulation (besides obligation, also including permission and prohibition), precisely this is so suited that, regardless of the influence of non-legal factors—economic, political, spiritual and moral, etc.—the necessary social effect is achieved by juridical means, "thrusting" on people variants of behavior, pre-programmed for them by state power.

Therefore, under the conditions of predominance of the command-administrative method for managing society, obligation also becomes a priority method of legal regulation.

Obligation and everything supporting it are the main indicators of the "force" of statized law. Both in juridical theory, as well as in practice under the conditions of command-administrative socialism, primary attention is devoted not to guaranteeing a person's rights, but to guaranteeing the fulfillment of obligations by him. Here, everything "operating" in the legal system for the implementation of obligatory instructions is recognized as a decisive aspect of its functioning: prohibitions as a means, creating conditions for the execution of positive obligations, persuasion and compulsion as ways to subordinate the behavior of citizens to the will of the state, legal sanctions, and legal responsibility.

In this regard, it is interesting that ideas about the content of the concept, reflecting the condition of the functioning of the legal system on the whole and the quality of operation of all juridical mechanisms—the concept of **legality**—are also fairly unique. Clearly, it is no accident that the concept of legality as the rule of law in relations between power and the individual, as an indicator of a person's legal protection from the arbitrariness of the power apparatus, has never been broadly recognized here. The ideas of legality as a principle of law, a method of state leadership, and a regime of responsible life, in which its "substance" is formed by the requirement of strict and unswerving observance of the laws by all subjects, have become traditional.

An obvious manifestation of the state-will nature of law was a phenomenon which could be called the degeneration of subjective rights into legal obligations. Essentially, it in fact gives the rights of citizens a content entirely opposite to their nature, as a consequence of which these remain rights only formally, in reality having been turned into legal obligations.

A widespread case of such degeneration is the merging of subjective rights and legal responsibilities, when certain rights are simultaneously established as obligations, or obligations—as rights. For the time being, such merging is preserved in our legislation. For a long time, juridical science has deemed this strange situation to be normal and even to personify the special, socialist nature of Soviet law. The right to work and the obligation to work, the right to a vacation and the obligation to use it, the right to administrate state affairs and the obligation to participate in one or another form of administration are rarely seen as the clearest manifestation of the principle of "the unity of rights and responsibilities" under socialism, very popular for Soviet jurisprudence in past years. Only recently has our juridical literature noted the negative features of such merging, its dependency on the role of administrative-command methods for managing society. In reality, the merging of rights and responsibilities is nothing other than a fiction, concealing the actual replacement of rights with responsibilities. The point

here is that the setting of responsibilities and the granting of rights are mutually exclusive ways of influencing people: in one case, the person receives a certain possibility of accomplishing certain actions to satisfy his own needs, the use of which or not is his personal business, while in the other the corresponding variant of behavior is commanded by imperatives, leaving him no other choice. Therefore, a situation, in which a right is granted and, at the same time, a responsibility is set with the same actual and juridical content, is contradictory. However, this contradiction works in favor of responsibility, since precisely its implementation is ensured through the compulsory force of the state, which in the final account means the victory of responsibilities over rights, making the latter formal and illusory.

There is yet another form of degeneration of subjective rights into responsibilities. Although, from the legal viewpoint, rights fully continue to remain possibilities of the subjects, it is in fact traditional to view their implementation as a kind of necessity, the citizens' "duty" to society. This tradition is reinforced by public opinion and, mainly, is maintained by evaluations, far from indifferent for the subjects, of their behavior by both state and non-state power structures. Let the reader ponder the following question: Until quite recently, what in fact for the overwhelming majority of citizens in our state was the implementation of their rights to participate in elections or rights to demonstrate—the free use of legally guaranteed possibilities, or the often onerous "fulfillment of duty?"

As we see, the predominance in a statized legal system of obligatory (and prohibitive) principles is displayed not only in the fact that the main aspect of its functioning is to ensure the performance of duties, but also in that even rights in one form or another acquire the features of responsibilities. It must be noted here that, for the aspect under consideration, many of our traditional ideas receive nontraditional treatment. For instance, is it more correct to consider "the right to work and the obligation to work" an obligation to work with the right of a certain choice (within the framework of this obligation) of the nature of labor activity and the place of work? Was not the instruction, written in our Constitution until 14 March 1990, concerning "conformity to the goals of communist building" as a condition for the association of citizens in social organizations, evidence of the authorization procedure for forming such organizations, based on a general prohibition against creating them? It seems, clarification of the genuine essence of the concept "law is the state will," which has seriously influenced the content of our present legislation, will help to carry out a certain "demythologization" of it, to reveal the true nature of ideologically masked and camouflaged legal mechanisms.

The main thing in the essence of law based on the fundamentally different, liberal, democratic concept of juridical mediation of social life relates to guaranteeing freedom and asserting general human values. Strictly speaking, this is precisely what people of all times have

expected of laws. Precisely from such positions, the philosophy of law has often suggested evaluating existing legislation on the basis of whether it reinforces legal principles or is "legislatively shaped by arbitrariness." In this case, freedom, equal rights, and the requirements of justice and humaneness are the basis of the legal content of everything juridical, and state will, established in obligatory rules of behavior and in the strengthening of its organizational force and of compulsion, is of an auxiliary nature, acting in the legal system only as a necessary form, as a method for the existence of this content.

In characterizing such a legal system, it is appropriate to recall the words of K. Marx: "The legislator... does not **make up** the laws, he does not invent them, he merely formulates and expresses the internal laws of spiritual relations in conscious positive laws" (ibid., vol 1, p 162). He spoke of "law as a measure of freedom." It also differs in that, to a great extent, it serves as an instrument for the self-organization of civil society, giving the state the authority to establish its internal laws of existence in legislation and to ensure them, rather than being a tool in the hands of the state, deciding for society and for the people how everyone should live.

Interpreted as a measure of freedom, law serves to keep order in the behavior of independent and socially active subjects. Juridical regulation is being created here, oriented precisely toward these human qualities. It is striving to get by without "foisting" one or another variants of behavior on people. The limitation of freedom, the determination of its frameworks and limits in law is necessary in this case only to prevent conflicts between the actions of free individuals, so that the arbitrariness of one does not infringe on the freedom of another. In other words, legal restrictions in the final account are a way to ensure freedom. All this finds reflection in the specific features of the juridical means being applied and, in particular, influences the principles for using the authorization and generally permissive types of legal regulation.

More than 200 years ago, it was noted: "The opinion that every citizen has the right to do anything that is not against the laws, fearing no consequences whatsoever except those which might be generated by the action itself, is a political dogma... without which a legitimate society cannot exist" (C. Beccaria, *On Crimes and Punishments*, Moscow, 1939, p 230). Obviously, this statement was based on the above concept of freedom as a necessary condition for the normal, natural existence of man and society. Ensuring it should also be the main goal of state and legal institutions. Otherwise, the primacy and priority nature of freedom as a social value with regard to everything that relates to the functioning of power, including the maintenance of organization, discipline and order in society (which, in turn, should serve the freedom of the person), also dictate the need,

when selecting a method for restricting it, to give preference to the generally permissive procedure, to the principle "everything is permitted, except what is forbidden."

Probably, one could say that the regulation by this principle of all "horizontal" social ties and relations, whose subjects are citizens, their associations, and economic organizations, is a sort of juridical foundation for the existence of a civil society with its own life, independent of "state" life. The activity of the power apparatus as a structure, receiving its authorities from civil society for use in its interests, is therefore un-free from the start. Under such conditions, it ought to be regulated through authorization: it should be allowed to do only that which is directly stipulated in legislation. As already suggested in the press, including *KOMMUNIST* (1989, No 13, p 17), generally permissive juridical regulation should apply to citizens and their associations, and authorization regulation—to the power apparatus and its officials.

As far as methods of legal regulation (positive obligations, prohibitions, and permissions) are concerned, the use of the latter two dominates in "law as a measure of freedom." The regulating force of permission and prohibition, taken together, lies precisely in that, by granting people rights with a precise indication of the limits to possible behavior and by ensuring normatively organized social freedom, scope is given to the action of a whole system of social regulators: economic, spiritual, moral, and others. These methods partially form and set in motion the restraining motivations for behavior. However, even in this aspect, they lack a "foisted" nature, since they erect barriers against those actions with regard to which, as a rule, moral prohibitions already exist. It is most important that these methods of regulation open an opportunity for the action of extra-legal stimuli, for developing the qualities of the individual, related to the initiative-minded activity of participants in social relations.

The main goal of the existence of everything juridical as applied to law as a measure of freedom is to ensure the reality of the rights of the members of civil society. It is entirely natural that under contemporary conditions, when the assessment of the role of law in our country is increasing to a significant extent and the need to "destatize" it has been recognized, having cleansed it of remnants of the power and state principle (in order to eliminate the total subordination of law to the state and, conversely, to subordinate the state to law), the emphasis in our juridical science is being put precisely on subjective rights. In particular, it is noted that compulsory obligation, prohibition and legal responsibility—everything that shapes law according to the common stereotype—in reality relate not so much to law, as to state power. Law is, above all, that which, in S. Alekseyev's words, "speaks of rights," and precisely this is the most important, determining aspect of juridical regulations (S. Alekseyev. *"Pravovoye Gosudarstvo—Sudba Sotsializma"* [A Rule-of-Law State: The Fate of Socialism]. Moscow, 1988, pp 96-100). In this approach,

subjective rights and a solid and reliable guarantee of them are the "super-task" of the functioning of the legal system. Thus, the most careful attention in both theory and practice should, in our opinion, be devoted to the whole set of questions concerning the reality of the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens: to the conformity of our legislation to international human rights acts, to legal procedures for their use and protection, and to guarantees against the violation of constitutional rights and freedoms by current legislation.

Is it realistic to hope that Soviet society will finally reject law which basically "speaks of responsibilities," in favor of law which "speaks of rights?" There are reasons to believe so. In the current process of extensive renovation of our legislation, the approach from positions of "law for society and the person" is noticeably beginning to crowd out the once-traditional "law for political power" approach, which subordinated society to "state" interests.

Of course, the tumultuous legislative flow of recent years has not gone by without normative legal acts of the former, statist nature. Among these are the "anti-alcohol" legislation, the 1988 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium ukases on meetings and demonstrations and on the duties and rights of Internal Troops, as well as the 18 April 1989 Ukase on changes and additions to the legislation on state crimes (it probably reminded the reader of the "sensational" Article 11 on "insulting or discrediting state bodies and public organizations"). However, the overall trend in this area is such that, in acquiring freedom, our society is striving ever more persistently to "vanquish" the prohibitive-obligatory content of such acts. In any case, it is quite obvious that they no longer serve as such an organic "legal grounds" for it, as they would have several years ago.

Nevertheless, in our opinion, the main thing distinguishing the current process of legislative renovation is the appearance in it of precisely such laws that "speak of rights." Laws have already been passed on individual labor activity, on cooperatives, on ownership, on the bases of legislation on land, on leasing, and there are laws on the procedure for appealing to the court about illegal actions by bodies of state management and officials which infringe on the rights of citizens, on procedures for resolving collective labor disputes, on citizenship, and on the press and other mass information media. Draft laws on public organizations, freedom of conscience, and religious organizations have been submitted for universal discussion. All these are sources of law, based on the whole on the liberal interpretation. They predominantly use the generally permissive type of regulation, structured on the interaction of permissions and prohibitions; considerable attention is being devoted to ensuring the rights of citizens and their associations. The most important thing is that the legally-formed freedom of the members of civil society serves as the main "spring" here, which drives the entire mechanism of legal regulation.

For the time being, some serious shortcomings are inherent in such acts. In particular, their reorientation from ensuring "state" interests, above all, to ensuring the interests of society and the person is not always entirely consistent and, in our opinion, the rights stipulated in them are still not fully established as absolute and unconditional social values, and in many ways their reality is still viewed by the legislator as merely a means of resolving political, economic and other social problems, not as the goal. However, the very first steps on the way to creating a legal foundation for a free, democratic society and a rule-of-law state have nonetheless been made. Let us hope that in the future the renovation of Soviet legislation will take precisely this path.

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Psychiatry and Human Rights

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[Article by Boris Protchenko and Aleksandr Rudyakov]

[Text] An article by B. Protchenko and A. Rudyakov, "A Painful Subject" (KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1989), as well as the editorial review of the responses to it (No 13 of the same year) and the problems, touched on by them, of Soviet psychiatric practice continue to be discussed in our readers' letters. The editors and authors of the article have received a number of such letters, including from abroad, many of which were personal appeals. People are speaking of their own troubles, the fate of loved ones, voicing their alarm on the subject of abuses and sharply criticizing the leadership of the country's psychiatric service. Mainly, however, they justifiably demand clear legal regulation of psychiatric activity and the passing of legislation which would guarantee strict observance of human rights and freedoms.

The editors do not consider this "painful subject" exhausted and continue it in this publication.

A common motif unites all the appeals to us: the severity and unfairness, reigning for the time being in the designation and application of compulsory psychiatric treatment. Unfortunately, those who manage Soviet psychiatry, primarily the officials of USSR Minzdrav, the VNII for General and Forensic Psychiatry imeni V.P. Serbskiy and the USSR AMS [Academy of Medical Sciences] Center for Psychiatric Health "have failed to notice" the critical materials printed in the theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee. Meanwhile, it is precisely they who ought to thoroughly and self-critically explain themselves regarding the reasons for numerous violations of legality and human rights in the sphere under their direction. A great deal has already been said about these violations in the press, on the radio, on television, and at meetings of the congresses of people's deputies.

Attempts by officials artificially to smooth over the real state of affairs in psychiatry are, at the very least, inappropriate. Thus, regardless of the fact that the All-Union Society of Psychiatrists publicly acknowledged cases of abuse by psychiatry and assured that the cases of its innocent victims would be reviewed, the scientific secretary of this society declared that he does not allow "the doctors to deem a wittingly healthy person mentally ill due to political convictions." N. Zharikov, chairman of the board of the All-Union Scientific Society of Psychiatrists, and G. Lukacher, the chief scientific secretary, attempted in the article "The Way is Clear to Us!" (Meditinskaya Gazeta, 20 December 1989) to shrug off justifiable critical remarks aimed at psychiatry (and themselves personally) and to diminish the scales and lessen the nature of the abuses that occurred. Such maneuvers can lead to nothing good. In our opinion, it is time to learn to take criticism with dignity. The more so since the All-Union Society of Psychiatrists has been conditionally accepted (at its request) into the World Association of Psychiatrists; this matter will be finally resolved only after the conduct of an inspection, the goal of which is to ascertain that our psychiatrists do observe human rights.

The written and oral complaints from citizens are filled with the pain of the past, with sincere indignation on the subject of groundlessly sending people for psychiatric evaluation, which is fraught with serious moral and material consequences (dismissal from work, refusals to employ, etc.), unsubstantiated compulsory placement in psychiatric hospitals, and the use of medications which cause the patient physical suffering. People are justifiably indignant about the arbitrariness, bureaucracy and indifference of certain employees in the health care agencies, prosecutor's offices, militia, courts, and other state and public agencies and institutions which examine complaints of illegality.

A number of judicial criminal processes, instituted on cases of such abuses, as well as reports in the mass information media indicate that abuses in psychiatry have been and are still being permitted. In this regard, sensational statements were made at one of the briefings by N. Zharikov, head of the Scientific Society of Psychiatrists, Yu. Aleksandrovskiy, head of a boundary condition center, V. Yegorov, head of the USSR Minzdrav Psychiatric and Narcological Service, and V. Tikhonenko, Moscow chief psychiatrist. They finally slightly parted the curtain around the "holy of holies:" certain statistical data in the field of psychiatry.

It turns out, compulsory placement in psychiatric hospitals has been a genuinely mass phenomenon here: in 1987 in Moscow alone, psychiatrists at their own power hospitalized 81,000 people, and in 1988—71,000. To this, we should add the significant (but not yet precisely known) number of people sent for compulsory treatment on orders from the courts in criminal proceedings.

In the words of the above officials, "Soviet psychiatrists have taken a course toward sharply limiting their

instructions for urgent hospitalization without the patient's consent..." In connection with this, it was suggested reducing the number of patients in hospitals by 30 percent. In Moscow alone, 10,000 people have been released from psychiatric hospitals annually and 60,000 were removed from evaluation at psychoneurological clinics. Throughout the country on the whole, it is planned to reduce the number of people registered for psychiatric evaluation by 1.5-2 million people. Millions of Soviet people, it seems, have been deemed mentally impaired without sufficient medical grounds. This alone degrades a person's dignity and limits his rights. What kind of spiritual disturbances do these people and their relatives and friends experience!

However, the disclosures by the leaders of psychiatry, elicited by sharp criticism from Soviet and foreign society, were not exhaustive. Many important issues still remain unclear.

Above all, it is unclear why the course toward limiting medical grounds, or rather, toward developing scientifically substantiated criteria for compulsory hospitalization was not outlined significantly earlier. What prevented this? Who specifically is to blame? Some writers, not without grounds, put the blame on A. Churkin, who has resigned from the post of chief psychiatrist of USSR Minzdrav, G. Morozov, director of the VNII for General and Forensic Psychiatry, and M. Vartanyan, head of the USSR AMS All-Union Scientific Mental Health Center. Indeed, these leaders are responsible for the disdain for the principle of presumption of normal mental health for every person, which prevailed for many years.

The time has come to publish the complete statistical data on the number of people kept in the country's psychiatric hospitals, on the time periods for stays there, the results of treatment, the number of people registered in psychiatric records, and finally, on the number of those who, being on the records, have not undergone psychiatric treatment as a consequence. This information is urgently needed for the conduct of scientific research by physicians, sociologists and lawyers. Society also has a right to know the true state of affairs.

People's deputy Ye. Yevtushenko suggested creating a deputy commission to ascertain the legality of the actions of psychiatrists who have given expert conclusions on cases of so-called "enemies of the people" and "dissidents" during the years of the cult of Stalin and in subsequent years, and to reveal and rehabilitate those who were illegally repressed and placed in psychiatric hospitals. This proposal, in our opinion, merits the utmost support.

Regardless of whether a person suffered from deranged mental faculties or was mentally healthy at the moment he was placed in a psychiatric hospital on an groundless accusation, he should be rehabilitated. If criminal proceedings were instituted and there was a court decision to put the person in a psychiatric hospital, such a case should be closed due to the absence of corpus delicti.

Those against whom extra-court repression was applied (by NKVD "troikas," OGPU collegiums, and the USSR NKVD-MGB-MVD "special meetings") by way of placement in a psychiatric hospital should be rehabilitated according to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 16 January 1989, "On Additional Measures to Restore Justice With Regard to Victims of Repressions Which Occurred in the Period of the 1930s-1940s and Early 1950s." On this matter, however, additional clarifications by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium are required.

In order really to ensure the strict observance of legality by psychiatric agencies and practicing psychiatrists, it is necessary to undertake a number of broad and decisive measures, based on the international obligations of the Soviet Union to defend human rights, in particular to protect these rights and freedoms from illegal psychiatric practices. In the first place, we need a law on psychiatric aid in the USSR which would regulate the entire process of treatment and preventative work by psychiatric institutions, relating to the restriction of the rights and freedoms of citizens, both the mentally ill and the healthy. Such a law must not be delayed. In our opinion, the draft version, developed by a USSR Minzdrav commission with the participation of representatives of the health care agencies, does not guarantee the protection of human rights. Without delay, a special commission under the aegis of the USSR Supreme Soviet should be created to prepare another version of the draft, having included highly skilled scientists and practical workers on the commission.

The law should stipulate in detail (to maximally prevent subsequent departmental norm-making) the grounds and rules for placement on psychiatric records and removal from them, ruling out the possibility of arbitrariness; specific, strictly limited, scientifically substantiated medical and juridical grounds for urgent hospitalization, as well as prosecutor's and judicial supervision over the fulfillment of this compulsory measure; guarantees of the rights of citizens, listed on the psychiatric records or in treatment in psychiatric institutions, as well as the corresponding responsibilities of the administration. Apparently, in each case of urgent hospitalization, the doctor receiving the patient ought to draw up an official document, indicating on whose instructions, by whom, and when this person was sent to a medical institution and on the grounds of what medical or juridical orders was the decision made to hospitalize said patient.

We share the opinion that the conditions of departmental dependency and the administrative-arbitrary, bureaucratic nature of the leadership of domestic psychiatry on the part of Minzdrav and its agencies are a serious obstacle to its development and the performance of its work strictly within the framework of law. Very promising prospects are opening up here with the creation of a "parallel" psychiatry, acting together with "state" psychiatry in the form of public associations of psychiatrists, independent of Minzdrav. The formation

of associations and corporations on the basis of charitable, joint-stock or cooperative principles will free the initiative of scientists and practical workers and will help to raise the level of psychiatric service and subordinate it to the interests of society.

The Independent Psychiatric Association (NPA, President Yu. Savenko) has been organized in Moscow and is now functioning actively. It has become a member of the World Association of Psychiatrists, which confirms its international recognition. Familiarization with the NPA statutes (in the drafting of which the authors of this article participated) shows that its goals and tasks are progressive and democratic in nature. The organization's work is aimed at preserving and restoring people's psychiatric health, protecting their rights from violations, developing psychiatric science, and improving practice. The association members offer direct medical assistance to citizens. Unfortunately, for now such aid is basically consultative in nature due to the absence of premises for work and of medical equipment. Expert opinions are being given on people's psychiatric conditions, and it would be expedient to define the juridical significance of this in law.

The process of decentralization of management which is occurring in our country should, in our opinion, also spread to psychiatric aid to the population. The monopolistic departmental system for planning and organizing psychiatric service has not withstood the tests of democracy and glasnost. As a field of medicine, psychiatry is special in that tremendous, sometimes almost uncontrollable power over people is concentrated in the hands of psychiatrists and the decisions made by them are often fraught with the risk of negative legal consequences for the patient and infringements on his rights and freedoms. Thus, it seems expedient to separate the psychiatric service from the Minzdrav system, freeing it from departmentalism, so that it can function independently, publicly and openly, under society's constant supervision.

Expert analysis of a person's mental health holds a special place in psychiatry. The legal significance of the opinions of forensic psychiatric expert analysis is extraordinary. Suffice it to say that the court, on the grounds of an expert's opinion, can deem a person who has committed a publicly dangerous act to be irresponsible, i.e., from a legal viewpoint, innocent of that which was committed, and release him from criminal accountability. The conclusions from forensic psychiatric expert analysis also serve as grounds for the court to deem a person incompetent, which entails the deprivation of his constitutional right to vote, the voiding of any actions committed with his participation (marriage, contracts, promises, etc.), and the deprivation of his possibilities to independently utilize his property or non-property rights.

The number of expert analyses done by psychiatrists is enormous. Meanwhile, the now-existing organizational structure and system for doing forensic psychiatric

expert analysis conform to neither the requirements of law, nor the interests of jurisprudence.

According to Article 51 of the Bases of Legislation of the USSR and of the Union republics on health care, the procedure for organizing and carrying out forensic psychiatric expert analysis is established by Minzdrav with the agreement of the Prosecutor's Office, the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice and the MVD. Thus, according to law it turns out that precisely Minzdrav should draft and determine, first, the procedure for organizing forensic psychiatric expert analysis in accordance with its types (stationary, ambulatory, commission, and so on), which are established by legislation, as well as expert analysis in the preliminary investigation stage and in court, and expert analysis of the convicted; second, the procedure for performing this expert analysis, i.e., the specialized methodology for carrying out studies of a person's mental state and for drafting an expert opinion or document concerning his presence (absence) of a specific mental illness, the capability of a mentally ill person to realize the nature of the acts committed by him and to control them, to give conscious explanations regarding one or another event, etc.

The above-indicated article did not state that forensic psychiatric expert analysis be organically included in the health care system and be subordinate to it, although this question should only be resolved at the legislative level. It is not ruled out and is even quite likely that the organization of expert analysis should, from the start, be based on independent principles, since any expert analysis in principle ought to be objective, independent and "extra-departmental" (in accordance with Article 80 of the RSFSR Criminal Procedural Code, an expert gives an opinion in his name on the grounds of studies conducted and bears personal responsibility for it). Nonetheless, the ministry has resolved the issue in its own interests, and the passive attitude of the above-listed Union law enforcement bodies toward this very important problem has greatly contributed to this. In any case, USSR Minzdrav has fully subordinated forensic psychiatric expert analysis to itself. Item 2 of the Instructions for Conducting Forensic Psychiatric Expert Analysis in the USSR, approved on 27 October 1970 by the USSR Minzdrav and coordinated with the Prosecutor's Office, the Supreme Court and the MVD (the Ministry of Justice for some reason "dropped off" the list, although it had the legislator's direct instructions), indicates that expert forensic psychiatric institutions are to be under the auspices of the health care agencies, which will guide expert analysis through the republic, kray, oblast and city psychiatrists, although, as stated above, Minzdrav was not granted such authorities by law. Minzdrav has appropriated methodological and scientific leadership for itself, implementing this, as stated in the Instructions, via the Institute imeni Serbskiy, to which "the right of control over the quality and time periods for the conduct of expert analysis is granted." In other words, the actual leadership of expert analysis was assigned to this institute.

Item 3 of the Instructions instructs experts to be guided by, in addition to the law, the orders issued by Minzdrav as well. The conduct of forensic psychiatric expert analysis in especially complex cases was also assigned to this institute. Item 17 of the Instructions states that the experts are accountable to the health care agencies and the Institute imeni Serbskiy.

Thus, it has arbitrarily created a system of strict departmental subordination of expert psychiatrists which knowingly restricted their independence and did not ensure the full possibility of conducting thorough studies of the mental condition of those being tested in all cases or of giving scientifically substantiated, objective opinions as the law requires.

In our opinion, this situation has contributed to politicizing expert analysis. Precisely it has led and leads to knowingly groundless expert conclusions and to the illegal placement of people in psychiatric hospitals. The departmental interests of medical agencies and the investigative agencies have been linked. As a result, the latter has an opportunity to arrange expert conclusions. Gradually, Minzdrav essentially appropriated the functions of the court: on its instructions, experts everywhere have begun to give opinions on especially legal questions, such as the irresponsibility of a person who has committed a socially dangerous act. This entirely suited the investigative bodies, prosecutor's office and the court, who willingly isolated themselves from the responsibility of answering the main question in criminal trials of the mentally ill—their responsibility or irresponsibility—despite the requirements of the law. A "theory" has even appeared concerning the incompetence of jurors to examine and resolve the question of a convict's responsibility, which is supposedly only within the abilities of psychiatrists. Yet at the same time, no one denies that irresponsibility is a legal, not a medical category.

Illegality continues in the investigation and judicial examination of cases on the use of compulsory measures of a medical nature. Since the final decision on the whole depends on the expert opinion, such cases are investigated extremely superficially. During the investigation and judicial examination, procedural violations and infringement on the person's rights are nearly always permitted. Often, unsolved crimes committed by persons unknown are "written off" on the mentally ill. Prosecutor's supervision of the observance of legality in such cases is extremely poor. Experts rarely express themselves at court meetings: the court limits itself to publishing the conclusion of expert analysis and on this shaky grounds makes a decision on the case.

No small share of erroneous expert conclusions are caused by questionable scientific formulations. Thus, a years-long clinical and criminological study of socially dangerous acts by residents in Moscow Oblast, deemed irresponsible, which was conducted in its time, showed that one of the mistakes in the expert practice of the Institute imeni Serbskiy lay in the extensive diagnosis of schizophrenia (according to the Moscow Diagnostic

School) and the consideration of this diagnosis as unquestionable grounds for concluding irresponsibility. Besides diagnostic mistakes, expert practice has underestimated the significance of stable and prolonged remissions, which rule out irresponsibility. Such a deeply faulty practice has been sharply criticized by some psychiatrists, both scientists and practical workers. The courts, in turn, sometimes insufficiently critically evaluating the conclusions of forensic psychiatric expert analysis, often release dangerous criminals of accountability. Cases of scientifically groundless conclusions by forensic psychiatric expert analysis have also been noted in civil cases.

The absence of controversy in the work of psychiatric experts also calls attention to itself. For instance, we have not encountered conclusions containing the special opinions of members of the expert commission. Really, were there no disagreements? Of course there were. One can only suppose that the official position of the chairman of the expert commission, as well as the diagnostic school to which the leaders of the expert institutions adhere, are decisive here.

The above leads to the conclusion that forensic psychiatric expert analysis should have the right to exist independently beyond the framework of departmental dependency on Minzdrav or the Institute imeni Serbskiy. It is necessary to create an independent organization of forensic psychiatrists, similar to the Voluntary Association of Lawyers.

Independent psychiatric expert analysis should not only be forensic, but also generally medical in nature. This is necessary when the presence and type of mental illness are disputed. In this connection, the proposal of the possibility of conducting international expert analysis on such matters, voiced by the head of the USSR MID Administration on International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights, Yu. Reshetov, is interesting.

The law should stipulate the right of any citizen, who disagrees with the conclusion of psychiatrists about his mental state, to raise the question of conducting expert analysis and receiving a conclusion at its hands, as well as to demand a second expert analysis. At present, it is extraordinarily difficult to achieve this: as a rule, complaints of this nature are deflected by the health care agencies and the law enforcement departments under various pretexts, far from always substantiated.

Psychiatric experts are obliged to be guided exclusively by their own special medical knowledge and scientific medical criteria, not to adapt their conclusions to the suggestions of the investigator concerning the events that occurred and the actions of the person. The more so, since only the court may voice a final opinion on the commission of a violation of the law and on the subject's guilt. Unfortunately, this fundamentally significant rule often is not observed: many experts accept the hypothetical opinions of the investigative agency, contained in the documents for the performance of expert analysis, as

the truth long before closing of the investigation and use them as a basis for their own conclusions. In such cases, the experts rarely stipulate that their conclusion is preliminary in nature, or that the final conclusion will be given at a meeting of the court. Moreover, many experts avoid participating in court meetings on a case in which they have previously given their conclusion.

In the interests of developing psychiatric science and improving practice in the spirit of democracy and illegality, it is extremely necessary to open the archives of psychiatric hospitals and institutions, especially of the VNII For General and Forensic Psychiatry. The archive materials will serve as a most valuable support for interpreting the problems of psychiatry and will enable us to improve legislation with full knowledge of the matter in the name of protecting constitutional rights and the legitimate interests of the Soviet people.

In the complaints that we receive about the cruel treatment of patients by the personnel of psychiatric hospitals, the citizens are rightfully indignant about the fact that people, convicted of crimes, are on the staff. Although some of them have been conditionally convicted to imprisonment with mandatory labor involvement, many of them have committed serious crimes. It is not surprising that such "nurses," performing their duties in psychiatric hospitals through compulsion by way of serving criminal punishment, treat their charges cruelly, especially the "difficult" mental patients who represent a danger to the others.

Care for a sick person, no matter what illness he may suffer from, should be humane, kind, skilled and aimed at improving his health. For understandable reasons, it is hard to find volunteers for work as orderlies in psychiatric hospitals. However, in this case the state has no right to be stingy: serious, unpleasant and sometimes dangerous labor should be well-paid. Under today's conditions, the health care agencies could do a great deal to correct this abnormal situation. After all, there are organizations and individual citizens, prepared to offer assistance to loved ones selflessly: it is necessary merely to make contact with them. Other possibilities probably also exist. For instance, it seems reasonable to release those who refuse to perform military service due to religious or other convictions and, with their consent, replace their labor obligation with the duty to work for two-three years with pay as an orderly at a psychiatric center. It would be expedient to legalize such a practice, as has been done, for instance, in the FRG.

Prosecutor's supervision is called on to play an active role in ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens. The USSR Law on the Prosecutor's Office stipulates the implementation of prosecutor's supervision over the observance of laws during the fulfillment of compulsory treatment measures as designated by a court. This instruction, in our opinion, should also apply to cases of urgent hospitalization. The prosecutors should visit psychiatric hospitals, familiarize themselves with the medical documentation, expose cases of hospitalization done

without legal grounds, and assess the objectivity of information about the public danger of a person, on the grounds of which he was placed in a hospital for compulsory treatment. If such information is insufficiently convincing, the patient must be released rapidly. Verification of fulfillment by the administration of the treatment institution of legislation on the procedures for examining complaints and statements by persons, kept in the hospital, or by their relatives and loved ones, is also necessary.

Let us be so bold as to claim that systematic prosecutor's supervision over observance of the legality of the placement and holding of people in psychiatric hospitals is not being carried out, even though this is a question of restricting the personal freedom of citizens. Prosecutor's supervision, mandatory by law when compulsory measures of a medical nature are used, is functioning quite poorly and at a low professional level. Taking into account that the work of lawyers in such cases is also at just as low a level, one can speak with certainty of the actual defenselessness of the mentally ill, who are themselves in no condition to stand up for their rights and legitimate interests.

Study of a great mass of criminal cases shows that illegality is flourishing. Procedural violations have firmly entered into the practice of investigative agencies and the courts, and many legal errors are made. This is despite the fact that the law specially stipulates additional procedural guarantees in the indicated category of cases.

In order to correct the situation that has been created, we must introduce substantial additions to the USSR Law on the Prosecutor's Office, to clearly regulate within it the circle of specific duties of the prosecutors in supervising the observance of legality in offering psychiatric aid to citizens, including urgent hospitalization and placement and holding in psychiatric hospitals. It is time to legislatively stipulate the mandatory receipt by psychiatrists of the prosecutor's permission (sanction) for urgent hospitalization or, if the prolonged holding of a person in a psychiatric hospital is necessary, of a court decision.

Lastly, certain existing legal procedures are in need of review. The RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 5 January 1988 amended Article 126 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, "Illegal Placement in a Psychiatric Hospital." It calls for criminal punishment for putting a knowingly mentally healthy person in a psychiatric hospital. Obviously, the formulation of this article is unsuccessful. It does not clearly define who bears this criminal accountability for the act: whether these are the medical employees, who having the right to place people in a hospital, or any private (including official) person who has done this. Criminal actions are groundlessly limited to placement in a psychiatric hospital, when illegal placement in a different psychiatric institution, for instance, in a scientific research institute, should be similarly prosecuted. Furthermore, in the article it

should be a question not only of healthy people, but also of the mentally ill who are not in need of stationary psychiatric treatment, yet have been groundlessly placed in a hospital (for instance, for the purpose of ridding oneself of an undesirable neighbor, relative, etc.). Finally, evidently, it should stipulate criminal or administrative responsibility for knowingly groundless registration in psychiatric records and for disclosing information about a person's mental state.

For a long time, the negative legal situation that has taken shape and exists in Soviet psychiatry to this day, having received broad public response, and the absence of actions or even of publicly expressed intentions on the part of the leadership of this sector of medicine concerning its radical change evoke not only perplexity, but also serious alarm. Today the problem is taking on a new aspect, because the Soviet Union must urgently and conscientiously fulfill the requirements of the Final Document of the Vienna meetings of representatives of states that participated in the 15 January 1989 Conference on European Security and Cooperation. According to this document, the USSR has taken upon itself the responsibility of protecting citizens from psychiatric practices which violate human rights and freedoms, and of taking effective steps to prevent such practices and punish for them.

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THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: TRENDS AND CONTRADICTIONS

Foreign Policy: Continuing the Discussion

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[Article by Andrey Kortunov, head of department, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the U.S. and Canada, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] In the final documents of the 28th Party Congress, relatively little space was devoted to international questions. Indeed, in the discussion that developed at the congress itself, these questions were not often raised, leaving in the shadows sharp debates on the problems of the economy and the state system, on history and intra-party life.

Such placement of the accent is entirely understandable. First, it is hardly necessary to prove to anyone that the fate of our country at the current turning-point is being decided, above all, within it itself. Second, against the background of crisis phenomena within the Soviet Union, our international affairs seem favorable on the whole. In five years, we have managed not only to open up many dead-ends from politics of the previous era, not only to move forward in solving a number of practical

problems, but also rapidly to change the entire international community's concept of the goals and methods of USSR foreign policy activity.

Nonetheless, there is still a need for broad discussion of our foreign policy problems. This is not just because there have been some achievements in this area in the past five years. Discussion of the basic directions of USSR foreign policy strategy, of the role of the Soviet Union in the contemporary and future world is also extremely important for answering the fundamental questions of who we are on this planet and where we are going, what makes us unique, and what is our involvement with mankind, our contribution to its fate?

In discussing the question of what role the USSR should play in the modern world, it is a question above all of the position of our country—real, as well as desired—in the system of world economic, political and diplomatic, military, ideological, cultural and other relations, as well as of the historically changing image of its actions in this system. Concepts about the specific nature of Soviet society, about its interrelations with other ethnic, socio-political, and historical structures hold an important place.

The first difficulty that inevitably arises in attempts to determine the role of any state in the world arena is the choice of parameters for its international influence: direct influence on events in international life, or including a mediated influence on long-term processes occurring in the world. Is it a question only of the conscious activity of a state, or should we take into account the spontaneous influence of an entire society, often not coinciding with the goals of state policy? In general, how do we determine the correlation of the international role to a society's inner potential and possibilities?

In my opinion, it is appropriate to single out three forms of influence by the USSR on world social relations.

First, the USSR influences the foreign environment directly through its foreign and domestic policy. This role is determined, on the one hand, by the real possibility of creating and maintaining military potential at a level, necessary for ensuring its political independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as the security of allies, and on the other hand—by the ability to draft and consistently implement a foreign policy based on the new, democratic principles, to implement the perestroika of international relations in a direction meeting the interests of the country.

Second, the USSR influences the world situation via its economic achievements (or failures). This role is determined by the capability (or incapability) of a society to ensure high and stable rates of economic development, to successfully compete with other societies in the sphere of scientific and technical progress, to ensure the effective mobilization of material resources for solving the most important problems, to minimize economic losses, etc.

Third, the Soviet Union influences the surrounding world through the force of its social example. In other words, our country's role lies in creating a certain "model" sociopolitical system, providing the maximum democratization of social life, the broadest participation of the population in managing state affairs, the most favorable conditions for overcoming the "alienation" of the individual in all his manifestations, and the assertion of humanism, justice and social equality in relations among people.

If we approach the question from abstract theoretical positions (as is most often done in our scientific and political literature), no contradictions whatsoever exist among these three forms of influence. Rather, they mutually supplement and enrich each other: social harmony creates prerequisites for successful economic development, a reliable and solid economy serves as a material basis for successful foreign and domestic policy, and foreign policy successes, in turn, facilitate the solution of urgent social and economic tasks. Thus, the foreign political, social and economic influence of the Soviet Union on events in the world strengthens, and the arsenal of means for such influence expands.

We would rejoice at this idyllic picture, of course, if it conformed to the real experience of our state. Unfortunately, this experience attests to something else. In its existence, the Soviet Union has not managed to achieve the proper "multidimensionality" of its role in the world: the concentration of efforts in one sphere was often accompanied by a weakening or loss of previous positions in other spheres. As a result, our country was perceived by the world, in turn, first as predominantly a "social challenge" to the West, then as a dynamic economic force, then above all as a military and political "superpower."

What causes such a situation? How come we have not achieved the necessary integration of our foreign policy strategy? The answer to this question is not simple. Let us examine some of the most important reasons.

The most obvious reason for the inability of any state to fulfill one or another function in the world is the shortage or absence of the necessary resources. As everyone knows, this circumstance has had the greatest influence on our country's role in the world during the first post-revolutionary years, essentially predetermining the "one-dimensionality" of this role. Could the new Russia, ruined by world and civil wars, by hunger and the sabotage of counterrevolutionaries, by emigration of the most educated segment of the population, by foreign intervention and the breakdown of economic relations with other countries, be considered a serious economic "challenge" to the West? Was it possible to speak of a military "challenge" from a state, forced to sign the humiliating, predatory Brest peace?

The only "challenge" that our country could throw to the West and the whole world then was the social challenge inherent in the very existence of Soviet power itself, of a

society built on fundamentally new, socialist grounds, a challenge promising the development of fairer and more humane social relations. Nonetheless, the historical significance of this challenge, despite its one-dimensional nature, should not be underestimated. Precisely it to a decisive degree contributed to the rapid development of social progress in the world.

Does the problem of resources exist for the Soviet Union today? It goes without saying, it does in the sense that our country, like any other, does not have unlimited resources for implementing certain functions in the international arena. We do not have the strength, for instance, to allocate aid to all developing countries, similar in scale to what we offer to Cuba or Vietnam. We also do not have the strength to maintain our armed forces at a size, superior in terms of number and technical parameters to the armies of all potential opponents taken together. Finally, even under the most favorable variants for implementing economic transformations in our country, it is hard to presume that the country in the foreseeable future will be able to surpass the leading states of the West in terms of labor productivity or standard of living.

However, it would be wrong to underestimate the material possibilities that our country now has at its disposal. Although of late we often hear about its economic problems, instead of its achievements, we must not forget that the Soviet Union was and remains the world's second industrial power, possessing a weighty potential for economic might, a very broad scientific and technical base, the richest reserves of natural resources, and enormous intellectual capital. Today, there are no reasons whatsoever preventing it from being actively included in the international division of labor, from overcoming (albeit not immediately, in the course of several decades) the lag behind the most developed states in the world in the economic regard. As far as defense capability is concerned, the Soviet Union proved its ability to achieve military and strategic parity with the United States and to preserve this parity, regardless of all attempts by militaristic circles in America to regain strategic superiority.

Thus, in our time the problem of material resources for the USSR is fundamentally different, than it was in the first years of Soviet power. It is not simply the existence of resources as such, but their most rational utilization, or in other words, the balancing of goals and means, of investments and dividends. However, this is no longer just a question of the existence of objective conditions, but of the subjective capability of using them, a question of the competence, scientific grounds, and comprehensive nature of the political course.

Another reason for deformation of a state's role in the world may be a direct foreign threat, especially in the event that opposition to it requires the full mobilization of forces, rejection of the achievement of other goals, and the sacrifice of all other interests. Our country has also passed this test. Understandably, without taking into

account the foreign threat factor, it would have been impossible to explain not only the international policy of the USSR in the 1930s or the first postwar decades, but also our domestic development in that period.

Of course, Stalinism as a social phenomenon has a highly complex genesis and cannot be defined by one reason alone. Its basic sources are of an objective and subjective domestic nature. However, it is also obvious that the constant and ever increasing pressure from without, the growing threat of world war, also played their role in the 1930s processes of deviation from the democratic gains of the revolution, deformation of the sociopolitical order in the USSR, in determining the priorities of economic development, of foreign political goals, and even in diplomatic practice itself. This threat and its perception by the political leadership of the country were the catalyst for accelerated industrialization, compulsory collectivization, the repressions of 1937-1938, the struggle against the "internal class enemy," spy-mania, suspiciousness, etc.

Precisely so, in the first postwar years the threat of a new world conflict, especially using nuclear weapons, unquestionably had a tremendous distorting influence on the role that the Soviet Union played in the world. Its social aspects were essentially ignored, the economic tasks were viewed as especially subordinate, and all efforts were aimed at achieving the established military and political goals. We can only guess how the world might have been today, what painful problems and conflicts we might have avoided, if immediately after the end of WWII the danger of its repetition in an even more vicious, nuclear variant had not appeared.

What is the situation with the military threat today? Does the danger of war (or, more broadly, the military threat to national security) serve as an objective reason, preventing our country from playing the role that it ought to play in the world. If we speak of the prospects for conscious development of a large-scale military conflict with the USSR (be it nuclear or non-nuclear), this threat seems the least likely at the present time and in the foreseeable future. Without going into an analysis of the numerous factors of restraint and self-restraint (military and technical, economic, social, political and psychological, and others, the significance of which has changed considerably in past decades), I limit myself to stating that today references to the "military threat," "hostile arms," the "complex international situation," etc. no longer serve as justification for deforming the role of the USSR in the international arena or as a grounds for preserving an artificial system of foreign policy priorities.

As far as the prospects for involvement of the USSR in various local conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin and Central America are concerned, it does not relate to the basic interests of the USSR either militarily or economically. Only ideological formulations in the spirit of a distorted interpretation of the principle of proletarian

internationalism ("we should help all anti-American forces"), not the interests of our security, could drag us into such conflicts.

Changes in the understanding of Soviet patriotism are also linked to the differences in defining the desired role of the USSR in the world of the future. The Stalinist, state-bureaucratic interpretation requires sparing no forces for the "sake of the state's prestige" and trying to make our flag, figuratively speaking, visible to the whole world. The other, social interpretation presumes something else: the correlation of foreign political goals with the needs both of all society, as well as of its individual components, right up to the interests of the individual person.

A social understanding of patriotism does not, of course, mean a narrow, pragmatic approach to foreign policy. It does not mean isolationism. As a great power, the USSR bears the burden of special responsibility and obligations, denial of which in the final account could also harm the development of Soviet society itself. It is a question of something else: the burden of these obligations should be feasible, yet the maximization of foreign policy influence should not become the goal in itself.

Presently, for the first time in the history of our country, the objective prerequisites have formed for balancing its international role. Obviously, the proper use of these prerequisites should be the basic element of USSR foreign policy activity in the 1990s.

In this regard, it seems to me, the 1990s will differ considerably from the 1980s. After all, in the final account, an important task of our foreign policy in the second half of the last decade was to destroy the obsolete mechanism of confrontation and the institutions and structures of the "Cold War," and to eliminate ideological myths. For this, the breadth of the new thinking, political courage, and the ability to fascinate world society was required. Today, fragments of the former era and the inertia of "traditional" approaches still remain, but nonetheless the world will never be the same as it was 5 years ago. Too much in it has changed irrevocably.

An enormous task faces us now, that of fulfilling the new, above all, positive and creative role of the Soviet Union in world politics. This task will inevitably be far more laborious and complex, than the destruction of the old. We need new tools, a new style, a new system of priorities. Where general slogans and appeals were sufficient before, we need proven political programs. Where it was a question of radical proposals of a global nature, gradual and goal-oriented actions are more appropriate. Where we appealed to all mankind before, now a subtle diplomatic maneuvering between various "centers of force" is necessary.

Consider, for instance, Eastern Europe. Of course, it took great political courage to decisively reject the traditional "paternalistic" relations with countries in the region, to proclaim the principle of free choice, and to accept the choices of the people of Eastern Europe.

However, today the task is more complex, although also more ordinary: to painstakingly and carefully form new structures for bilateral and multilateral communication, overcoming mistrust and sometimes even hostility, taking into account the subtlety of the political situation in each of the East European countries and their foreign political orientation, in this regard not forgetting about our own interests (the latter is especially important, since in the current decade we will compete ever more with Eastern Europe—for Western markets, investments, and orders. We have too much in common, both in our economic problems, as well as in our economic possibilities).

The perestroika occurring here and the transformations in the East European countries should create a more natural and solid basis for voluntary, mutually advantageous ties. However, the creation of such grounds is possible only through the synchronization of reforms in the USSR and in Eastern Europe.

It goes without saying, this lag relates to objective reasons. Above all, we must realize that Soviet society, due to its size and its ethnic, cultural and social diversity, is far more unwieldy, for instance, than Hungarian or Czechoslovak society. Differences in ethnic structure have special significance: whereas in a number of East European countries the growth of ethnic self-awareness plays a constructive, mobilizing role, in the USSR this process is generating numerous sharp conflicts.

It is also telling that state socialism, the administrative-command system, ideological dogmas and other attributes of Stalinism have far deeper roots in the USSR than in its Western neighbors. After all, Stalinism (including its "Brezhnev model") existed in the Soviet Union for more than 60 years, and in Eastern Europe—about 40 years. For us, Stalinism is our own creation, a monster that grew out of our native soil. For East Europeans, it is to a significant degree an item of forced import.

Meanwhile, mixed feelings of satisfaction, irritation and hope predominate in our perception of the dramatic 1989 events in Eastern Europe. Moderate supporters of reform are satisfied by the fact that these countries have started profound transformations, but are troubled by the "too" rapid and uncontrollable course of the reforms. The conservatives are irritated by the decline of the role of communists and the rapid turn of the East Europeans toward the West. "What is this!" some of them say. "We were the first, we pushed the East Europeans toward reform, and now some of them are already turning their backs on us." Of course, the revolutionary events on that side of the Soviet border are sparking a flood of impatience from the radicals and an aspiration to more rapidly follow their example in politics and economics. The soil is especially fertile for such impatience in regions of the USSR where the level of economic development and cultural traditions are similar to those in Eastern Europe.

It seems that emotions in the assessment of radical shifts in Eastern Europe should give way to sober analysis as quickly as possible. We must admit that the present-day turn of Eastern Europe toward the West is a historical inevitability, stipulated by objective economic and political factors. In fact, is it possible, for example, to demand that these states, as before, be oriented toward the USSR in their economic relations, regardless of the fact that we are in no condition to offer them effective assistance in modernizing their economies and, moreover, intend to reject low prices for Soviet raw materials and energy?

The greatest patience, caution and tact is necessary in order not, as before, to try to thrust our friendship on Eastern Europe, but to begin gradually to lay a foundation for new relations, free of the troubled legacy of the past and based not on ideology, but on common interests.

Let us not deceive ourselves: the world to come will not be a kingdom of universal harmony. The entire historical experience of mankind and the dialectic itself of development of international relations speak against this. In place of contradictions between the West and East, others will appear: between North and South, between integrated Europe and the "Pacific community," between multinational corporations and national states, between traditional values and the technocratic environment. There will also be contradictions, the possibility of which we do not even suspect today. Arguments, sharp conflicts between states, and outbreaks of left- and right-radicalism, international terrorism, economic inequality, and the pressure of the strong on the weak will all remain in the world of the future. The balance of interests, although mediated and with certain corrections, we must assume, will still for a long time be determined through the coarsest method—the overall correlation of forces.

It is another matter that the concept of "force" in international relations is changing quickly and irrevocably. Military might is losing its significance, not only on the global level, where nuclear arsenals have exceeded all conceivable scales of "super-destruction," but also on lower, religious levels, where the use of arms does not help to solve a single problem.

The significance of economic and technological elements of state "might" is growing sharply. Force, if it can be thus stated, is becoming more civilized and its application—not so destructive. In the world of the future, a network of 5 million personal computers connected to each other will mean far more than an army of 5 million. Ten thousand high-level managers will create a greater guarantee of security than 10,000 nuclear warheads. School reform will become no less important than a review of military doctrine. We must prepare ourselves for this new world.

For a long time, the status of our country in international affairs was assured mainly by its colossal military might. In addition, in the years of Stalinism, voluntarism, and

stagnation, the image of the first country of socialism lost its former attractiveness in many ways. The rest of the world long ago ceased to view the USSR either an example for imitation, or as a model for the future. Its growing lag behind other industrially developed countries in the most important fields of modern technology has been revealed. Illusions of the advantages of Soviet society in the sphere of humanizing social relations were destroyed long ago. In a great many parameters—in the structure of our economy, the supply of information equipment, life span, and general political culture—for a long time we have not even come close to the levels considered acceptable for a developed state.

Of course, it is hard to reconcile ourselves to the loss of former concepts of greatness. Especially when several generations have been raised in the conviction that their country is the ideal country, a model for all mankind. Gigantic sacrifices were made for the sake of this; we suffered inconceivable deprivations for this; the awareness of our responsibility to mankind supported us in the years of the most difficult trials. However, we must not deny the obvious.

We are faced with years and years of strained labor, the utmost concentration of efforts, in order, having realized the tremendous potential of perestroika, to give our country qualitatively new strength, to bring it among the most developed states, enabling it to acquire a new international status. Under these conditions, the question of the choice of partners and system of priorities becomes crucial.

Obviously, in the near future the international activity of our country will be carried out under an entirely new procedure for making political decisions. It is no secret that for the time being the process of democratizing the formation of our foreign policy is still in the starting stage. Many recent foreign policy "breakthroughs" had to do precisely with the fact that decisions were made at the very top, boldly and immediately, but without the extensive consultation of executive power with the law-makers, without public discussion.

Meanwhile, in the course of reforming the political system and creating a rule-of-law state, a real constitutional mechanism for practical and competent discussion of foreign policy problems and for making responsible decisions is being formed and established. The USSR Supreme Soviet and its Committee on International Affairs will perform these functions. The most important foreign policy decisions and programs should be discussed beforehand precisely here (and not approved after the fact). It is not ruled out that some "surprises" may appear in this regard. For instance, there is no complete certainty that consent will be easily secured from the Supreme Soviet on one or another item of the foreign aid allocations. I do not doubt that sooner or later reliable cooperation in the shaping of foreign policy will be established between the legislative and executive powers, but it would be naive, it seems, to assume that this will form very rapidly.

The passivity, for now still retained, of the Supreme Soviet in matters of foreign policy and its willingness to transfer all matters to the hands of individual committees are generating disillusionment. Really, is there not a danger that certain committees (above all, the Committee on Matters of Defense and State Security) could turn into various appendages of the respective departments, and would serve narrow group interests?

The tasks of the coming decade require us more realistically to approach the role of ideology in world politics. For the time being, despite all talk of the "de-ideologization" of inter-state relations, we often perceive the new thinking precisely as an ideology: we need only apply the principles of the new thinking and reject the old approaches, they say, and all problems—from the Near East conflict, to the "ozone hole" over Antarctica—will be resolved quickly and painlessly. However, is the problem really just that various leaders "do not understand" the principles of the new thinking and exist in the darkness of ignorance, and that we must persuade and educate them and bring them to the true path? Such a viewpoint would be non-Marxist, at the very least. Sometimes we overlook the fact that each country has its own, in many ways specific national and geopolitical interests, which dictate, above all, the logic of behavior of politicians.

In the public awareness, our obvious successes in foreign policy to a certain extent morally compensate for the crisis situation on the "domestic front:" even though things are not good in our economy, we lag behind in technology, and we have ruined nature and continue to ruin it, to make up for it the ice has broken in international affairs and, in the area of political thinking, we are ahead of everyone. Such a tactic can hardly operate successfully. The Soviet Union really is "fashionable" in the West: they are interested in us, listen to the speeches of our leaders, holding their breathes, and our newspapers and magazines enjoy popularity. A stream of foreign guests has rushed to us. All this is good. However, is it possible to build a long-term foreign political course on "fashion?"

I again emphasize: we are faced with living in a severe world, with proving our competence in a difficult struggle, with encountering powerful competitors (and not just the Americans and Japanese) on the world markets. The world will develop with or without our participation. Yet, if the Soviet Union shuts itself off again, if we place our social primacy in the main corner, as before, this will be fatal to us.

I assume that these remarks seem unfair to some with regard to Soviet foreign policy. After all, the last 4 years the international authority of the Soviet Union has grown considerably. We have strengthened our foreign policy positions, and the "image of the enemy" which had taken shape over decades is being undermined. Not as quickly as we would wish, but nonetheless economic, scientific and technical ties with the West are expanding. Mainly, a fundamentally different situation has taken

shape in the world. The "light at the end of the tunnel" has appeared; the foundations are being laid for the international relations of the 21st century.

One cannot but agree with this. However, precisely today it is extremely important not to let ourselves rest idle in international affairs. After all, the acquisition by the Soviet Union of its new role in the world of the future is only beginning. Sober analysis both of the successes, as well as the failures of our diplomacy, and a clear understanding of what politics is—the art of the possible, the constant correlation of the desired and the real—will also contribute to boosting the effectiveness of our foreign policy, to the growth of our country's prestige.

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The Most Difficult Job

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[Interview of Hans Schumacher, leader of representatives of the Friedrich Ebert Fund in Moscow, by N. Maslennikov]

[Text] [Maslennikov] You have been in the USSR for half a year now, observing the complex upheavals of social life. What new things have the documents of the 28th Congress added to your understanding of the problems of our society? Which ideas of M.S. Gorbachev's CPSU Central Committee political report are most interesting to you?

[Schumacher] Above all, the courage, decisiveness and merciless frankness and directness in the analysis of the situation in society made a great impression on me. As I assume, this is most proper today from the political viewpoint, because saying everything is the best prerequisite for true and successful policy.

It is also important to me that key points were disclosed in the Central Committee report, on which the struggle both in the party and in society is heading in different directions. It seems to me that this congress document is a good basis for future political discussions. It is structured so that it seems like an invitation to a dialogue, to consideration, independence and responsibility. I think the new, far-reaching steps in the democratization and humanization of Soviet society, outlined in the congress documents, are the most interesting, and not just for me. Development in this direction, unquestionably, is a most necessary prerequisite for economic improvement. Clearly, this is a very difficult matter. Social transformations do not happen overnight. They require time and, it goes without saying, encounter resistance.

Right now, M.S. Gorbachev has the most difficult job imaginable in the modern political world. It is incomparably more difficult to develop democracy, than to act within the framework of an administrative command system. After all, democracy presumes the expression of

the most varied opinions existing both in society and in the party. It is no longer a question of monolithic unity, but of association and consolidation on the basis of the decisions of the majority. This is difficult in itself. However, one must also consider the views of the minority. Naturally, this is also very painful.

The consistency with which M.S. Gorbachev intends to conduct the further process of perestroika, as the CPSU Central Committee political report indicated, also made a deep impression on me. There was not the slightest indication of ambiguity in his positions. They are clear, including to political opponents, who always exist in any democratic society.

[Maslennikov] There is a discussion in our party surrounding the programmatic goals. Many are questioning the definition of "humane, democratic socialism," saying that true socialism can be nothing other. What is your opinion on this?

[Schumacher] In the past, I think, along with a number of specific causes, an important contradiction of a theoretical nature was the ground for disputes between the communists and social democrats. The social democrats, in describing a socialist society, always did so only in a most general plane, stipulating that this picture of society is rather the ideal, not fully attainable here in our real world. Conversely, in the past, and indeed right now, the communists were distinguished by the certainty that a socialist society could be created, if the right means were used.

In my opinion, it is hard to imagine a socialist society as inhumane and undemocratic. It should be said that, for me, the criterion for such a society is not which form of ownership of the means of production prevails within it, but how people live in such a society. For me at least, a society in which the person becomes the subject of history, rather than the object, is socialist. The answer to the question of what specific prerequisites are necessary for this must be left to specific policy, determined by the specific situation existing in one or another country.

[Maslennikov] Some view the very name of the programmatic declaration of the congress, "For Humane, Democratic Socialism," as a clear shift of the party toward the positions of social democracy. How would you comment on this situation?

[Schumacher] Above all, I would like to say that if there is such ideological criticism, it attests precisely to the reality of the changes in society and the party. This may seem paradoxical, but the intensity and sharpness of criticism express precisely the fact that changes really are happening.

In addition, the critics of perestroika ought to have a more accurate concept of social democracy, which they often overestimate when interpreting it as a strict, completed world-outlook system. Social democracy differs from communism precisely in that it does not propose any such finished system. Almost all modern social

democratic parties, as opposed to the CPSU, are not world-outlook parties. This is the main point. As far as inter-party pluralism in the CPSU is concerned, it seems to me, it is leading not to social democracy, but quite simply to raising the effectiveness of the party as such. Discussion within the party is making it more viable, more intelligent. Under conditions of a multi-party system—and this is quite important—it is also significantly more attractive to the population than a party-monolith.

Taking into account this main difference (although it is impossible to rule out the chance that the situation might change in time), I would say that the CPSU is not a social democratic party. In the foreseeable future, I see no grounds for it becoming such. The problem, as I see it, is not what labels are attached to the CPSU. Your party is developing and, naturally, will continue to develop. The CPSU has its own traditions and history, to which it itself critically relates, and I know from my own party's experience how hard this work can be. However, I think the most important thing is not whether the party goes forward under an old or a new banner, but how it solves specific problems today.

[Maslennikov] What do you see as the main directions for modernizing social democratic and communist parties? Are there general problems which they should solve, naturally, each in its own way?

[Schumacher] First, let me note that modernization, in general, if you will, is the rule of action for any (including conservative) political party. Not one party in the world can live by its past alone, can adhere to old formulas. In this case, it will not be on top of new problems and will be doomed to fail in its most important task—transforming the society in which it functions.

Now, on general problems: indeed, they do exist. Their basis lies in the fact that the technical revolution in both social systems is leading to a differentiation of society. The working class that Marx wrote about no longer exists. All political parties ought to take this into account. I think, for social democracy, at least in Western Europe, the following problems are topical: to avoid the image of the party of the workers movement in the classical sense and to become that which were formerly called "popular parties." There is a trivial reason for this. If you speak of yourself only as a party of the classical industrial proletariat, you automatically lose the opportunity to speak in the name of the majority of society. The most important problem in this regard is representation of the interests of the working population. Its interests are differentiating and it is becoming increasingly harder to organize.

Another problem is the growing cultural diversity in West European countries. Under these conditions, there can be no unified social democratic interpretation of culture, or a unified cultural policy. Currently, social democracy is trying to work on this problem very intensely. We shall see how successful it is.

[Maslennikov] All the same, which main direction of modernization of the CPSU would you single out, proceeding from discussions at the congress?

[Schumacher] The main direction, in my view, is that the CPSU is starting to become a political party. The word "party" comes from the Latin "pars," meaning "part." Precisely a part, not all of society. If the millions of CPSU members manage consciously to accept this conclusion, this will become important, if not decisive, grounds for the successful development of Soviet society. I regard this as most important in the further modernization of the CPSU. A political party, functioning in a society, cannot encompass all aspects of it. It cannot be a synonym for society, just as it cannot be equivalent to the state. The new role which, as it seems to me from discussions at the congress, the CPSU has voluntarily chosen for itself may be very useful. Of course, this is both new and difficult. It is still necessary to find the appropriate intra-party instrument, making it possible to be not a community of believers, but a political organization fighting to achieve definite, openly announced goals.

[Maslennikov] In your view, has this process begun?

[Schumacher] I think so. There would not be such sharp discussion in the party and at the congress, if developments were not taking this direction. I can only repeat that this is a most difficult path. Possibly, other variants would be more comfortable for the party, but not, however, for society.

The traditions of the CPSU include the formulation of tremendous goals and tasks. The task now: if there is really to be democracy—then it must be absolute democracy. It seems to me that the citizens of the Soviet Union should be more patient toward their country. The more so since, despite all the most urgent problems, rooted in the past, a great deal has been achieved in the last 5 years, particularly in social development. I understand that many processes, as it seems to the people, are happening too slowly, especially in the economy and social policy. However, it cannot be said that nothing has happened, the more so nothing positive. Much has been achieved, and in a relatively short period of time. I even get the impression that a significant part of the criticism of the state today is caused by a poor memory of what you had in the past.

[Maslennikov] Probably, the speeds of democratization of the party and of society are different. Should democratization of the party outstrip democratization of society?

[Schumacher] What do you mean by the word democratization?

[Maslennikov] Let us say, the capability of reaching a consensus.

[Schumacher] The broader and larger a party, the more abstract and washed-out such a consensus objectively should be. If the party claims to represent all large segments of society, it is doomed to an extraordinarily abstract

formula for such a consensus. The smaller the party, the more specific the consensus and the more easily consensus is reached. One must consider that there is by no means less diversity of opinions in the USSR, than in other countries. As opposed to the past, only now is it receiving expression. Incidentally, the positive nature of the changes of past years is also displayed in this.

Being able to reach a consensus in politics is a very difficult matter. As a rule, it is achieved on the basis of a program of principles which by their nature, of course, should be sufficiently abstract, as well as on the basis of specific political courses in different spheres (from taxes to foreign policy). In this regard, the path to consensus is discussion, which also makes the party an effective and powerful political force.

Democracy, however, is a broader concept. As applied to a party, it includes the way in which the rights of its members are protected, in what manner the minority does not dominate over the majority in its structure, the fact that the a party's opinion on one or another issue is formed from the bottom up, and many other things.

[Maslennikov] In the programmatic declaration, one of the goals of the CPSU was stated as overcoming the historical schism in the workers movement. Did the congress give impetus to new steps in this direction?

[Schumacher] If by overcoming the schism you mean some kind of organizational association, today this can scarcely be a goal. Just as turning communist parties into social democratic parties or vice versa cannot be the goal. The fact that we have not been beating each other to death for several years now is already a tremendous and desirable success. It is clear that we are treating each other far more amicably than in the past. Naturally, the programmatic declaration of the congress strengthens the current situation, in which the "image of the enemy" is not poisoning the atmosphere between communists and social democrats.

In my view, the programmatic declaration passed by the congress is a document which is very useful for the further development of relations between both currents of the socialist movement in the contemporary world. Unquestionably, this is an important step in a positive direction.

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REVIEWS AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES. INFORMATION

To Know Oneself: On the New Journal CHELOVEK

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[Review by V. Romashov, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[Text] The concept of the journal took shape long ago and with difficulty. Every year, the need for it became

more pressing. It was awaited in a time when, hidden behind the loud slogan "everything in the name of man," no one was truly interested in real people. It was awaited when the switch was planned from the rather abstract "human factor" of the first years of perestroika to the real individual, to his vital goals and needs. The new journal, the first issue of which has just gone out to the readers, certainly may be a publication in mass demand, although its first printing was small: 15,000 copies.

However, it has a fairly promising niche in our periodical system. After all, until now there has not been one popular scientific publication in the country, devoted specially and exclusively to humanitarian problems, to the issues of humanizing social relations, to revealing the creative, moral potential of the individual under conditions of renovating socialism. There is not a single general humanitarian, interdisciplinary periodical publication, in whose pages specialists from all fields of knowledge, joined by the common name of sciences of man, would be equally represented. The journal CHELOVEK is the organ of the USSR AS Presidium All-Union Center for Sciences on Man, a scientific institution which was organized last year and has an unusual task. The journal is called on to fill these important gaps. It will be published bimonthly. Its editorial board, which includes noted representatives of philosophy, biology, history, economics, sociology, genetics, physics, mathematical modeling and medicine, as well as writers and leaders in the arts, attests to the breadth of the combined efforts in studying the human problems that the journal will cover.

However, the journal's broad scope may unwittingly generate doubts. The social sciences, which have seriously discredited themselves in past decades, the humanitarian sciences, and the years-long chronic separation between words and actions, between intentions and the true state of affairs, have generated a persistent mistrust of loud declarations and promises. After all, nothing more nor less than an attempt to guess at the eternal secret of man, concealed within him himself, is being undertaken here. What is this, a knowingly unrealizable intention to comprehend the incomprehensible? Let us look at the first issue.

Purely outwardly, it is of high quality, a tastefully illustrated and printed, compact booklet of slightly over 200 pages. The rubric titles immediately help assess the editors' strategic concept: "Human Studies: History, Theory, Methodology," "Humanitarian Expert Analysis," "The Individual and Power," "A Human Face," "Man in World Religions," "From the Funds of Culture," and "What is the Last Century Preparing for Us? The 19th-21st Centuries." Each of the rubrics, as well as the materials published in them, of course, could very well be included in some other publication. However, gathered together and combined in the search for an answer to the question "what is man?," they take on a different quality and become fragments of a whole

canvas. They reveal different perspectives, levels and essences of human existence.

Traditionally, literature and art have addressed man as a unique personality. Science, guided by its own principle of knowing the world, the principle of objectivity, with its inevitable narrow specialization of research, does not easily attain knowledge of the integral nature of human subjectivity. However, in our recent past even modest attempts were often cut short due to considerations far removed from science. Judging by the first issue and the editors' stated plans, the journal is trying to gather the grains of scientific knowledge about man, scattered throughout history in the layers of the separate sciences, which are, it seems, fairly far removed from each other, as well as in literature and art.

However, if the journal were to publish only scientific studies, no matter how important or even exciting they might be, it would still be a question of just another traditional publication. CHELOVEK strives to be something more for the reader.

Knowing the nature of man is a unique process. Each person participates in it in his own way and in terms of his own strengths, regardless of his profession. Here, it is not enough to have only a group of the select, studying the question of man through the researcher's duty, and an audience interested in scientific achievements in order to expand its horizons. There cannot be information alone here: the indispensable participation of each person in the process of individual realization of the enigma of his own existence. Therefore, the journal does not merely talk about things. It strives, in my opinion, not without success, to show and to let one feel the entire multifaceted nature of human existence. It seeks an echo in the readers' hearts, assisting them in the extremely complex and highly necessary inner work of self-knowledge, of shaping one's own personality. Apparently, the most serious obstacle to man's realization of his own freedom and uniqueness, of everything that we include in the concept of "man," is the deep-rooted dogmatism in thoughts and feelings, the pressure on the awareness of the conditions of life and of the reigning concepts as the only possible ones. Most of the journal's authors, well-known or otherwise, see their "super-task" in promoting the destruction of stereotypes and myths, in helping the reader see the splendid and unique world around and within himself. In my opinion, this task is well done in the articles of this issue, such as, for instance, those by academicians A.A. Bayev, "Keys to the Code: On the 'Human Genome' Program," and N.N. Moiseyev, "The Russian Choice," or by the Volokolamskiy and Yuryevskiy Metropolitan Pitirim, "Body, Spirit, Conscience."

The journal is discussion-oriented. One almost never encounters instructive sermons or expositions of "already established truths," which one can only accept or reject. It shows everything in comparison, in interaction. Assessments of human existence are correlated (see "Diary of a Genius" by S. Dali; "The Infallibility of the

Clergy. Notes on Salvador Dali" by D. Orwell; and "Great Salvador" by O. Kandaurov). The views of people from different eras (the rubric "What Is the Last Century Preparing for Us?") and different types of world views (the rubric "Man in World Religions") are compared. CHELOVEK is designed to be an illustrated sociopolitical and popular scientific journal, but I would add that it is also a literary and artistic journal, breaking the existing stereotype of academic popular scientific publications.

The sense of the complexity and multifaceted nature of man's problems is strengthened by the inclusion of materials, contrasting both in terms of statistics, as well as in form (a diary, interview, article, essay, story, novel and poetry). This polyphony of genres helps the journal's creators use words especially cautiously, to avoid chattering and, thus, destruction of the hidden meaning in the concepts.

Among the successes of the first issue, let us note the broad and impressive rubrics: "The Human Face," "My Interlocutor," and "The Last Word." In "The Last Word" section, under the title "A Russian Lyre of Life and Death: The 20th Century," there is a selection of poems by A. Annenskiy, I. Bunin and V. Bryusov. Perhaps, under these rubrics the specific nature of the journal, that which makes it unlike any other such publication, is displayed with the greatest strength. This special feature is its aspiration to show man in his uniqueness, which is also manifested in the fact that the "trifles of life" have traditionally been considered unimportant: habits, whims, mistakes, delusions, etc. However, precisely personal traits, for instance, the neatly printed letters in the manuscript "Roman NEP" [Novel of the NEP] by folk artist Ivan Nikiforov (under the rubric "Original") and the grammatical mistakes, reproduced in facsimile, as well as the author's clever drawings, accompanying the text, give the materials the warmth of interaction, a sense of the presence of a living person.

Man's multidimensionality cannot be understood and expressed, for instance, by the means of one science or art alone. That which has long been called the "comprehensive approach" is needed, in fact often turning into an eclectic mix of different methods, interpretations and reading points. The journal seeks a way to show man truly comprehensively (no matter how lifeless this word sounds), not simply comparing different visions and interpretations of his problems, but intertwining them, animating them with the warmth of human existence.

The journal CHELOVEK was born of perestroika and, unquestionably, has a great deal to offer. It can intensify the human measurement of socialism and enrich our lives with eternal humanistic values.

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CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY. INFORMATION

Review of Published Materials

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[Review by A. Vasilyev and M. Krans]

[Text]

Where To Hurry and Where Not To Hurry

The problem of resolving the ecological and socioeconomic crises which have arisen in Kalmykiya and the Aral area were the topics of articles in KOMMUNIST: "Stalemate" (No 16, 1989) and "Aral: Solution Options" (No 2, 1990). What has been done lately?

An interdepartmental commission, headed by Academician A. Aganbegyan, developed a concept for the socioeconomic development of the Kalmyk ASSR and the adjacent areas. It was recently discussed by the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium. The basic idea contained in this document can be formulated as follows: to struggle not with the consequences but the reasons of the catastrophe which resulted from an erroneous economic strategy; in order to improve the ecological situation, it is necessary radically to change the entire socioeconomic way of life.

Priority is given to the task of surmounting the currently existing contradictions within the "nature-economy-population system. So far, the central element of this triad was primary and in order to accommodate it one could ban nomad animal husbandry (since a nomad life, it was claimed, was inconsistent with a socialist way of life) formulate excessively stressed plans and make people grow grain in the steppes and semi-desert areas of the Northern Caspian area. The program formulated by the scientists presumes the abandonment of extensive and outlay-based development of the national economy, converting the conservation of resources into a decisive factor of economic growth, making the tasks of the industrial and agrarian sectors consistent with the natural possibilities of the area and turning to relatively simple, reliable and safe means of the utilization of nature, reviving the traditional farming methods, and creating small enterprises with full-cycle processing of agricultural raw materials. Paying particular attention to the strengthening of the social trend of the economy, the concept asserts that only that which contributes to the growth of the well-being and the protection of human health and does not cause irreparable damage to nature can be advantageous.

Naturally, this is merely the first step and now the scientists have had their say.

As to the Aral area, we cannot as yet speak of any whatsoever universally accepted concept. We even lack a full picture of the situation in the area. The Aral problem

is being studied by tens of departmental and academic institutes, both Union and republic. Public organizations are also engaged in independent research. Symposiums and conferences are being held and substantial funds are being spent. However, the researchers are dispersed and the work itself, as a rule, is strictly specialized and unrelated through a unified plan. An initial attempt to coordinate such activities was found in the decision to create, in accordance with the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers of 1988 (familiar to all who are involved, one way or another, with this problem, as Resolution No 1110) an Institute of Ecology and Water Problems of the Aral Sea Basin, in Nukus. According to many scientists, this turned out to be a more or less unsuccessful option, for Karakalpakiya lacks the necessary conditions to this effect. It has insufficient scientific potential and it would be hardly possible to expect that leading specialists from other cities in the country would rush here.

By the end of last year the Aral Scientific Research Coordination Center was set up. It was hoped that, finally, it would be able to rally the efforts of the different institutes. The plan was to set up temporary scientific collectives, to formulate all alternative concepts with the help of the best Soviet and foreign sociologists, economists, demographers, ecologists and geographers, and to finance the most interesting projects on a competitive basis. For the time being, however, all of this remains no more than a pious intention. The reality is the following: despite all efforts on the part of its organizers, the center's legal status and range of obligations remain undefined and the promised millions have been reduced to 500,000. Yet one of the main tasks of "Aral" was to open a branch in Nukus which meant establishing a base for that same institute. It was on this that most of the appropriated funds were spent while the remaining funds, which amounted to insignificant subsidies, were scattered among republic institutes. In other words, actually nothing essentially new was created.

Nonetheless, it is obvious that it is impossible to undertake the resolution of the problem of the Aral area without a clear long-term program. The USSR Council of Ministers passed a resolution on sponsoring a competition for the development of an Aral concept. This document deserves particular attention, for it is a question not of a purely academic intellectual competition but of formulating a strategy for the development of a huge area.

What is the main objective set to the participants in the competition? As in the past, it is reduced to the restoration of the Aral Sea. The first variant of the plan even named a specific date which was, naturally, the year 2000! All of this would be during a time when we would be unable not only to increase the flow of water into the Aral but even to stabilize the present level. Without getting into the details, let us merely mention that in order to implement such a "governmental order," according to Doctor of Geographic Sciences N. Glazovskiy, we should annually pump into that sea 85 cubic

kilometers of water, i.e., nearly 10 times more than is stipulated even in said Resolution No 1110 (incidentally, even the 8.7 cubic kilometers it calls for cannot be found with the present water utilization system).

Is it simply a matter of water? Could the Aral, restored to its former size (even assuming that this were possible!) restore the health of the people and increase their life span, lower infant mortality and change the archaic farming system? The feeling develops that the stipulation of "taking into consideration the interconnection of social, ecological and economic processes" is included in the resolution as no more than a concession to fashion. All in all, we find in this the same old "Ministry of Water Resources" approach.

Hardly anyone will start to object that the salvation of the Aral must be undertaken and that decisive measures must be taken to prevent desertification, salinization and soil erosion. However, it is just as obvious that the resolution of economic and technological problems should not replace the main thing: radically improving the living conditions of the local population. This could hardly be possible if everything is reduced to a purely mathematical increase in the number of hospitals and schools or a certain reduction in the areas planted in cotton.

We need a "perestroyka of the socioeconomic structures of the area and a conversion to a balanced and stable development, which presumes the implementation of an active demographic policy and intensification of the national economy," i.e., the modernization of the area. It is precisely thus that the participants in the international roundtable, which took place last April in Aralsk, formulated the strategy for action. Scientists and governmental and social figures from the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, along with foreign experts, supported the suggestion formulated at the Shavat Meeting (described in our journal) on the use in the Aral area of new forms of regional management and farming, specifically the organization of a separate socioeconomic zone here.

Defining the optimal trends of modernization is a complex and responsible matter. Various options require extensive work which must be preceded by a serious study of public opinion in the Aral area. In general, such studies should become the rule: first determine what the population wants and what social consequences could result from one decision or another and only then formulate it as a resolution or a law.

Let us note in this connection that the governmental commission suggested that concepts relative to the Aral be submitted by 1 September. Considering the scattered nature and limited trend of studies currently conducted, it would be difficult to assume that such projects would take fully into consideration the interests of each of the ethnic groups inhabiting the area. Would the result not be a document which would either be totally impractical or else (if implemented) could even worsen the crisis?

We believe that it is precisely in that case that haste is harmful. Extreme concern is obviously needed about something else: providing emergency aid to the local population, supplying it with good quality water and food, and organizing medical services on a modern level. So far, even these emergency measures stipulated in the 1988 resolution are being implemented extremely unsatisfactorily. Most of the resources are being shifted, as in the past, to the production area while problems related to the living conditions of the people are being resolved on the basis of the residual principle.

Here is another circumstance. Under the conditions of the lack of socially and economically substantiated programs, the chances increase of reviving the "projects of the century." Although the press may have held a memorial service for the variant suggested by the Ministry of Water Resources, this option still has a number of supporters on a great variety of levels. In a letter to the editors, Doctor of Economic Sciences S. Bobylev shares his impressions from a meeting of the governmental commission for the Aral: "The general theme of the speeches of the participants was the accelerated doom of the sea, the inefficient nature of the steps being taken and the impasse developed by the present situation. Hence the conclusion that it is necessary to return to the plans for increasing the water resources in the Aral area. This involved the old plans of transferring some of the stock of Siberian rivers and relatively recent yet virtually similar suggestions of building a canal from the Caspian Sea as well as entirely exotic projects of artificially promoting precipitation from clouds, with the help of airplanes, or increasing the stock of Central Asian rivers by 'covering in black' the surface of the glaciers which feed them."

Well, the heirs of the Ministry of Water Resources are ready, starting immediately, to spend more tens of billions of rubles by moving into the Aral Sea armadas of excavators. Their logic is known: fill the Aral with effluent waters (as was the case with the "Kalmyk variant"—fill with sand the saline solution of the Volga-Chogray Canal) and all ecological, economic and social problems will be resolved. It would be naive to believe that the people are being simply misled. Actually, the implementation of their plans would mean preserving the existing farming system oriented toward the sheep, the single-crop structure of the economy, and the old management methods. Slowness in providing decisions to pressing contemporary problems only strengthens their hopes that this may lead to the further aggravation of the situation in the area and thus become the definitive argument in favor of the Ministry of Water Resources' panacea.

We find it difficult to understand how the approach based on a socially oriented economy could be specifically refracted in our plans and projects. How can we convert from "turning the rivers" to turning to man?"

The "map of the gravest ecological situations," which was charted by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute

of Geography, marks the Kalmyk and Aral territories in a single color: red. This is used to indicate areas in which natural catastrophes are being combined with an extremely difficult socioeconomic situation. Kalmykiya and the Aral area are no more than two "hot spots" on this map. Meanwhile, in our country, such hot spots already number 290!

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